The Leadership Assumptions of American Statesmen during the Federal Convention and Ratification debates 1787-1789 by Gerdes, Darin L
  
 
 
 
THE LEADERSHIP ASSUMPTIONS OF AMERICAN STATESMEN DURING THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION AND RATIFICATION DEBATES, 
1787-1789 
 
  
 Submitted to Regent University School for Leadership Studies  
In partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in Organizational Leadership  
 
 
DARIN LAYTON GERDES 
MAY 2003  
 
 
 
 
 ii
 
 
 iii
Abstract 
This study sought to ascertain and analyze the leadership assumptions of American 
Statesmen during the Constitutional Convention and ratification debates. The researcher 
examined the primary source public debates from 1787-1789. This study identified the 
Statesmen’s view of leadership, which emerged from their writings and debates. Their 
assumptions were classified into assumptions on the nature of man, the nature of power, 
the nature of the people, the nature of government, and the nature of society. The 
Statesmen’s views were then compared and contrasted to contemporary leadership 
literature using Bass’s (1990) framework in his Handbook of Leadership. 
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is a scholarly “thank-you” note to these men who still rule from the grave.  
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CHAPTER I  
Background 
 
 The American Statesmen, who directed America’s course from 1787-1789, 
labored diligently to deliver to posterity a stable government with the greatest measure of 
liberty and prosperity known to mankind. This was their primary purpose as they framed 
the constitution. As James Madison expressed in Federalist 14, “Posterity will be 
indebted for the possession, and the world for the example, of the numerous innovations 
displayed on the American theatre, in favor of private rights and public happiness” 
(Hamilton, Madison, & Jay, 1789/1996, p. 154).  
The British, from whom America inherited its legal system, acknowledged the US 
Constitution as the most advanced instrument in the establishment of rights and liberties 
that the world had known. Prime Minister William Pitt, the Younger, a contemporary of 
the American Statesmen, called the US Constitution the, “pattern for all future 
Constitutions and the admiration of all future ages” (Charleton, Ferris, & Ryan, 1986, p. 
85). Likewise, W.E. Gladstone (1878), one of the most esteemed British Prime Ministers, 
praised the American Constitution saying: “As the British Constitution is the most subtle 
organism which has proceeded from the womb and long gestation of progressive history, 
so the American Constitution is, so far as I can see, the most wonderful work ever struck 
off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man” (p. 264). 
The Constitution was not developed in a vacuum. It was created by men who held 
particular beliefs about the world around them. Nearly 150 years before Lord Acton was 
born, these Statesmen understood his famous dictum: “Power tends to corrupt, and 
absolute power corrupts absolutely” (as cited in Fears, 1887/1986, p. 383). These 
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Statesmen would translate their realistic picture of man into a durable system of 
government. Thomas Jefferson, author of the Declaration of Independence would write, 
“In questions of power, let us hear no more of trust in men, but bind them down from 
mischief with the chains of the Constitution” (as cited in Stedman & Lewis, 1987, p. 
261). 
Statesmen of all political stripes shared the assumption that leaders would do evil 
if they could. However, these assumptions were not original to the American Founding 
Fathers. The Scriptures speak to the issue of personal characteristics requisite for 
leadership. In Old Testament Israel, the law bound down political leaders such as judges 
and kings. Judges were to “judge the people fairly . . . not pervert justice or show 
partiality . . . . not accept a bribe, for a bribe blinds the eyes of the wise and twists the 
words of the righteous” (Deuteronomy 16:18-19, New International Version). A king:  
must be from among your own brothers. . . . The king, moreover, must not acquire 
great numbers of horses for himself . . . He must not take many wives, or his heart 
will be led astray. He must not accumulate large amounts of silver and gold. . . . 
he is to write for himself on a scroll a copy of this law . . . and not consider 
himself better than his brothers. (Deuteronomy 17:14-20) 
 
In the New Testament, the Apostle Paul laid down rules for elders and deacons. 
Leaders in the church were to be men of character1. An elder: 
must be above reproach, the husband of but one wife, temperate, self-controlled, 
respectable, hospitable, able to teach, not given to drunkenness, not violent but 
gentle, not quarrelsome, not a lover of money. He must manage his own family 
well and see that his children obey him with proper respect . . . . He must not be a 
recent convert, or he may become conceited and fall under the same judgment as 
the devil. He must also have a good reputation with outsiders, so that he will not 
fall into disgrace and into the devil's trap. (I Timothy 3:2-7)  
                                                 
1 Webster (1828) defines character as: The peculiar qualities, impressed by nature or habit on a person, 
which distinguish him from others; these constitute real character, and the qualities which he is supposed to 
possess, constitute his estimated character, or reputation.  Hence we say, a character is not formed, when 
the person has not acquired stable and distinctive qualities 
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Similar character was expected of deacons:   
Deacons, likewise, are to be men worthy of respect, sincere, not indulging in 
much wine, and not pursuing dishonest gain. They must keep hold of the deep 
truths of the faith with a clear conscience. They must first be tested; and then if 
there is nothing against them, let them serve as deacons. . . . A deacon must be the 
husband of but one wife and must manage his children and his household well. (I 
Timothy 3:8-12) 
 
Leaders in the Scripture were neither above the law, nor given divine rights. They 
were under the same law as the people, as noted by Elazar and Cohen (1985) and Wines 
(1997). Biblical leaders were under the law, precisely because they were human and were 
subject to all of the natural, often destructive, tendencies that are common to man. The 
book of Proverbs is replete with leadership assumptions. The Statesmen incorporated 
these ideas as they debated about government. Appendix B documents the Proverbs that 
deal with leadership, specifically, they discuss righteousness, justice, corruption, the 
oppression of the poor, and self-government. The American Statesmen of the 
constitutional era were aware of these lessons as they formed the Constitution.  
Statement of the Problem 
Why is it important to understand the assumptions about leadership held by 
American Statesmen during the Constitutional era? In any given political debate, the 
Founding Fathers are invoked to support both sides of the same issue. This is often done 
by taking isolated quotations and using them to proof-text the issue, thereby blessing that 
particular agenda with the words of the founders. This is intellectually dishonest and it 
mocks the men who pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor for our 
liberty (Declaration of Independence, 1776). 
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While a great deal has been written on the Founding Fathers and their view of the 
system of government (e.g., checks and balances), very little has been written about their 
view of leadership. Leadership studies, as an academic discipline, has developed a large 
quantity of literature. Yet, as a student of the Founding Fathers, the researcher found 
inconsistency in the contrasting assumptions between these contemporary leadership 
theorists and the presuppositions held by the American Statesmen during the 
Constitutional era.  
Many contemporary theories hold a high or progressive view of human nature in 
contrast to the low view that the Statesmen held. Hamilton summarized this low view 
when he wrote, “To judge from the history of mankind, we shall be compelled to 
conclude that the fiery and destructive passions of war reign in the human breast with 
much more powerful sway than the mild and beneficent sentiments of peace” (Federalist 
34, p. 251). Yet, the Statesmen were balanced realists who sought the best in man while 
factoring in their limitations. Madison wrote, “As there is a degree of depravity in 
mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other 
qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence” 
(Federalist 55, p. 378). The researcher became interested in the harmony or dissonance 
between these two groups. 
Contemporary leadership literature is preoccupied with business dynamics such as 
flexibility, efficiency, and customer satisfaction. In contrast, the Statesmen were 
concerned with matters of justice, power and the prevention of tyranny. Where the 
current leadership literature focuses largely on playing and winning the game of business, 
the Statesmen were concerned with setting up the rules. Contemporary leadership theory 
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rests on a fundamentally different base--largely humanistic social science. It naturally 
leads to different conclusions than those of the Statesmen who were trained in history, the 
classics, and Christian Theology. 
The literature suggests that the Statesmen’s assumptions about leadership were 
quite advanced for their time-period. They built on the shoulders of past political 
philosophers, but they deviated just enough to avoid repeating many of the historical 
errors of Europe. They had the additional advantage of a British legal heritage that 
inculcated individual rights and the rule of law.  
How do their ideas compare to contemporary leadership theories? Contemporary 
leadership theories expand our understanding of leadership. Yet, leadership theorists do 
not agree on simple definitions, or the assumptions upon which their theories rest. Spin 
and equivocation of terms compound this difficulty in our postmodern society. For 
example, as President Clinton’s impeachment trial was just beginning, the Democratic 
National Committee Chairman, Steve Grossman said, “You have demonstrated, at least in 
my adult lifetime, a higher commitment to the kind of moral leadership that I value in 
public service, in public policy, than any person that I have ever met” (as cited in 
Connolly, 1998). Grossman apparently has a very different conception of moral 
leadership than the Statesmen held.  
Such modern redefinition may lead to a greater problem when new concepts are 
applied to the original structure. By replacing the Statesmen’s original meanings with 
modern ideas, it is quite possible to undermine critical assumptions that could threaten 
the entire system.  
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The researcher was first fascinated by this concept years ago when he read 
Covey’s (1989) Seven Habits of Highly Effective People. In the text, Covey wrote: 
As my study took me back through 200 years of writing about success, I noticed a 
startling pattern emerging in the content of the literature. Because of our own 
pain, and because of similar pain I had seen in the lives and relationships of many 
people I had worked with through the years, I began to feel more and more that 
much of the success literature of the past 50 years was superficial. It was filled 
with social image consciousness, techniques and quick fixes--with social band-
aids and aspirin that addressed acute problems and sometimes even appeared to 
solve them temporarily, but left the underlying chronic problems untouched to 
fester and resurface time and time again.  
 
In stark contrast, almost all the literature in the first 150 years or so focused on 
what could be called the character ethic. As the foundation of success--things like 
integrity, humility, fidelity, temperance, courage, justice, patience, industry, 
simplicity, modesty, and the Golden Rule. (p. 18)  
 
Purpose of the Study  
This study seeks to ascertain what assumptions American Statesmen, during the 
Constitutional era, held about leadership. What was realistically expected of the men who 
would govern our land? These assumptions are revealed in records of public debates, 
pamphlets, and other primary source documents. The 18th century assumptions they used 
to create the system supports the 18th century structure, which was built for posterity.  
The primary reason for this study is the dearth of information on the American 
Statesmen’s views on leadership. While the Constitution has been widely written about 
for over 200 years, this particular question has rarely been addressed. Most writers have 
focused on the organizational checks and balances, or the continuity (or lack of 
continuity) from the revolution to the constitution. Those who write about the Founding 
Fathers tend to write about their personalities, or their economic interests.  
Only a few writers have even attempted to deal with Founding Fathers’ views on 
leadership. Yet, these authors started with leadership theories and then worked their way 
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back to the actions of the Founding Fathers to see if they worked in teams or personally 
led from the front (Phillips, 1997).  
Instead of imposing a contemporary academic theory upon the American 
Statesmen of the constitutional era, the researcher seeks to identify their assumptions 
about leadership. The study follows the example of Napoleon Hill who was 
commissioned by Dale Carnegie to study the great men of industry to create a new 
philosophy of wealth. Hill did not set out to prove a particular theory of wealth, but 
simply to interview successful men and find out what they believed. The success formula 
that emerged from Hill’s (1960) research was later published as the best seller, Think and 
Grow Rich. According to Hill, Carnegie, “Believed the formula should be taught in all 
public schools and colleges, and expressed the opinion that if it were properly taught it 
would so revolutionize the entire educational system that the time spent in school could 
be reduced to less than half” (p. 14). In the same way, the researcher seeks to uncover the 
philosophical underpinnings of leadership held by these American Statesmen by 
examining the record that they left to their posterity.   
Objectives 
The aim of this study is threefold. First, this study will identify the assumptions 
on leadership held by early American Statesmen. It will uncover who they considered to 
be leaders, what the Statesmen expected of leaders and what they believed the leader 
normatively should or should not do.  
The Statesmen were preparing a system strong enough to withstand any assault, 
even one from within. As Hamilton explained, “The principal purposes to be answered by 
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union are these--the common defense of the members; the preservation of the public 
peace as well against internal convulsions as external attacks” (Federalist 23, p. 199). 
Second, this study will relate the assumptions of the Statesmen through the 
perspective of the philosophers that the Statesmen would have read and subsequent 
historians’ estimates of the philosophers. Finally, the researcher will compare the 
Statesmen’s assumptions to leadership literature. 
Significance of the Study 
This study will fill a gap in the literature by examining and documenting the 
Statesmen’s view of leadership. The Constitution was created by men who held specific 
beliefs, that influenced the system they created. As the late Francis A. Schaeffer 
(1968/1976/1982) explained:  
There is a flow to history and culture. This flow is rooted and has its wellspring in 
the thoughts of people. People are unique in the inner life of the mind--what they 
are in their thought-world determines how they act. This is true of their value 
systems and it is true of their creativity. It is true of their corporate actions, such 
as political decisions, and it is true of their personal lives. The results of their 
thought-world flow through their fingers or from their tongues into the external 
world. This is true of Michelangelo’s chisel, and it is true of a dictator’s sword. 
(p. 1)  
 
The Supreme Court made this same case in legal language. In Powell v. 
McCormack (1969) the court stated: 
The values of the Framers of the Constitution must be applied in any case 
construing the Constitution. Inferences from the text and history of the 
Constitution should be given great weight in discerning the original understanding 
and in determining the intentions of those who ratified the Constitution. The 
precedential value of cases and commentators tends to increase, therefore, in 
proportion to their proximity to the adoption of the Constitution, the Bill of 
Rights, or any other amendments. (395 U.S. 486, 547) 
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To understand the assumptions of the Statesmen, you must understand them in 
context. In Ex Parte Grossman (1925), the Court explained that analysis of the 
Statesmen’s language must be hermeneutically sound: 
The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely, except where 
reference to common law and to British institutions as they were when the 
instrument was framed and adopted. The Statesmen and lawyers of the convention 
who submitted it to the ratification of conventions of the thirteen states, were born 
and brought up in the atmosphere of the common law and thought and spoke in its 
vocabulary . . . when they came to put their conclusions into the form of 
fundamental law in a compact draft, they expressed them in terms of common 
law, confident that they could be shortly and easily understood. (267 U.S. 87, 
108)   
 
In this study, the researcher has identified the Statesmen’s beliefs through the 
methods discussed in chapter III. The key assumptions were identified and analyzed to 
determine their meaning in their original context. The critical assumptions were identified 
in the Philadelphia Convention, the ratification debates, and the various Federalist and 
Anti-Federalist writings of the period. 
The meaning of a term may be validated through its intellectual heritage--the 
classical works of political philosophy that these Statesmen would have read. They were 
again checked by contemporary usage during the constitutional era and early American 
dictionaries. They were compared to what historians have written since the convention on 
the Statesmen’s beliefs about the qualities of leaders. Finally, these assumptions were 
compared with contemporary leadership literature. A glossary of all the terms defined in 
the study is found in Appendix C. 
Scope and Limitations 
Limitations of an historical study are based on the breadth of documents, the 
selection of documents, and the interpretation of the documents. Proper limitations 
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narrow the scope appropriately. The problem for the researcher is too much, rather than 
too little information.  
Breadth 
Since the context is critical, the researcher has extensively examined the 
historical, political and philosophical background leading to the Constitutional 
convention. This preparatory research was conducted primarily to train the researcher to 
see in the way that the Statesmen saw. However, the problem in this study deals 
exclusively with a two-year period from 1787 to 1789. The researcher is seeking to 
isolate the Statesmen’s assumptions about leadership during the convention and 
ratification debates. Constitutional scholar, McDonald (1958/1997), followed this method 
when preparing his doctoral dissertation on the constitution. His professor advised him 
that: “If I wished to understand the contest over the constitution, he insisted, I should not 
focus on 1787 and 1788, as Beard had done, but should begin at least as early as 1776” 
(p. xv).  
In preparatory investigation, the researcher reached back to early American 
colonization historically, the early British legal heritage politically, and to Jerusalem and 
Athens philosophically. The major British charters and legal documents from the Magna 
Carta (1215) forward have been reviewed (see Appendix D). Primary source legal 
documents of the American Revolution, including British and early American legal 
documents were also studied to ensure contextual continuity (see Appendix E). Political 
philosophers such as Locke, Montesquieu, Blackstone, Grotius, Vattel, Trenchard and 
Gordon, and others were examined and are discussed in the literature review. The 
research included philosophers whom the Statesmen would have been familiar with, but 
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who are rarely cited in public debates during this time period. These included Plato, 
Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau. Such an approach helps the researcher to 
understand the Statesmen’s reasoning, including why they would or would not include 
specific concepts based on their intellectual heritage.  
Exhibit I.1 Levels of Participation by Statesmen in this Study 
 
 
Limitations 
The study has dealt with the assumptions of the American Statesmen during the 
constitutional era. In this study Statesmen included (a) delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention, (b) delegates to the ratifying conventions in the several states, and (c) 
individuals who influenced the outcome of the ratification debates by writing pamphlets 
Those who attended the 
Ratification debates in the
several states 
Those who were influential 
Federalist or Anti-Federalist 
writers 1787-1789
Framers who 
attended the 
Convention at 
Philadelphia 
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(Federalist or anti-Federalist) during the years 1787-1789. This is shown in Exhibit I.1. 
The most potent sources were Statesmen who functioned in two or more capacities, such 
as Madison and Hamilton. Both were members of the Constitutional convention, 
delegates to the ratification debates in their respective states, and wrote articles to 
promote their cause. 
As an additional limitation, this study did not examine the leadership assumptions 
of the First Congress as they discussed and debated the Bill of Rights. Madison included 
a Bill of Rights during the Virginia convention, and other state legislatures (e.g., New 
York) ratified this Constitution with full confidence that a Bill of Rights would be 
proposed. However, because the First Congress is a separate and distinct governing body 
and a dissertation must necessarily be limited in scope, the parameters herein do not 
include the discussion of the Bill of Rights. 
Organization of Study  
In this dissertation, chapter II reviews literature relevant to the Statesmen of the 
constitutional era as well as contemporary leadership literature. Chapter III explains the 
methods used to perform the research. Chapter IV presents the findings of the research, 
relying heavily on primary source documentation. Chapter V provides analysis of these 
findings and conclusions and areas of study for further research. 
Summary 
 The US Constitution is an incredible document that has provided stable 
government and liberty for 214 Years. The Constitution was written by men who held 
specific assumptions. This study was undertaken to ascertain the Statesmen’s view of 
leadership and compare the Statesmen’s view with contemporary leadership theories.  
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CHAPTER II 
Survey of the Literature  
A review of the literature in this study was divided into two major sections. First, 
the historical record left by the Founders has been established. This historical review was 
further divided into three parts. The first was an examination of the original source 
documents that the Statesmen wrote. The second is an examination of what the Statesmen 
would have read as an intellectual heritage. This helps ensure that the researcher is not 
overlaying 21st century definitions onto an 18th century mindset. Finally, the literature 
review concludes with an evaluation of the writings of the major constitutional historians 
over the last 214 years. In the second part of this literature review, contemporary 
leadership theories were evaluated to determine their similarity or dissimilarity to the 
assumptions of the Statesmen.  
Historical Review  
Primary Sources 
The logical focal point for a study on these Statesmen is the Constitutional 
Convention in Philadelphia. According to their charge from Congress, the purpose of the 
Philadelphia convention was: “that the Articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected 
& enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution” (Madison, 
1840/1987, p. 23). The official record of the debates, the Journal of the Acts and 
Proceedings of the Convention, assembled at Philadelphia, Monday, May 14, and 
dissolved Monday, September 17, 1787 (1819) is a useful starting point. This journal 
contains a record of the debates including proposals and votes, but it leaves out a great 
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deal of commentary. James Madison’s posthumous Debates in the Federal Convention of 
1787 Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America, captures 
significantly more discussion on the floor. This discussion reveals many assumptions 
supporting and explaining the delegates’ propositions and votes.  
 The second level of primary source documents are the ratification debates. Elliot’s 
(1836/1974) Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787, a 
five-volume overview of the ratification debates in each state, was the next major set of 
primary source documents to assimilate. Elliot’s debates contain the floor debates and 
relevant supporting material such as public statements on the Constitution and critical 
letters written between delegates. 
  The third level of original source documentation includes writings about the 
Constitution at the time of the ratification--Federalist or Anti-Federalist. Hamilton, 
Madison, and Jay (1787/1996) collaborated to write the fundamental writings in favor of 
the constitution, known as the Federalist Papers. They wrote collectively under the 
penname Publius. These leading Federalists offer an apologetic for the adoption of the 
Constitution. While defending the merits of the Constitution point by point, these authors 
indirectly revealed their assumptions about leadership. They frequently disclosed their 
expectations of the leader’s behaviors before demonstrating how the Constitution will (or 
will not) bridge the gap between expected behaviors and normative behaviors.  
The Federalist papers were central in outlining the Federalist argument. In one 
essay an Anti-Federalist who wrote under the penname, the Sentiments of Many, refers to 
“PUBLIUS, the oracle of the Fœderalists” (as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 5, p. 276). On 
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the subject of the Federalist papers, Washington wrote to Hamilton, “When the transient 
circumstances and fugitive performances which attended this crisis shall have 
disappeared, that work will merit the notice of posterity, because in it are candidly 
discussed the principles of freedom” (as cited in Bailyn, 1967/1992, p. 327). 
Other lesser-known Federalists writings can be found in Ford’s (1888/2000) 
Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States: Published during Its Discussion by 
the People 1787-1788 and Sheehan and McDowell’s (1998) Friends of the Constitution.  
The opponents of the constitution, the Anti-Federalists likewise revealed their 
assumptions in their public speeches and writings. Kenyon (1966) provided an overview 
of significant Anti-Federalist writings. Ketcham’s (1986) volume contains only a handful 
of the clearest Anti-Federalist papers, but he provides additional documentary support 
from the Articles of Confederation through the Bill of Rights. Allen and Lloyd’s (1985) 
Essential Anti-Federalist also contains a number of significant papers and background 
commentary. Yet, the two most comprehensive collections include Storing’s (1981) six 
volume, The Complete Anti-Federalist, and Frohnen’s (1999), The Anti-Federalists. Both 
contain compilations of Anti-Federalist thought with explanatory notes by the editors. 
The most complete series on the subject, Federalist or Anti-Federalist is the Documentary 
History of the Ratification of the Constitution (1976). 
Philosophical Heritage 
The assumptions that the Statesmen held were not completely original. They were 
based on a rich legal and philosophical heritage. This section includes an overview of 
what the Statesmen would have read. For example, Eidsmoe (1987) reported that 
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“Hamilton . . . read Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke, Montesquieu, Blackstone, Hobbes, 
Berlamaqui, Postlethwaite, Hume, and others” (p. 154).  
Lutz and Hyneman (1984) reviewed 15,000 documents, books, and pamphlets 
from the founding era printed between 1760 and 1805. This body of research was then 
reduced to 916 documents. They broke philosophical influences down by decade based 
on citations of the Founders. During the 1780s, they found that the Bible had the greatest 
influence with 34%, followed by enlightenment thought with 29%, Whig thought with 
19%, the classics with 10%, common law with 9%, and other at 4% (p. 194).  
They also classified the most cited thinkers by decade. In the 1780s, Montesquieu 
was cited most frequently with 14% of all quotations, Blackstone was second with 7%, 
and Trenchard and Gordon, Beccaria, and Delolme were tied for third place with 3% each 
(Lutz & Hyneman, 1984, p. 193). 
“The celebrated Montesquieu”2 was the most cited political philosopher during 
the constitutional era. Charles de Secondat de Montesquieu (1752/1990) in his Spirit of 
the Laws provided a number of core concepts that the Statesmen used to construct the 
constitution. They included three types of government: republican, monarchical, and 
despotic (Book II), the distinction between liberty and license (Book, XI), and the idea 
that laws are poor means to change manners and customs (Book XIX). However, 
Montesquieu also provided the Anti-Federalists with a false idea about representation. He 
taught, for instance, that a republic is ill-suited for a large country (Montesquieu, Book 
VIII, 20, p. 126).  
                                                 
2 Montesquieu was reverently referred to by the statesmen as “the Celebrated Montesquieu” as on July 11, 
1787 in the convention. (Madison, 1987, p. 233) 
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Montesquieu is often credited with the concept of checks and balances, though 
this is not his original concept. Checks and balances can be found in the Bible in the 
Hebrew Republic as Elazar and Cohen (1985) and Wines (1853/1997) demonstrated. 
Elazar depicted this graphically in the Jewish Polity (Exhibit II.1). 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Exhibit II.1: The Governmental Structure of the Hebrew Republic3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Used with permission by Indiana University Press. 
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Sir William Blackstone (1765/1979) in his first volume of the Commentaries on 
the Laws of England set, as an intellectual standard, a principled approach to law for 
England as well as America. Amos (2000) maintained that “The first 140 pages of 
Volume One are the most important,” because he “lays out the bedrock principles of the 
common law” (p. 16). The Statesmen would rely on Blackstone’s principles during the 
constitutional era, just as they relied heavily on Locke during the pre-revolutionary era 
(Lutz, 1984).  
John Locke was a less forceful influence during the constitutional era than he was 
a decade earlier when he influenced many of these same men in previous decades (Lutz, 
1984). His First Treatise of Civil Government was a simple rebuttal to Robert Filmer’s 
defense of the divine right of kings. His renowned Second Treatise of Civil Government 
set the groundwork for the revolution by outlining a theory of inalienable rights which he 
enumerated as “life, liberty and property” (1698/1988, Book II, Chapter IX, p. 350). 
Locke discussed the nature of political power (Chapter I), property (Chapter V), forms of 
government (Chapter X, XII), and the nature of tyranny (Chapters XVII, XVIII). From 
the debates, it is evident that these concepts were never far from the Statesmen’s thought 
processes. These were basic assumptions from which they reasoned. Such ideas formed 
the foundation for the structural checks in the Constitution.  
Algernon Sidney (1698/1979), like Locke, wrote in reaction to Robert Filmer’s 
justification of the divine right of kings in Patriarcha. Sidney wrote his Discourses 
Concerning Government at a time where monarchy was the norm, and other systems of 
government were largely theoretical. Though he focused primarily on the king and judges 
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as leaders, he dealt with themes that were quite familiar to the Statesmen. For example, 
he claimed virtue is requisite to leadership, “When [God] intends to exalt a People, he 
fills both them and their Leaders with the Virtues suitable to the accomplishment of his 
end” (p. 113). In contrast, he explained the nature of corruption as common to man: 
“Again, Corruption will always reign most where those who have the power do most 
favor it, where the rewards of such Crimes are greatest, easiest, and most valued, and 
where the punishment of them is least feared” (p. 201).  
Trenchard and Gordon (1720-1723/1995) wrote Cato’s Letters. It was a series of 
articles written to combat governmental abuses in England that were widely read in 
America during the Revolution. These articles were as popular in America as they were 
in Great Britain. Where Locke was lofty and theoretical, Cato’s letters were common and 
practical. Cato’s Letters (not to be confused with the Roman statesman or the later Anti-
Federalist by the same name) addressed the same issues on a more practical level. One 
could find within Cato’s Letters the same type of reasoning about leadership that later is 
found in the constitutional and ratification debates. For example, they wrote about the 
passions as a catch-all psychology. Cato wrote, “Were the passions properly balanced, 
men would act rationally; but by suffering one passion to get the better of all the rest, 
they act madly or ridiculously” (vol. I, p. 55). This view was also embraced by the 
American Statesmen. 
Cato, Sidney, and, Locke, and other political philosophers of the era wrote against 
the king in a time when their lives were in jeopardy for such treasonous actions. 
Trenchard and Gordon (1723/1995) wrote under the penname Cato for this reason. Locke 
encrypted his language to send secret messages. Blackstone had to temper what he said in 
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volumes two through four of his Commentaries so as not to displease the Crown, in 
whose service he was employed. Passages from Sidney’s (1698/1979) Discourses 
Concerning Government were used to convict him of treason, for which he was executed.  
John Milton, the author of Paradise Lost, also wrote political literature. The 
Areopagitica (1637-1651/1999) was Milton’s appeal for freedom of speech. Among his 
essays, such as his Second Defense of the People of England Against the Infamous 
Anonymous Libel, Entitled the Cry of Royal Blood to Heaven Against the English 
Parricides, Milton delineates the difference between leadership and tyranny when he 
stated:  
No monarch could injure me, without first condemning himself, by the confession 
that he was a tyrant. If I inveigh against tyrants, what is that to kings? Between 
whom and tyrants I make the widest difference. As much as a good man differs 
from a bad, so much, do I maintain, that a king differs from a tyrant. (p. 324) 
 
Again, in another political tract Milton (1637-1651/1999) wrote, “A tyrant . . . is 
he who regarding neither Law nor the common good, reigns only for himself and his 
faction” (p. 66). In such writing, Milton presents a normative view of leadership, and 
identifies assumptions that will be embraced by the Statesmen during the framing of the 
constitution, just as they were in England a century before.  
Thomas Hooker (1626-1633/1975), the ideological force behind the Fundamental 
Orders of Connecticut (1639), was primarily a theologian. He wrote about the 
relationship between the leader and his faith. He complained about, “A generation of 
politicians in the world that count it a great point of wisdom for a man to conceal his 
religion to himself” (p. 100). Hooker exposed hypocrisy in leadership when he wrote:  
First, the hypocrite: what he doth. He is only the picture of godliness. As 
Machiavel, that cursed politician, speaks, he would have a man to take up the 
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name of virtue because there is no trouble in it, no disquiet which comes by it, but 
he would not have him take up the practice of it. (91) 
 
Hooker made the connection between the scriptures and good government and the 
relationship between leaders of the church and leaders of the state. He asked: 
Whether the Scriptures be not able as well to make magistrates and governors 
perfect to every good work as they can do ministers? Whether either minister or 
magistrate should do, or ought to do, anything which God hath not commanded 
them? Whether a faithful minister in his office ought not to understand what that 
Word reveals, ought not to teach all magistrates what out of the Word on so 
understands?4 (p. 367) 
 
 Vattel (1758/1982) and Grotius (1625/1984) are both worthy of mention because 
they would have been read and respected by the Statesmen. They primarily deal with 
foreign policy, not constitutional thought or leadership. Vattel speaks of virtue and 
corruption, not only of the leaders, but also of the people. He wrote:  
It is an incontestable truth, that the virtues of the citizens constitute the most 
happy dispositions that can be desired by a just and wise government. Here then is 
an infallible criterion, by which the nation may judge of the intentions of those 
who govern it. (p. 51) 
 
On corruption, Vattel (1758/1982) maintained: 
But if they corrupt the morals of the people, spread a taste for luxury, effeminacy, 
a rage for licentious pleasures--if they stimulate the higher orders to a ruinous 
pomp and extravagance--beware, citizens! beware of those corruptors! they only 
aim at purchasing slaves in order to exercise over them an arbitrary sway. (p. 51) 
  
 The above passages could easily have been written by the Statesmen who shared 
the same basic assumptions as is evident in chapter IV.  
Grotius passed on a rich heritage regarding international relations including just 
war theory, and the roles of ambassadors and international trade. Grotius is best known 
for his summary of the principle of limited self-government. He wrote: 
                                                 
4 The Word refers back to the Scriptures 
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He knows not how to rule a kingdome, that cannot manage a Province; nor can he 
wield a Province, that cannot order a City; nor he order a City, that knows not 
how to regulate a Village; nor he a Village, that cannot guide a Family; nor can 
that man govern well a Family that knows not how to Govern himselfe; neither 
can any govern himself unless his reason be Lord, Will and Appetite her Vassals: 
nor can Reason rule unlesse herselfe be ruled by God, and (wholly) be obedient to 
Him. (as cited in Slater, 1965, p. 69) 
 
 Although much is made about the American connection to Greece and Rome 
(Pocock, 1971), the Statesmen held predominantly negative views toward the ancient 
democracies. Publius often cited the history of the ancient world to demonstrate what did 
not work.5 Madison would devote Federalist 18 to a discourse on why the Greek 
confederacies failed. He wrote, “In theory, and upon paper, this apparatus of powers 
seems amply sufficient for all general purposes. In several material instances, they exceed 
the powers enumerated” (Federalist 18, p. 172). He spoke of, “the turbulent democracies 
of ancient Greece” (Federalist 14, p.151). Madison would enter into more historical 
analysis in Federalist 38, 43, and 63. Hamilton and Jay also invoked the history of 
Greece--Hamilton in Federalist 6, 8, 9, and 25, and Jay in Federalist 4. Neither of them 
were complimentary toward the ancient world. Hamilton wrote:  
It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy 
without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which 
they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by 
which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of 
tyranny and anarchy. If they exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-
lived contrast to the furious storms that are to succeed. (Federalist 9, p. 124) 
 
                                                 
5 Federalist 34 and 63 are exceptions to this rule. Hamilton used the division of the legislature in the Roman 
Republic of an example of  “co-ordinate authority,” to prove his own point (Federalist 34, p.248). Madison 
would concede, “From these facts, to which many others might be added, it is clear that the principle of 
representation was neither unknown to the ancients nor wholly overlooked in their political constitutions” 
before writing, “it cannot be believed, that any form of representative government could have succeeded 
within the narrow limits occupied by the democracies of Greece.”  (Federalist 63, p. 417).  
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Rome, according to Hamilton, “Was never sated of carnage and conquest” 
(Federalist 6, p. 111). It was likewise considered a poor historical role model. Hamilton 
discussed Rome in Federalist 6, 34, and 70; Madison in Federalist 18, 41, and 63.  
Madison would assert that the, “the liberties of Rome proved the final victim to her 
military triumphs” (Federalist 41, p. 296). 
While learning from the lessons of Greek and Roman history, American 
Statesmen rarely invoked the classical political philosophers of Greece and Rome during 
the constitutional debates. They were certainly aware of the philosophers, and their 
pennames were often inspired by historical figures of the classical age (e.g., Brutus, 
Cato). American Statesmen, steeped in Calvinism, more often argued from the Bible and 
only select (16th and 17th century) political philosophers. Many Enlightenment 
philosophers were completely overlooked in the debates. Yet, this literature review would 
be incomplete without an overview of these works. 
 In The Republic, Plato (360 BC/1968) recorded Socrates’ dialogues as he dealt 
with themes such as justice (Book I-II), the best men as rulers (Book III), philosopher 
kings (Book V-VII), and the five types of regimes (Book VIII). However, Plato’s utopian 
vision of the ideal society was very different from the society that the Statesmen 
envisioned.  
Aristotle’s Politics (350 BC/1941) dealt with topics such as the virtue and the 
pursuit of happiness. However, Aristotle’s brand of virtue and the pursuit of happiness 
were quite different from the 18th century view of the Statesmen. Blackstone’s 
(1765/1979a) view was more in line with the thought processes of the Statesmen. He 
argued that the pursuit of happiness was actually the pursuit of conformity to God’s law. 
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Where Aristotle traced happiness to virtue through reason, Blackstone traced it back 
directly to God. Blackstone wrote:  
As therefore the creator is a being, not only of infinite power, and wisdom, but 
also of infinite goodness, he has been pleased so to contrive the Constitution and 
frame of humanity, that we should want no other prompter to inquire after and 
pursue the rule of right, but only our own self-love, that universal principle of 
action. For he has so intimately connected, so inseparably interwoven the laws of 
eternal justice with the happiness of each individual, that the latter cannot be 
attained but by observing the former; and, if the former be punctually obeyed, it 
cannot but induce the latter. (Blackstone, vol.1, p. 40) 
   
Thomas Aquinas (1272/1952) brought Aristotle closer to the Statesmen’s views 
by mixing Aristotelian thought with Christian doctrine. Aquinas’ scholasticism had a 
great, albeit indirect, influence on the thought of these late 16th century thinkers. The 
Statesmen were familiar with natural law, but they did not regularly cite Summa 
Theologiae 
Machiavelli, (1513/1988) “that cursed politician,” was one of the few 
philosophers clearly rejected by the Statesmen as an immoral example that was not to be 
followed. Machiavelli stood in sharp contrast to most of the other classical political 
philosophers. For example, he counseled the prince to act immorally and to refuse to be 
held to his word. He advised, “Therefore, a ruler who wishes to maintain his power must 
be prepared to act immorally when this becomes necessary” (p. 55). Again, he wrote: 
Everyone knows how praiseworthy it is for a ruler to keep his promises, and live 
uprightly and not by trickery. Nevertheless, experience shows that in our times the 
rulers who have done great things are those who have set little store by keeping 
their word, being skilful rather in cunningly deceiving men; they have got the 
better of those who have relied on being trustworthy. (p. 61)  
 
Hobbes was understood by the Statesmen, but rarely mentioned in their 
arguments. His state of nature is more severe than Locke’s or Rousseau’s version. 
However, Hobbes, who wrote de Cive (1642/1998) and Leviathan (1651/1985), was a 
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proponent of the divine right of kings. American Statesmen categorically rejected the 
doctrine of the divine right of kings. Hobbes was marginalized by the Statesmen for the 
same reasons that Robert Filmer’s defense of Rex Lex was attacked by Locke and 
Sidney.   
Hume (1740/1969), the great skeptic of the Scottish Enlightenment, was also rarely 
mentioned by the Statesmen. Hume discussed the passions in much the same way that the 
Statesmen would discuss it: “Can we imagine it possible, that while human nature 
remains the same, men will ever become entirely indifferent to their power, riches, beauty 
or personal merit, and that their pride and vanity will not be affected by these 
advantages” (Book ii, Part 3, p. iii). Although Adair (1957) tried to draw a connection 
between Hume and Madison, in general, Hume’s philosophy of skepticism was neither 
practical nor relevant to the task of building the constitution. 
 Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality (1755/1984) and Social Contract (1762) were 
rarely cited. He was a marginal figure to the Statesmen of the constitutional era because 
his philosophical point of view was the inverse of the view primarily held by the leading 
American Statesmen. Rousseau (1762) viewed the pre-societal state as the closest 
approximation to perfection, lauding the noble savage. His most famous statement, “Man 
is born free; and everywhere he is in chains” marks the difference between perfect society 
being corrupted by mankind and the “more perfect union” the Statesmen felt that society 
could attain through their efforts (U.S. Constitution, 1787, Preamble). Storing (1981) 
pointed out that an obscure essay by a Newport Man “appears to be the only reference to 
Rousseau in the Anti-Federalist literature” (vol. 4, p. 250). 
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 Other philosophers, particularly enlightenment philosophers such as Voltaire, and 
Diderot, are surprisingly absent in the constitutional debates. Though the more 
fashionable and intellectual men in American society were certainly aware of these 
philosophers, it should be kept in mind that the French Revolution was the same year as 
the ratification of the US Constitution (1789). These events were so contemporary that 
they had little bearing on the constitutional convention in 1787. 
Historical Review  
The third step of this process of the literature review is to examine what historians 
have written about the Statesmen over the last 200 years. Grob and Billias (1992) offered 
some structure in Interpretations of American History. They categorize constitutional 
historians into five categories:  
• The nationalist school  
• The progressive school  
• The neo-conservative school  
• The new intellectual historians  
• The neo-progressives. 
Nationalist School 
Bancroft (1882) and Fiske (1894) are the two pillars of the nationalist school. 
Bancroft is the first major constitutional historian. He saw the Constitution as a part of 
the unfolding events of the revolution--an inevitable next step. Many later historians 
criticized Bancroft for romanticizing the time. He saw the U.S. Constitution as the 
crowning achievement of all of history (Grob & Billias, 1992, pp. 160-162)  
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Bancroft (1882) is charged with bias for viewing the constitutional era 
providentially, that is, as the movement of the hand of God in human history. Bancroft, 
however, used the terms and sentiments of the Statesmen in his historical writing. 
Additionally, he provided over three hundred and fifty pages of primary source letters 
and papers in the appendix that lend themselves to such a conclusion. Yet, Bancroft says 
little of the Statesmen’s assumptions about leadership since his purpose is the history of 
the constitution, not a psychology of leadership. 
Like Bancroft (1882), Fiske (1894), author of The Critical Period, focused on the 
time period between the revolution and the formation of the constitution. He spent most 
of his time tracing the problems caused by the weaknesses in the Articles of 
Confederation, and consequentially, the need for a more energetic constitution. He 
highlighted post-war insurrections and legislative encroachments of the states, but he also 
said little of the Statesmen’s views on leadership. Bancroft only dealt with the 
Statesmen’s assumptions by simply citing Madison’s notes. Assumptions about 
leadership were a secondary consideration for these and other historians. 
Progressive School  
The major progressive writers include Beard (1913/1986), Hacker (1947), and 
Parrington (1927). The progressives did not deal directly with the leadership assumptions 
of the Statesmen. Since they did not view the U.S. Constitution as an ideological 
document, they focused on the economic aspects of the Constitution. Their assumptions 
lead them to focus on the economic motivations of those who created the instrument. 
Under their assumptions, the Framers were viewed as creating the Constitution for their 
own benefit. 
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The progressive school is named for the era in which it was formed. Grob and 
Billias (1992) reported, “Around the turn of the twentieth century the rise of the populist 
and progressive reform movements brought about marked change in attitude toward the 
Constitution” (p. 162). The progressive movement was birthed in the depression of 1893-
1897 and continued until the end of World War I in 1917. It was a movement toward left-
wing political reform (Worldbook Encyclopedia, 1999, vol. P, p. 813). In the same year 
that Charles Beard (1913/1986) published An Economic Interpretation of the 
Constitution, Congress adopted the 17th Amendment that mandated popular election of 
senators. For the previous 124 Years, senators were elected by the state legislatures. The 
Statesmen considered this method a substantial check against the encroachment of the 
federal government. 
Beard (1913/1986) redirected the flow of scholarship on the Constitution with his 
work that asserted that the Framers of the Constitution were interested men who stood to 
gain financially if the Constitution was adopted. He wrote: “The members of the 
Philadelphia convention which drafted the Constitution were, with a few exceptions, 
immediately, directly, and personally interested in, and derived economic advantages 
from, the establishment of the new system” (p. 324). Beard’s ultimate conclusion was, “It 
cannot be said therefore, that the members of the convention were ‘disinterested’” (p. 
151). Beyond this basic claim, his analysis of the assumptions of the Framers on 
leadership, was somewhat speculative as when he wrote, “The theories of government 
which men entertain are emotional reactions to their property interests” (p. 157).  
Hacker (1947) follows a similar thesis claiming that capitalism is the driving force 
in American history from colonization to the Civil War. To Hacker, the creation of the 
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Constitution, was also only a product of capitalistic forces rather than an ideological 
struggle. While it is undeniably true that capitalistic profit motive did influence this era of 
history, as it affects all other eras, it would be an oversimplification to suggest that it is 
the only factor.  
Parrington (1927) continues this theme, but he takes it a step further. As a 
progressive, Parrington believed that the structures of society shape the individual. He 
wrote in his introduction:  
It asserted that the present evils of society are the consequence of vicious 
institutions rather than depraved human nature; and that is as free men and equals 
it is the right and duty of citizens to re-create social and political institutions to the 
end that they shall further social justice, encouraging the good in men rather than 
perverting them to evil. (p. xix) 
 
 Parrington (1927) believed that the Calvinism of New England only served to 
retard American society--including the mindset of the leadership. He wrote:  
Calvinism was no friend of equalitarianism. It rooted too deeply in the Old 
Testament for that, was too rigidly aristocratic. It saw too little good in human 
nature to trust the multitude of the unregenerate . . . . that the immigrant Puritans 
brought in their intellectual luggage the system of Calvin rather than of Luther 
must be reckoned a misfortune, out of which flowed many of the bickering and 
much of the intolerance that left a stain on the pages of early New England 
history. (p. 11) 
 
  These progressive historical perspectives stand in sharp contrast to the 
Statesmen’s view of their own ethos. Even with this bias, however, Parrington (1927) 
applauded Hamilton’s brilliant leadership presuppositions as seen in this statement: 
“Whoever aspires to become a sane political leader must remember that his business is 
not to construct Utopias, but to govern men” (p. 298).  
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Neo-Conservative School  
The neo-conservatives challenged the progressive economic reinterpretation of 
the Constitution. They focused on the ideological motivations of the Framers. Neo-
conservatives include Brown (1965), McDonnald (1958/1997), and Wright (1958).  
  Brown (1965), in his reply to the progressives, Charles Beard and the 
Constitution, demonstrated that because of Beard’s methods and his bias, his findings 
were inaccurate. Brown challenged Beard’s lack of sufficient research, and his use of 
alphabetic or random order instead of in the chronological order in which each state 
ratified. He also challenged and refuted Beard’s two primary assumptions about 
economic interest. 
McDonnald (1958/1997) continued in this stream of thought. He found that the 
Constitutional convention delegates were an, “almost complete cross-section of the 
geographical areas and shade of political opinion existing in the United States in 1787” 
rather than interested aristocrats (p. 37). He maintained that the Beardian thesis was 
inaccurate because Beard made an artificial distinction between personalty interests and 
realty interests. McDonnald explained, “No alignment of personalty [sic] interests versus 
realty interests existed in the Convention” (pp. 101-102). Therefore, he concluded, to 
approach the Constitution in the manner in which Beard proceeded, “renders 
unintelligible many of the forces at work in the making of the Constitution” (p. 415).  
Wright (1958) not only asserted that the Beardian view of economic motives was 
wrong, but he demonstrated that the Framers of the Constitution were essentially the 
same group of patriots and Statesmen who fought the British in the Revolution and 
formed the state constitutions a decade earlier. Avoiding the criticism leveled against the 
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nationalists, Wright did not glamorize these Statesmen, though he clearly respected them 
from afar. He wrote: “These statesmen-inventors were not supermen or demigods. They 
had human failings--they were not without self-interests--and they did not create, nor did 
they long for, Utopia” (p. xx). 
Unlike the other neo-conservatives, Wright (1958) dealt with the leadership 
assumptions of the Statesmen. For instance, he wrote: 
A fundamental assumption of nearly all political thinking in America at this time 
was that men in public office are not to be trusted, that human nature is sadly 
defective, and that institutional provisions must be made to safeguard the 
governed against the ever present tendency to abuse of powers. This view is found 
in Anti-Federalist and Federalist literature alike. (p. 48) 
 
New Intellectual Historians 
Adair (1957), Bailyn, (1967/1992), Kenyon (1955), Pocock (1971, 1987), 
Rackove (1997), and Wood (1969/1998) also attacked the Beardian thesis, though for 
different reasons than the neo-conservatives. These new intellectual historians also 
believed that the ideas behind the Constitution were more important than economic 
interest. They proved their theses by making the connection between the ideas in the 
Constitution and their intellectual forbearers. 
Adair (1957) connected James Madison’s reasoning to David Hume by way of 
Witherspoon’s lectures at Princeton, formerly the College of New Jersey. He also 
explained that the founders were, in their day, trying to reduce politics to a science (pp. 
347-348).  
Bailyn (1967/1992) described a continuity between the revolution and the 
Constitution when he claimed, “The American Constitution is the final and climatic 
expression of the ideology of the American Revolution” (p. 321). He asserted that the 
 32
Statesmen, “had a thoroughly realistic sense of human nature, and never deluded 
themselves that any people could be entirely virtuous” (p. 345). He discussed some of the 
particulars of the Statesmen’s assumptions: that power corrupts (p. 60), the need for 
“contending powers” (p. 273), self-interest, or as Patrick Henry called it, “self-love” as a 
vital force to check corruption, (p. 345), and the recognition of the depravity of man (p. 
347). Bailyn felt that these factors, among others, shaped the leadership assumptions as 
the statesmen built the Constitution.  
 Kenyon (1955) focused on the Anti-Federalists, labeling them “men of little faith” 
because of their low view of human nature. This low view of human nature would 
become a primary assumption in their arguments. In contrast, Beard’s position was that 
the Anti-Federalists were economically motivated democrats simply opposing the 
property interests of the aristocrats. Kenyon demonstrated that the Federalist v. Anti-
Federalist debate was political, not primarily economic. Kenyon also dealt with specific 
assumptions of the Statesmen on leadership, albeit indirectly.  
Johnson (1997) in his History of the American People captured some of the 
beliefs of the Statesmen. For example, he wrote: 
Washington, who presided over the Convention, but who wisely confined his 
activity to ensure order and decorum, stuck to his view that most men were 
guided by their own private interests: to expect ordinary people, he said, to be 
‘influenced by any other principles but those of interest, is to look for what never 
did and I fear never will happen. (p. 186) 
 
Again, Johnson (1997) reveals a side of the Statesmen that exposes their 
underlying assumptions. In contrast to the popular perception that they held a high and 
lofty view of the people, Johnson recorded:  
Even Washington spoke of ordinary farmers as the ‘Grazing Multitude.’ His aide, 
Hamilton, referred to the “unthinking populace.” John Adams termed them the 
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‘common herd of mankind,’ and Gouverneur Morris felt ordinary people ‘had no 
morals but their interests.’ But this was just club talk. (p. 177) 
 
 Pocock connected the concepts of the Statesmen to origins of ancient Greece and 
Rome, and the renaissance (as cited in Grob & Billias, 1992, p. 171). Rackove (1997) 
dealt with original intent and the precise meaning of the language used during the 
convention. He too would see ideas, rather than economic motivations, as the prime force 
for shaping the convention and ratification debates, even though he would be led to 
different ultimate conclusions. For example, in Original Meanings, he concluded that 
since Madison, did not use the Federalist writings to interpret law when he was president, 
neither should we. 
Wood (1969/1998) understood that understanding underlying assumptions was 
the key to understanding the system. He began the Creation of the American Republic by 
explaining: “I could make little or no sense of the various institutional or other devices 
written into the Constitutions until I understood the assumptions from which the 
Constitution-makers acted” (p. xvi). Wood traced the organs of the Constitution back 
through Enlightenment and Whig thought, American Calvinism, Deism, and 
Unitarianism until it formed a distinctly American republicanism that these Statesmen 
embraced.   
Wood (1969/1998) touched on the assumptions of the Statesmen as when he 
captured Washington’s and Winthrop’s viewpoints. “We have probably,” wrote 
Washington with emphasis, “had too good an opinion of human nature in forming our 
confederation” (p. 471). The Anti-Federalist, James Winthrop, similarly wrote: “The 
complaints against the separate governments, even by the friends of the new plan are not 
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that they have not power enough, but that they are disposed to make a bad use of what 
power they have” (p. 507).  
Neo-Progressives 
 The neo-progressives were, in the main, a reaction to the neo-conservatives and 
the new intellectuals. They continued the earlier progressives’ view of economic 
determination. Neo-progressives include Handlin and Handlin (1944), Jensen 
(1950/1980), Lynd (1967, 1968), and Zinn (1980/1999) 
 According to Jensen (1950/1980), “Since the founding fathers themselves 
disagreed as to the nature of the history of the period and as to the best kind of 
government for the new nation, it is possible to find arguments to support almost any 
interpretation one chooses” (p. xii). Nonetheless, he rejected Fiske’s critical period 
writing that it, “was the result of an uncritical acceptance of the arguments of the 
victorious party in battle, of a failure to face the fact that partisan propaganda is not 
history but only historical evidence.” (p. 422). While Jensen conceded the need to see the 
men who wrote in their context, he promoted the progressive party line insisting that the 
Statesmen, “were concerned with the relations of man and of class to class in society” (p. 
194).  
 Lynd (1968) captured the essence of the neo-progressive position. He wrote, 
“Americans have made two revolutions, in 1776-1783 and in 1861-1865” (p. 3). Like his 
progressive forerunners, Lynd was more interested in the economic than ideological. 
Lynd (1967) set out to “defend Beard” (p. 8) and praised Beard’s work as the “most 
substantial” approach (p. 4). He dismissed dissenting historians, “largely as a product of 
the cold war years” (p. 5). 
 35
  Howard Zinn was not listed by Grob and Billias. Yet, Zinn’s (1980/1999) A 
People’s History of the United States is a Marxist interpretation of American history. He 
echoed the progressive theme. Eliminating ideological assumptions, Zinn simply 
embraced Beard’s earlier view that reduced the Constitution to a division of spoils for the 
victors: 
Thus, Beard found that most of the makers of the Constitution had some direct 
economic interest in establishing a strong federal government: the manufacturers 
needed protective tariffs; the moneylenders wanted to stop the use of paper money 
to pay off debts; and the land speculators wanted protection as they invaded 
Indian lands; bondholders wanted a federal government able to raise money by 
nationwide taxation, to pay off those bonds. (p. 90) 
  
Key Concepts 
This study seeks to ascertain the leadership assumptions of American Statesmen 
during the Constitutional era. The following paragraphs define the key terms used in this 
study.  
Leadership 
A survey of the leadership literature offers no scholarly definition that has been 
agreed upon. Bass (1990) explained that there are as many definitions as there are those 
who attempt to define leadership (p. 11). Pfeffer echoed this claim adding that the 
definitions that exist are ambiguous (as cited in Bass, 1990, p. 11). Bennis (1989) 
explained “Leadership is like beauty: it is hard to define, but you know it when you see 
it” (p. I).  
Yet, some definitions are more acceptable than others. Katz and Kahn 
(1950/1978) referred to leadership as “the influence increment over and above 
mechanical compliance with routine directives of the organization” (pp. 302-303). As 
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Spitzberg found, “the meaning of leadership may depend on the kind of institution in 
which it is found” (as cited in Bass, 1990, p. 11). Bass’s Handbook of Leadership 
definition is as follows: “Leaders are agents of change--persons whose acts affect other 
people more than other people’s acts affect them” (p. 19). This definition is true of 
officeholders simply because they are officeholders. As Bastiat (1850/1968) explained, 
“law is force” (p. 28).    
 Selznick (1957), to make finer distinctions, separated leadership from the office 
of the leader, and power from influence. However, such a distinction is unnecessary in 
this study. The leader cannot be easily separated from the office he holds--even if he is a 
poor leader in the sense of accomplishing a particular agenda. The Statesmen argued as 
though the officeholder was a leader by default, and that power and influence emanated 
from the office. For our purposes in this study, leaders are those who occupy the offices 
created by the United States Constitution. As Gini suggested: 
leadership can only be known and evaluated in the particular instantiation of a 
leader doing a job. In other words, while the term “leadership” and “leader” are 
not strictly synonymous, the reality of leadership cannot be separated from the 
person of the leader and the job of leadership. (as cited in Hickman, 1998, p. 365) 
 
Assumption/Presupposition:  
 The American Heritage Dictionary (2000) defines an assumption as, “something 
taken for granted as true without proof; a supposition: a valid assumption” (p. 110). 
Schaeffer (1968/1976/1982) defined a presupposition as, “A belief or theory, which is 
accepted before the next step in logic is developed. Such a prior postulate often 
consciously or unconsciously affects the way a person subsequently reasons” (p. 201). In 
this study, the researcher is not searching for practical advice or conclusions, but the 
suppositions which supported the system that was set in place.  
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Statesmen 
In this document, a number of similar terms are used to denote specific meaning. 
Founding Fathers, Framers, Statesmen, Federalist and Anti-Federalist may confuse the 
reader unless adequate attention is given to correct usage. The phrase Founding Fathers is 
a broad term that spans decades from the early 1770s to the late 1780s. This may include 
the men who fought the Revolution or those who adopted the Bill of Rights. In contrast, 
the term framer reflects a narrow meaning. It is only applied to members of the 
Constitutional Convention who favored the creation of the constitution. There is no single 
term for the opposition members, or those that attended the ratifying convention, or wrote 
pamphlets. Therefore, the term Statesmen was chosen to be an inclusive term which 
would cover any of the political and social leaders who had an influence on the formation 
of the US Constitution during the constitutional era. This helps to minimize the confusion 
of the first term and potential equivocation of the second. 
This includes Statesmen who were neither at the convention nor directly took part 
in the ratification debates or pamphleteering. Thomas Jefferson, the primary author of the 
Declaration and his colleague John Adams, the author of the Massachusetts Constitution, 
present a problem. Jefferson and Adams were ambassadors to France and England 
respectively during the constitutional convention and ratification debates. Yet, they 
engaged in meaningful correspondence during the time, and thereby influenced the 
process. Although they were undeniably American Statesmen, their opinions on the 
creation of the Constitution in this document are restricted to correspondence during the 
constitutional era. 
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The Statesmen have been criticized for a number of reasons. They are charged 
with holding unrefined views of enlightened democracy, loud silence on women’s 
suffrage, and a number were even slave-holders (Charleton et al., 1986, pp. 7-8). Yet, we 
must consider them in their cultural context. In spite of these things, they were arguably 
the most advanced thinkers and leaders that the world has known (before and possibly 
since). This is particularly true in their views on rights and liberty.  
Federalist and Anti-Federalists: 
Noah Webster (1828/1996), a Federalist pamphleteer, defined a Federalist as “an 
appellation in America, given to the friends of the Constitution of the United States, at its 
formation and adoption, and to the political party which favored the administration of 
President Washington.” It is interesting to note that the term does not appear in any 
document from the Magna Carta to the United States constitution, nor does it appear at 
any time during the debates in the Constitutional convention. Surprisingly, it is only used 
one time in the text of Federalist papers.6  
Federalists felt that the national government needed to be energized to be secure. 
As Madison explained, “Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of the assumptions of 
power, called for, on pressing exigencies, by a defective constitution, than out of the full 
exercise of the largest Constitutional authorities” (Federalist 20, p. 184). Both Federalists 
and Anti-Federalists were concerned with the prospect of tyranny, but the Federalists felt 
that the filtering process of representation would present the best men to fill public 
offices (Storing, 1981, p. 41). Frohnen (1999) explained, “Federalists insisted that the 
people would retain sufficient virtue to pick representatives with character good enough 
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that the Constitution’s checks and balances would keep these representatives honest and 
public-interested” (p. xxi) 
Federalists also felt that a larger representation that covered a more extensive 
territory would be more difficult to corrupt. This would be a natural check on tyranny 
(Storing, 1981, p. 44). However, they found greatest protection in the division of power--
checks and balances (p. 61). Hamilton explained: “Power being almost always the rival 
of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of 
the state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the general 
government” (Federalist 28, p. 225).  
Federalists felt that altering the form of government would solve many of the 
problems that riddled state governments since the revolution. Madison defined the 
Federalist view when he wrote:  
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican 
remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according 
to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our 
zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists. (Federalist 
10, p. 136) 
 
Exhibit II.2 catalogs the pennames of the Federalists with their actual names and 
official positions during the ratification. Many of the authors are unknown. The names 
below are those covered in the primary source documents during the research. 
Exhibit II.2 Federalist Authors and Pennames 
 
Penname Author Position 
Alfredus Samuel Tenny Surgeon 
Atticus Author Unknown Author Unknown 
Caesar Author uncertain (possibly  
                                                                                                                                                 
6 This excludes the title of each of the Federalist papers 
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Alexander Hamilton) 
An American Citizen Tench Coxe  
Cato Author Unknown Author Unknown 
A Citizen of America Noah Webster  
A Citizen of Philadelphia Peteliah Webster  
A Citizen of New Haven Roger Sherman Member of the 
constitutional convention 
A Citizen of New York John Jay  
Civis David Ramsay Member of South Carolina 
ratification convention and 
physician 
Common Sense Author Unknown Author Unknown 
Convention Author Unknown Author Unknown 
A Countryman Roger Sherman Member of the 
constitutional convention 
Crito Stephen Hopkins  
Elihu Author Unknown Author Unknown 
A Democratic Federalist Author uncertain (possibly 
Tench Coxe) 
 
A [Pennsylvania] Farmer Author Unknown Author Unknown 
Fabius John Dickenson  
A Federalist Author Unknown Author Unknown 
A Foreign Spectator Nicholas Collin  
A Freeman Tench Coxe  
A Landholder Oliver Ellsworth Judge of the Connecticut 
Supreme Court and 
Member of constitutional 
convention 
Monitor Author Unknown Author Unknown 
One of Four Thousand Author Unknown Author Unknown 
One of the People called 
Quakers 
Author Unknown Author Unknown 
Philodemos Author Unknown Author Unknown 
Philo-Publius William Duer Originally, one of those 
who was to write the 
Federalist Papers 
Publius Alexander Hamilton Delegate to the convention 
and New York Ratification 
Debates 
Publius John Jay Delegate to the New York 
Ratification Debates 
Publius James Madison Delegate to the convention 
and Virginia Ratification 
Debates 
Socius Unknown Unknown 
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State Soldier George Nicholas Member of Virginia 
ratification convention 
 
Leading Federalists included men who had proven their merit during the 
American War for Independence. Even Anti-Federalists acknowledged that these men 
were tried and tested, but they worried about who may follow. Candidus wrote: 
Certain characters now on the stage, we have reason to venerate, but though this 
country is now blessed with a Washington, Franklin, Hancock and Adams, yet 
posterity may have reason to rue the day when their political welfare depends on 
the decision of men who may fill the places of these worthies. (as cited in Storing, 
1981, vol. 4, pp. 128-129) 
 
According to the National Archives and Records Administration, “the two terms 
are grossly misleading. The Federalists might more aptly have been called the 
‘Centralists’ or ‘Nationalists’ and the Anti-Federalists ‘Federalists’ or States righters” 
(Charleton et al., 1986, p. 88).   
Anti-Federalist  
  Frohen (1999) defined Anti-Federalists as those who opposed the Constitution 
because they believed that the Constitution would “destroy the concrete institutions, 
beliefs, and practices they, and the Federalists, held as a sacred inheritance” (p. xv). 
Charleton et al. (1986) believed, “The Anti-Federalists tended to defend the Articles of 
Confederation, though they felt they needed to be modified, or advocated a weak central 
government that would allow maximum participation of the people and ensure state 
sovereignty” (p. 91). Storing (1981) explained that where the Federalists spoke of an 
energetic government, and explained how they might restrain it by balancing interest 
against interest, the Anti-Federalists felt that restraint was best secured by granting fewer 
powers to the federal government (p. 30). He continues, “The Anti-Federalists stood, 
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then, for federalism in opposition to what they called the consolidating tendency and 
intention of the Constitution” (p. 10).  
Storing (1981) explained that, “They were, they often claimed, the true 
Federalists. Some of them seemed to think that their proper name had been filched, while 
their backs were turned, as it were, by the pro-Constitution party, which refused to give it 
back” (p. 9). The Anti-Federalists griped about this problem in their letters. Aristocrotis 
satirically wrote, “All who presume to speak or write against the Constitution, must be 
branded as enemies to their county and to the union of the states; to impress this upon the 
minds of the vulgar, they must be termed antifederalists” (as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 
3, p. 209). In a similar vein, a Countryman wrote:  
One thing, and it would appear but a trifling matter, puzzled us exceedingly, that 
is, the names the different writers have fixed upon one another; for we found that 
those who are for abiding by the confederation and strengthening it, so as to make 
it lasting, are called antifederalists; and the other party who are for throwing it 
aside, and having nothing farther to do with it, but are for making of us into one 
solid government are called Federalists: now I did not know the meaning of the 
high-flown words, but my neighbour told me, that anitfederalists were people, that 
were against the confederation; and that Federalists were those that were for it: 
now, as I said before, this puzzled us very much, and often prevented our 
understanding what we were reading--at length we both agreed, that either the 
writers themselves or the printers had made a mistake. (Letter II, vol. 6, p. 76) 
 
Exhibit II.3 outlines the pennames of the Anti-Federalists with their actual names 
and official positions at the time of the ratification. This compilation was assembled 
primarily from Ford (1888/2000), Frohnen (1999), and Storing (1981). Many of the 
authors are unknown, and historians differ as to the true authorship of particular papers. 
The Anti-Federalists wrote under pennames that often were descriptive of their 
positions. They called themselves Cato, for the Roman orator and defender of the State, 
Marcus Porcius Cato. Brutus was named after Marcus Junius Brutus, Caesar’s Assassin 
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who put his own son to death for the sake of the republic. The name John De Witt was 
taken up in honor of the 17th century Dutch statesman who fought the Aristocracy 
(Frohnen, 1999). An Old Whig refers to, “the “Old Whig” principles that motivated the 
Glorious Revolution and the War for Independence” (Frohnen, p. 316) 
The Anti-Federalists even used the name Federalist in their pennames as in the 
Essay of a Federalist found in the Boston Gazette, and the Essay of a Democrat 
Federalist published in the Pennsylvania Herald or a Republican Federalist, published in 
the Massachusetts Centinel. 
A number of leading men who took part in the convention wrote Anti-Federalist 
literature including Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, George Mason, and Edmund 
Randolph of Virginia. These three men alone refused to sign the Constitution at the 
convention. Other Anti-Federalists left the convention early. Some subsequently attacked 
the Constitution with their pens during the ratification debates. These men included 
Luther Martin of Maryland, and Robert Yates and John Lansing of New York.  
 
Exhibit II.3 Anti-Federalist Authors and Pennames 
Penname Author Position 
Agrippa James Witnhrop  
Alfred Author Unknown Author Unknown 
An American Author Unknown Author Unknown 
Anon Author Unknown Author Unknown 
Aristocrotis Author Unknown Author Unknown 
A Bostonian Author Unknown Author Unknown 
Brutus [New York] Robert Yates or 
Thomas Treadwell 
Member of the 
constitutional convention 
who left early and did not 
sign 
Brutus [Virginia] Reply to 
Cassisu 
Author Unknown Author Unknown 
Brutus, Jr. Author Unknown Author Unknown 
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Candidus Samuel Adams or 
Benjamin Austin, Jr.  
 
 Author Unknown  
Cato [New York] George Clinton 
or Abraham Yates 
Governor of New York 
Cato [South Carolina] Author Unknown Author Unknown 
Cato Uticensis Author Unknown Author Unknown 
Centinel  George Bryan  
or his son, Samuel Bryan 
Legislator and Judge, and 
Anti-Federalist leader 
Samuel Bryan is George 
Bryan’s son 
Cincinnatus Richard Henry Lee  
A Citizen Author Unknown Author Unknown 
A Columbian patriot Elbridge Gerry or  
Mercy Warren 
 
Warren – Historian, Sister 
of James Otis & wife of 
James Warren 
Consider Arms, Malichi 
Maynard and Samuel Field 
Author Unknown Author Unknown 
Cornelius Author Unknown Author Unknown 
A Countryman DeWitt Clinton  
A Countryman from 
Dutchess County 
DeWitt Clinton  
A Customer Author Unknown Author Unknown 
David Author Unknown Author Unknown 
Deliberator Author Unknown Author Unknown 
A delegate who has Catched 
Cold 
Author Unknown Author Unknown 
A Democratic Federalist Author Uncertain (possibly 
Richard Henry Lee) 
 
Denatus Author Unknown Author Unknown 
A Friend of the Republic Thomas Cogswell  
A Friend to the Rights of 
the People 
Thomas Cogswell  
John De Witt Author Unknown Author Unknown 
A [Maryland] Farmer John Francis Mercer Member of the 
constitutional convention 
(left early without signing) 
A [New Hampshire] Farmer Colonel Thomas Cogswell Chief Justice, New 
Hampshire Court of 
Common Pleas 
A [Pennsylvania] Farmer Author Unknown Author Unknown 
A Farmer and a Planter Author Unknown Author Unknown 
A Federal Farmer Melancton Smith or 
Richard Henry Lee 
 
A Federalist Author Unknown  
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Federal Farmer Richard Henry Lee  
A Federal Republican 
(AKA Veritas Politica) 
Author Unknown Author Unknown 
A Georgian Author Unknown Author Unknown 
A Gentleman in a 
Neighbouring State  
Author Unknown Author Unknown 
John Humble Author Unknown Author Unknown 
Helvidius Priscus Samuel Adams or  
General James Warren 
Warren – Speaker of the 
Massachusetts House of 
Representatives 
An Impartial Examiner Author Unknown Author Unknown 
Sentiments of Many Author Unknown Author Unknown 
Montezuma Author Unknown Author Unknown 
A Newport Man Author Unknown Author Unknown 
An Observer Author Unknown Author Unknown 
An Officer of the Late 
Continental Army 
William Findly  
One of the Common People Author Unknown Author Unknown 
An Old Whig Author Unknown Author Unknown 
Philadelphiensis Benjamin Workman Mathematics instructor at 
the University of 
Pennsylvania 
Phileleutherous Author Unknown Author Unknown 
A Plebian Melancton Smith  
Poplicola Author Unknown Author Unknown 
A Proposal for Reviving 
Christian Conviction 
Author Unknown Author Unknown 
A Republican Federalist James Warren Speaker of the 
Massachusetts House of 
Representatives 
Republicus Author Unknown Author Unknown 
Samuel Author Uncertain (possibly 
James Sullivan) 
 
Sidney, Address by Sidney Robert Yates Author Unknown 
Sidney, Essays by Sidney Abraham Yates Author Unknown 
A Son of Liberty Author Unknown Author Unknown 
Tamony Author Unknown Author Unknown 
A Virginian Author Unknown Author Unknown 
Vox Populi Author Unknown Member of the 
Massachusetts Legislature 
A Watchman Author Unknown Author Unknown 
William Penn Author Unknown Author Unknown 
The Yeomanry of 
Massachusetts  
Author Unknown Author Unknown 
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Leadership Literature 
The following section provides a theoretical rationale for this study. The purpose 
of the study is to determine the leadership assumptions of the American Statesmen during 
the constitutional era. This is necessary because a gap exists in the literature pertaining to 
those subjects in which the Statesmen focused their attention. Contemporary leadership 
literature does not address the themes that the Statesmen focused upon--such as tyranny, 
demagoguery, and balancing power.  
Various schools of thought have sought to explain the phenomenon of leadership. 
Yet, none of these theorists agree. In this dissertation, the Statesmen will be viewed as a 
separate and distinct school of thought. Then their views on leadership will be compared 
to other intellectual camps.   
Bass (1990) one of the premier scholars in the field of leadership created a 
conceptual framework of leadership models and theories in his comprehensive Handbook 
of Leadership. His categories are briefly reviewed below. He divided the theories into 5 
categories: 
• Personal and situational theories 
• Interaction and social learning theories 
• Theories and models of interactive process 
• Perceptual and cognitive theories 
• Hybrid explanations 
Personal and situational theories include great man theories, trait theories, 
personal-situational theories, psychoanalytic theories, political theories, and humanistic 
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theories. Great man theories paint a picture of the world moved by individuals, larger 
than life, who alone are capable of leading in their time. Great man theories gave way to 
trait theories that claim that the leader becomes the leader because of special inborn traits 
that he possesses.  
In contrast to trait theories, situational theories claim that the leader becomes a 
leader because of the demands of the environment. According to these theories, the leader 
is more a product of the right moment, than any internal characteristic.  
Psychoanalytic theories are a radical departure built upon the assumptions of 
various psychological theories. According to psychoanalytic theories, the success of the 
Constitution could be explained in many ways that include, but are not limited to: the 
Federalist’s need for ego-gratification, the people’s need for a savior, or the Statesmen’s 
good (or bad) relations with parents at an early age. 
Political theories explain leadership through the eyes of a particular political 
ideology. For example, a Marxist, a Nazi and an American with a democratic mindset 
each see the same event through different filters. They would, therefore, explain the event 
differently. 
Humanistic theories begin with the premise that, “The human being is by nature a 
motivated organism” (Bass, 1990, p. 43). Many business and leadership theories have 
been developed upon this premise. “McGregor (1960, 1966) postulated two types of 
organizational leadership--Theory X and Theory Y” (Bass, p. 43). A leader who 
subscribes to Theory X assumes a low view of human nature. Conversely, a leader who 
subscribes to Theory Y expects the best of men and would structure the organization in 
such a way as to allow for man’s best effort.  
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Argyris (1957) felt that the organization and the individual were inherently in 
conflict. Likert (1961) felt that leaders ought to consider and be supportive of their 
followers. Blake and Mouton (1964, 1985) charted leaders according to their task 
orientation or people orientation. Task orientation and people orientation certainly factor 
into a leader’s ability to be effective. Yet, in general, the Statesmen were not thinking in 
such terms (Hershey & Blanchard, 1982).  
Some of these ideas are complementary, but not congruent with the Statesmen’s 
assumptions. Others are simply contrary. For example, although the Statesmen certainly 
took followers into account, they operated on different premises. Followers were less 
informed about the substance of legislation, but they were ultimately the king-makers in a 
representative democracy.  
Interaction and social learning theories include the leader-role theory, theories of 
attainment of the leadership role, reinforced change theory, path-goal theory, and 
contingency theory. According to Bass (1990) the leader-role theory maintains that, 
“Leaders behave according to what is expected of them, and how they perceive their roles 
are defined” (p. 44). This expanded the function of leadership to include followers. 
Theories of attainment focus on who becomes a leader and why. The Statesmen, for 
instance, had this point down to a science (although their explanations would appear 
uncouth in contrast to modern analysis). By standards of modern academia, the Statesmen 
appear simplistic in their reasoning and superstitious in their assumptions since they 
deduct many core suppositions from Christianity. 
Reinforced-change theory asserts that, “Leaders acquire their position, by virtue 
of their perceived ability to reinforce the behavior of group members by granting or 
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denying rewards or punishments” (Bass, 1990, p. 45). Path-goal Theory likewise 
accounts for leadership by asserting that the leader creates a path to the goals that the 
followers seek.  
Contingency theory creates a division between two basic types of leaders: task-
oriented leaders, and relation-oriented leaders. Task-oriented leaders are suited for certain 
situations, while relationship-oriented leaders are suited for others. According to 
contingency theory, the type of leader necessary is dependent upon the primary need.  
Theories and models of interactive processes included Yukl’s (1971) multiple 
linkage model, the multiple-screen model, vertical-dyad linkage, exchange theories, 
behavioral theories. Yukl suggested that followers are more satisfied when the leaders 
were more considerate of their well-being. The multiple-screen model suggests that 
followers receive additional benefit when their leaders maintain good relations with their 
bosses. Vertical-Dyad Linkage focuses on the relation between leaders and specific 
followers rather than the whole group. According to this model, in-group members 
perform better than out-group members. 
Exchange theories suggest a quid pro quo between the leader and his followers. 
Jacobs’s (1970) social exchange theory asserted that the leaders purchase their status by 
providing benefits to the people whom they lead. Behavioral theories are built upon the 
premises of behavioral psychology. They tend to ignore the cognitive function and focus 
on changing and reinforcing behavior (Bass, 1990, p. 49). 
Perceptual and cognitive theories include attribution theories, information 
processing, open-systems analysis, and the rational-deductive approach. Attribution 
theories, or implicit theories of leadership, suppose that followers have preconceived 
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notions of leadership, and leaders must either match these expectations or suffer the 
consequences. According to information processing theories, a leader has a greater 
burden of solving the problem or structuring the task than the members of the group. 
Open systems analysis views the leader not only as a member of the group, but as part of 
an eco-system. In open systems analysis, the environment in which the leader functions is 
as important as the actions of the leader. Vroom and Yetton (1974), in their rational-
deductive approach, created a scale for leaders to determine the degree of direct or 
participative involvement that the leader should engage in.   
Hybrid explanations are theories that combine two or more of the previous 
theories into a larger theory. The most notable of these theories is transformational 
leadership. Transformational leadership takes a step beyond transactional leadership in 
that the goal is more than a simple exchange. Instead, the transformational leader inspires 
his followers to go above and beyond their natural capacity. “Transformational leadership 
is closer to the prototype of leadership that people have in mind when they describe their 
ideal leader and is more likely to provide a role model with which subordinates want to 
identify” (Bass, 1990, p. 54). 
In this dissertation, the researcher has not attempted to validate any particular 
theory or historical viewpoint. Instead, the researcher has examined the written record to 
discover the viewpoint of the Statesmen. In chapter V (analysis) the researcher compared 
and contrasted the assumptions of the Statesmen on leadership with those of the 
contemporary leadership literature. 
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CHAPTER III 
Methods 
Chapter III describes the methods employed in this study. This chapter begins 
with the research question and is followed by the methods selected to answer the research 
question and the rationale for these particular methods. This section concludes with a 
description of data collection and analysis process. 
The Research Question 
This study describes American Statesmen’s assumptions on the nature of 
leadership. This initial statement of the problem leads to subsidiary questions that 
allowed the researcher to categorize statements made during the convention and 
ratification debates.  
Based on the primary source writings of the Statesmen, the assumptions have 
been classified into categories ranging from most relevant primary sources such as 
Madison’s notes on the Federal Convention to less relevant primary sources such as those 
of little-known Anti-Federalists. The researcher’s working assumption was that the most 
reliable and useful information on the Statesmen’s views on leadership can be found at 
the constitutional convention. That is, the researcher believed that the men who 
hammered out the Constitution in the Philadelphia Convention understand it best.  
The second most credible source then would be those who took part in the 
ratification debates. As directly elected representatives of the people of each state, these 
delegates were to offer their sound judgment after thoroughly reviewing the constitution. 
The next and final level of primary sources was the public writings that argue for, or 
against, the Constitution.   
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Dissertation Matrix 
The Statesmen’s own words have been classified based on relevance in a second 
similar series of concentric circles in a five-tiered process visually represented below. 
The Statesmen’s assumptions dealt with the nature of the leader, the nature of power, the 
nature of the people, the nature of the government, and the nature of society.  
While surveying the literature, the researcher developed a matrix (see Appendix 
A) as a tool to systematize the data. The overarching research question is followed by six 
specific research questions that emanate from this question in light of the writings of the 
Statesmen. The matrix is visually represented below in Exhibit III.1.These questions are:  
• Who are leaders?  
• What did the Statesmen expect leaders to do?  
• What did the Statesmen expect leaders not to do?  
• What should leaders normatively do?  
• How would the Constitution bridge the gap between expected and normative 
behavior? 
Each of these specific questions was built upon a number of variables that have 
been unearthed in the literature review. These variables are classified and create a 
coherent picture of the Statesmen’s assumptions. 
Research questions 
 The dissertation matrix is a foundation built upon the questions discussed 
previously. The Statesmen held certain assumptions about leadership, power, the people, 
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Exhibit III.1 Visual Representation of the Assumptions of American Statesmen during the Constitutional Era 
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government, and society. They expected leaders to act in particular ways, and they used the 
Constitution to filter the leader’s behavior. The result has been a constitutional system that 
has offered great stability for the last 200 years. 
Qualitative Design  
 Due to the nature of this study, a qualitative research method was applied. Garraty 
suggested that, “content analysis offers history and biography a fruitful field for research” (as 
cited in Pool, 1959, p. 187). Interviews are impossible, since this study deals with the 
statements of men who have been dead for 200 years. They cannot be tested in a laboratory. 
Instead, they are tested in the text--the written record that they left behind. This calls for a 
qualitative design. According to Berelson (1952), “'Qualitative' analysis is relatively less 
concerned with the content as such than with content as a 'reflection' of 'deeper' phenomena” 
(p. 123). The qualitative researcher seeks the, “purposes, motives, and other characteristics” 
(p. 18) of those they are studying. The next section addresses concerns about reliability and 
validity in this study. 
Reliability 
The first issue in a qualitative study is reliability. Mark (1996) defined reliability as, 
“the extent to which an operational definition, a questionnaire, test, interview schedule, or 
other instrument is stable and consistent” (p. 402). The goal, as Berelson (1952) pointed out, 
is to be objective, or as nearly objective as possible (p. 171). He described reliability as “the 
degree to which the data are independent of the measurement instrument” (pp. 171-172).   
Believability flows from replicability. Although certain theories (e.g., implicit 
leadership theories, trait theory) have contributed to the creation of the analytical framework, 
this particular study is not attempting to prove or test any specific leadership theory. Rather, 
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it seeks to develop a pattern by identifying consistencies or inconsistencies within the 
primary source literature. It will thereby form a view of the Statesmen’s understanding of 
leadership that may or may not be aligned with contemporary leadership literature.  
Validity 
 The second issue in a qualitative study is validity. Mark (1996) defined validity as, 
“The extent to which it measures what it is supposed to measure” (p. 289). Again, he wrote, 
“An operational definition is valid to the extent that it measures the variable or concept in 
such a way that it reflects its “true” meaning” (p. 27). This section will deal with the different 
types of validity and explain how this study maintains validity in three ways: (a) construct 
validity, (b) internal validity, and (c) external validity. 
Construct Validity. Mark (1996) explained that construct validity determines, “the 
degree to which certain explanatory concepts (constructs), derived from theory, account for 
performance on a measure” (p. 291). Berelson (1952) believed that, “There is little difficulty 
in achieving validity in content analysis data” (p. 169). According to Berelson, “Most of the 
time, careful definition of categories and judicious and alternative selection of indicators will 
take care of the matter” (p. 171). For example, in this study, a measure of the Statesmen’s 
assumptions, as defined in chapter I, should correlate with the constitutional checks they 
implemented. It should negatively correlate with tyrannical or non-related behaviors. That is, 
the assumptions should lead to consistent conclusions that should be clearly connected. 
Internal Validity. Internal validity is concerned with the causal connection between 
what is studied and the result that is claimed. Mark (1996) explained that internal validity is a 
check to determine if the independent variable actually affects the dependent variable (p. 
131). Simply stated, does A cause B as the study claims? Repetitions of basic assumptions by 
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many of the Statesmen in debates across the various levels, for instance, create a higher 
probability of internal validity. Berelson (1952) wrote, “The requirement of objectivity 
stipulates that the categories of analysis should be defined so precisely that different analysts 
can apply them to the same body of content and secure the same results” (p. 16). Therefore, 
any researcher reading the references cited in this study and using the same operational 
definitions should come to similar conclusions. The Statesmen should not have changed their 
minds between two different studies on their assumptions of leadership. 
If an alternate explanation can adequately be substituted for our findings, the study 
cannot claim to have internal validity. This study seeks to ascertain the Statesmen’s 
assumptions on leadership. These assumptions shaped the structure (e.g., checks and 
balances) of the constitution. If it could be asserted that the Constitution was shaped by some 
alternative such as the weather or 17th century fashion, then the study would lack internal 
validity. 
External Validity. External validity deals with the issue of generalizability. Mark 
(1996) explained external validity by asking, “To what other groups of people, families, 
organizations and the like can the observed effect be generalized?” (p. 132). External validity 
can be difficult to maintain in such a unique study. The American Statesmen are a unique 
group of men who are not generalizable to the general population. Yet, they may have acted 
in such a way that lessons can be gleaned from their example.  
Limitations of method 
The researcher has carefully studied the philosophical, political and historical events 
leading to the Constitutional convention, and ratification debates. A rich assumption base has 
been developed through a literature review of public records, then confirmed (or denied) by 
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repetition and their relationship to the Constitution and actual experience over the last 200 
years. This review demonstrates that the environment in 1787-1789 was greatly different 
(socially, morally, etc.) from our current society. It also suggests a different assumption base. 
Yet, the researcher could only rely on the historical texts since he was not able to experience 
these differences first hand. 
Limitations in an historical study are based on the breadth of documents (in this case, 
this is not a problem), the selection of the most appropriate documents and the interpretation 
of the documents. Interpretation, however, may become a problem if the researcher has failed 
to eliminate as much bias as possible. In this study, bias was checked in two ways. First, the 
researcher steeped himself in the classical philosophy of the 17th and 18th century to be able 
to think (as much as possible) in the terms that the Statesmen would have thought. Second, 
the researcher posed “what” questions, so that findings emerged from the writings, rather 
than trying to prove or test specific positions or prove a particular theory.  
Research Methods 
The research methods of this study have been graphically illustrated in Exhibit III.2. 
This study is heavily reliant on primary source documents since secondary sources are more 
likely to contain bias or error and thereby decrease overall validity. The methods employed 
in this study have been explained in the following flow chart (see Exhibit III.3). The process 
of research was as follows: 
• Researcher inputs 
• Data Collection or Research sources 
• Review sources 
• Develop matrix 
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• Rank assumptions by weight/influence 
• Cluster concepts 
• Analysis 
Data Collection/Research Sources  
To overcome potential researcher bias, the researcher saturated himself in the same 
materials that the Statesmen would have read. The first step was an in-depth study of the 
classical political philosophers that American Statesmen would have read and been familiar 
with. There were two types of material in this category. The first group were those writers 
that the Statesmen respected, quoted and employed in their arguments while crafting or 
trying to impede the ratification of the constitution. These included Locke, Montesquieu, 
Blackstone, and others discussed in the literature review in chapter II. The second were the 
political philosophers that they read and ignored, ridiculed and avoided their advice when 
drafting the constitution. Plato, Machiavelli, and Rousseau fall into this category. Neither 
Federalist nor Anti-Federalist spent time defending their positions from such reasoning.  
The primary source documents--notes of the convention, the ratification debates, and 
the public Federalist and Anti-Federalist writings were reviewed for discussions of 
leadership. Since leadership was not the focus of the Convention or the ratification debates, 
the researcher had to read carefully to identify subtle references that identified the 
Statesmen’s beliefs.  
As the researcher read each text, the flagged items were reduced to Microsoft Word ®  
documents, and filed separately to create a virtual library containing each of the texts with 
only the relevant data. Each item contains the title of the work, the date of the essay or 
debate, a short summary context for the quotation, the volume and page numbers, and the 
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verbatim quotation. The researcher could then easily scan these Word ® documents for the 
assumptions, and then refer to the book for the broader context if necessary. Copies of these 
files were stored in a separate location to ensure continuity in case of computer problems.   
Sampling Methods 
The qualitative researcher must define his sampling method. Berelson (1952) 
suggests that a truly representative sample of content is not only “adequate” but 
“economical” (p. 174). However, primary source documents are crucial to this study. 
Because the study was limited to the public debates, the researcher has read every document 
in the most reliable compendiums of Federalist and Anti-Federalists in print as discussed in 
chapter II.  
This was followed directly by a study of the secondary sources. The study would be 
inadequate without a review of the works of major historians who have written about the 
constitution. These historians have been grouped by their intellectual orientation. The sample 
of secondary historical sources covered the most reliable and noted historians who have 
written on the Constitution. The final step in this process was to search the applicable 
leadership literature in order to compare established theories to the leadership assumptions of 
the Statesmen.
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Exhibit III.2. Research Plan for Quantitative Study 
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Matrix Development 
Through the literature review, the researcher developed a matrix (see Appendix 
A) that visually portrayed the sentiment of the political philosophers who preceded the 
Statesmen. This helped to refine the overall question and create specific research 
questions. The following research questions were developed in this way: 
• Who are leaders?  
• What did the Statesmen expect leaders to do?  
• What did the Statesmen expect leaders not to do? 
• What did the Statesmen believe leaders should do (normatively)? 
• What did the Statesmen believe leaders should not do (normatively)? 
• How does the Constitution bridge the gap between expected and normative 
behaviors? 
Ranking Assumptions 
 The statements made by the Statesmen were regarded of greater or lesser 
significance depending on a number of factors that include:  
• Who said it.  
• Where it was said. 
• When it was said.  
• Repetition of the idea.  
Assumptions were weighted on these factors to better gauge their relative 
strength. Leading figures who had a significant influence were given greater credence 
than those who said little, Federalists given more than anti-Federalists. For example, 
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Madison’s words on the Constitution carry more weight than the Anti-Federalist, an Old 
Whig, since Madison was at the convention, the ratification debates of Virginia, and 
coauthored the Federalist papers.  
Where a statement was made was also significant. George (1959) asserted that the 
researcher must account for “the time and place of the communication and related 
events” to assign proper emphasis (as cited in Pool, 1959, p. 28). The greatest weight was 
applied to statements at the Constitutional convention. The next highest weight to 
statements made during the ratification debates, and finally to Federalist and Anti-
Federalist writings, since they are more distant from the actual development of the 
Constitution.  
Repetition added significance to the weight of an assumption. Frequency is a 
strange phenomenon that scholars do not agree upon. It often indicates that a particular 
word or topic is important. Berelson (1952) writes that frequency demonstrates a higher 
value for certain words over others (p. 20). Yet, Garraty (1959) believed that frequency 
“means little” unless a statistically significant relationship can be established (as cited in 
Pool, 1959, p. 182).  
A rival school of thought considers terms infrequently discussed to be important 
as a point of general agreement. For example, the Statesmen’s near obsession with 
prevention of corruption shows how important this concept was to them. Yet their virtual 
silence on issues that were taken for granted (e.g., that justice was preferable to tyranny) 
was just as significant. George (1959) suggested that non-frequency cannot be 
overlooked because low or even single frequency occurrences may be just as meaningful 
(ac cited in Pool, 1959, p. 25). Berelson (1952) claimed that content analysis coding 
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ought “to be based upon the presence or absence of material, not upon its frequency--
upon whether, not how much” (p. 54). In this study, frequency was monitored as a quasi-
quantitative support for this qualitative study. 
Intensity is another category that was considered in the analysis. For example, 
cries of tyranny and slavery have a greater weight than statements that leaders may be 
incompetent or may fail to listen to the people. Waples, Berelson, and Jacobs found that 
intensity may be useful to determine the relative strength of statements (as cited in 
Berelson, 1952, p. 160). But Pool (1959) warned that measuring intensity is liable to bias 
the research process by “slanting a text” (p. 193). He does concede, however, that, “The 
assumption that the frequency of statements provides a good index of intensity of attitude 
is probably reasonable for a large class of cases” (p. 194). This is graphically illustrated 
above in Exhibit III.3. The darkest shading has the highest relative weight because these 
writers are closest in proximity to the formation of the constitution.  
Timing must also be considered. After 1789, even the best arguments are of little 
significance. They are irrelevant in their impact on the original assumptions leading to the 
Constitution and the subsequent Bill of Rights, though they may provide insight through 
hindsight.  
The researcher must also be aware of the bias of the primary source writers. 
Garraty (1959) affirmed the need for the researcher to be careful with bias of his sources 
when he wrote:  
Further, the historian will consider the known bias of the writer. Was he, in life, a 
friend or foe of the subject? And what was his reputation as an observer? Did his 
contemporaries consider him a good judge of men? Finally, contemporary 
comments can be checked against specific facts. A writer who offers opinions 
based on evidence which itself can be proved false cannot (obviously) be 
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considered a reliable judge . . . . Actions speak louder than words. (as cited in 
Pool, 1959, p. 172) 
 
Federalist and Anti-Federalist alike would have considered neutrality on the 
subject of the Constitution a disservice to their country. Even with names like the 
Impartial Examiner, Deliberator, A Watchman and Vox Populi, the writers clearly held 
biases. Hamilton acknowledged his bias when he wrote: 
Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it an attentive 
consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it. I am 
convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your 
happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with an 
appearance of deliberation when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my 
convictions, and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are 
founded. The consciousness of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, 
however, multiply professions on this head. My motives must remain in the 
depository of my own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be 
judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace 
the cause of truth. (Federalist 1, pp. 91-92)  
 
 
Clustering Concepts 
 Clustering the concepts was the heart of the analysis. Berelson (1952) maintained 
that the formulation of categories flows from a clear hypothesis (p. 162). He further 
explains that these categories must be clear to be useful (p. 164). George (1959) wrote 
that a, “Method of successive codings is often employed in communication analysis” (as 
cited in Pool, 1959, p. 21). George recommends that the code be related to the context 
when he writes: “In order to interpret the precise meaning intended by the speaker in any 
individual instance he takes into account the purpose or objective which the specific 
communication is designed to achieve” (p. 27) This sound hermeneutical principle must 
be applied to historical research with the same precision in which the Scriptures are to be 
interpreted. New Testament Scholar, Fee (1991) explained that: 
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The interpreter must try as much as possible to reconstruct the situation of the 
recipients. That is, one must ask, how is this letter, or this section of the letter, an 
answer to their problems or a response to the recipients’ needs? In every case, a 
primary concern of interpretation is to try to hear what they would have heard. (p. 
7) 
 
 Garraty (1959) warns against bias of the researcher and the need for sound 
practices in creating categories when he wrote: 
The choice of units for the study of these relationships is highly subjective--yet 
the size of the units may affect the results . . . . The interpretation of the results of 
any counting must depend upon the mind of the investigator, and his prejudices 
and preconceptions may influence his conclusions. The value decision as to what 
to count must also affect the outcome. The value of the results is completely 
dependant upon the setting up of proper categories, and of the accurate coding of 
the material. The reliability of the conclusions depends upon the soundness of the 
basic subjective decisions of the experimenter. (as cited in Pool, 1959, p. 186) 
 
 The researcher clustered statements logically into conceptual categories. The 
process is visually represented in Exhibit III.3. By way of analogy, if the leader is the 
subject, power is the verb. The people are the direct objects while the structure of 
government is the syntax and society is the context.  
Each concept was grouped in layers building upon the previous: 
• The nature of man 
• The nature of power 
• The nature of the people 
• The nature of the government 
• The nature of society 
Color-coding was employed as an effective way to separate each category. The 
process of clustering was as follows:  
• The texts were read with an eye to any discussion on leadership.  
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• These citations were then flagged, and later recorded in Microsoft Word ® 
documents.  
• The quotations were then faithfully transcribed with the page and volume 
number.  
• The author of the work, and the date the work was first published (and, if 
applicable, the name of the newspaper in which it was originally published) 
were added in a second screening.  
• Next, the text of each citation was double-checked to ensure accuracy--
particularly in regard to spelling, capitalization (which is often irregular in 
America in the 1780s).  
• Finally, each quotation has been re-read in the original texts and an @ symbol 
added, followed by a subject line explaining the discussion surrounding the 
quotation to provide meaningful context. 
The quotations were filtered into the appropriate categories established above by 
color code. Colors were assigned so the researcher could easily identify where the 
particular quotation belonged. The color-coding system was as follows: 
• Red: Nature of Man 
• Yellow: Nature of Power 
• Turquoise: Nature of the People 
• Green: Nature of the Government  
• Blue: Nature of Society 
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Exhibit III.3 Conceptual Categories in of the Statesmen’s Assumptions on Leadership 
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ratification, Federalist, and Anti-Federalist writings lent additional structure to the initial 
framework. This framework was arranged to make the flow of the discussion coherent in 
each category. These ideas were sorted conceptually, not chronologically to allow the 
researcher to fully analyze the Statesmen’s leadership assumptions.   
 
Exhibit III.4 Sample of Citation process 
 
LETTERS OF CENTINEL – Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer (24 October 1787) 
LETTER II (Frohnen) 
@ Articles of Confederation were good. 
*49. The lust of power is so universal, that a speculative unascertained rule of 
construction would be a poor security for the liberties of the people. 
 
 
These quotations were placed in sub-categories, tallied, and separated into file 
folders. After all the quotations had been sorted, the citations in each folder were cut and 
pasted from the Microsoft Word ® documents in which they had been placed to separate 
electronic documents that correlate to each tangible folder. This allowed the researcher to 
deal exclusively with only the relevant material in each sub-folder when he dealt with 
each topic point by point.  
This incremental method was a laborious, time consuming process. However, the 
process ensured accuracy and reliability by following the steps outlined above. This 
method creates built-in redundancy. The wisdom in this approach is that the researcher 
read and reread the material. Only when this clustering has been completed, can the 
findings be intelligently discussed. 
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Methodological Weaknesses 
 There are a number of pitfalls to be avoided in qualitative research. The primary 
concern is the subjective bias of the researcher. Garraty (1959) maintains that even 
“objective content analysis was in itself partly subjective” (as cited in Pool, 1959, p. 181). 
However, this problem can be overcome by proper systemic restraints built into the 
design of the study. These restraints function in the same way that Constitutional 
restraints operate in the federal government. They are checks to prevent error or 
intentional subversion. As Berelson (1952) explained, “Much “qualitative” research is 
quasi-quantitative… qualitative analysis usually contains quantitative statements in rough 
form” (p. 116).   
The historical method also contains inherent weaknesses. For instance, actual 
interviews cannot be done as in a case study. The researcher is dependent on original 
source documentation. Moreover, Garraty (1959) points out that even published personal 
writings, “are often the product of other pens than the official author’s” (as cited in Pool, 
1959, p. 187). In such cases, further reliance on secondary sources moves the researcher 
even farther from a valid and reliable source.  
Summary 
 Chapter III presented the methods by which this study was conducted. This study 
used established principles of content analysis. Data collection from primary sources led 
to categories for analysis. Dimensions of the Statesmen’s assumptions about leadership 
were classified and clustered. These clusters of assumptions became the units of analysis 
(findings).  
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CHAPTER IV 
Findings 
This chapter presents a distillation of the researcher’s findings in the primary 
source documents. The findings are arranged conceptually rather than chronologically 
(Exhibit III.1). The key concepts are the nature of the man, the nature of power, the 
nature of the people, the nature of the government, and the nature of society.  
The Nature of Man 
The Statesmen reasoned that all leaders are men. Therefore, they are subject to all 
of the virtues and vices of other men. Federalists and Anti-Federalists may have haggled 
over the details of how virtuous or corrupt leaders may be, but they did not expect 
behavior uncommon to man. Exhibit IV.1 illustrates the progression of thought of the 
Statesmen.  
Man Was Made in the Image of God 
The Statesmen were realistic about the nature of man. According to the 
Statesmen, man is what he is because he is created by God, and he is a reflection of 
God’s image. Nicholas Collin, under the penname of A Foreign Spectator, wrote: 
“Human reason is a ray from the eternal MIND, and true goodness an image of his 
loveliest attribute” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, Letter IV, p. 413).  
The Statesmen saw God’s providence superintending their affairs. Madison wrote, 
“It is impossible for the man of pious reflection not to perceive in it a finger of that 
Almighty hand which has been so frequently and signally extended to our relief in the 
critical stages of the revolution” (Federalist 37, p. 271).
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Exhibit IV.1 Assumptions about the Nature of Man  
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Man was not only made in God’s image, but he is bound by God’s law. On this 
point too, there was general agreement between Federalist and Anti-Federalist. The Arch-
Anti-Federalist Brutus, wrote, “For every man, rulers as well as others, are bound by the 
immutable laws of God and reason, always to will what is right” (as cited in Frohnen, 
1999, Essay VI, p. 420). Likewise, the Federalist John Dickinson, writing under the 
penname Fabius, concurred that, “Our most gracious Creator does not condemn us to 
sigh for unattainable blessedness: But one thing he demands--that we should seek for 
happiness in his way, and not in our own” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, Letter III, 
p. 66).  
The Statesmen’s view of human nature was consistent with a Biblical view of 
human nature. Their writings are peppered with phrases that indicate that man’s nature is 
fixed and universal. Denatus wrote: “Human nature ever hath, is, and will be the same, 
while this world continues under the same divine law” (as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 5, 
p. 262). John De Witt explained, “Human nature is the same in all parts of the world” (as 
cited in Frohnen, 1999, Essay IV, p. 509). Cato7 added that man is “the same at present, 
as they were eighteen hundred years ago” (as cited in Storing, Letter I, vol. 5, p. 141). 
Singletary believed, “that men were [not] better now than when men after God’s own 
heart did wickedly” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 2, p. 44). Therefore, as an Old 
Whig explained, “the only safe way of reasoning on political subjects is, to consider men, 
abstractly as men, with like passions and infirmities throughout the world, in every age, 
and every country” (as cited in Frohnen, Essay VIII, p. 358). 
                                                 
7 This is a lesser-known Cato, not to be confused with the Roman orator or Trenchard and Gordon who 
wrote under the same penname. 
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The Depravity of Man 
The Statesmen articulated a Biblical view of the depravity of man. They made 
statements such as, “The depravity of human nature, illustrated by examples from history, 
will warrant us to say…” (M. Maynard & S. Field as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 4, pp. 
256-257). Lenior said, “It is the nature of mankind to be tyrannical… We ought to 
consider the depravity of human nature” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 4, pp. 203-
204). John Marshall began his remarks with the assertion, “Those who know human 
nature, black as it is…” (as cited in Elliot, vol. 3, p. 562). John De Witt went even further 
when he wrote, “And let Human Nature be as depraved as Hell itself, (and we all know it 
is)…” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Essay IV, p. 510). A Georgian explained, “Mankind, 
upon the whole, is so depraved as, with pleasure, to trample upon the sacred rights and 
privileges of their fellow creatures” (as cited in Storing, vol. 5, p. 130).  
This is, in fact the reason that government is necessary. Governor Livingston 
explained, “Indeed, if it were not for the depravity of human nature, we should stand in 
no need of human government at all” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 2, p. 389). 
Madison likewise said, “But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections 
on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary” (Federalist 
51, p. 356). 
Corruption 
The Statesmen reasoned from internal to external. If depravity is the cause, then 
corruption is the effect. Corruption is the natural consequence of depravity. An Old Whig 
anticipated Lord Acton’s famous dictum when he wrote, “It is justly observed that the 
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possession of sovereign power is a temptation too great for human nature to resist” (as 
cited in Frohnen, 1999, Essay 2, p. 323).  
Corruption could come from many different sources. It may come from the 
legislature (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 4, p. 202), the executive (Madison, 
1840/1987, p. 46), an aristocracy (p. 396), a failure to separate powers (p. 269), a system 
that is too permanent (p. 168), foreign meddling (p. 369), man’s natural lust for power 
(Poplicola as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 4, p. 148), a failure to punish evil (A [Maryland] 
Farmer as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Essay IV, p. 592;  Iredell as cited in Elliot, vol.4, p. 
32), licentiousness (Atticus as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, p. 333), or simple 
complacency (Helvidius Pricus as cited in Storing, vol. 4, p. 155). 
Man is Neither Perfect Nor Perfectible 
 Perfection was not something that the Statesmen either expected or aspired to, 
personally or governmentally. At the convention, Franklin who was legendary for his 
faith in both man and reason explained, “The small progress made after 4 or five weeks… 
is methinks a melancholy proof of the imperfection of the Human Understanding” 
(Madison, 1840/1987, p. 181). Bloodworth advised that we “ought to be cautious” 
because “human nature is fallible” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 4, p. 185). 
Hamilton asked “Is it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden age . . . of 
perfect wisdom and perfect virtue?” (Federalist 6, p. 113). 
 The Statesmen reasoned that if men are imperfect, the institutions they create will 
be imperfect. Brutus warned, “Perfection is not to be expected in any thing that is the 
product of man” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Essay I, p. 384). A Landholder concurred, 
writing, “Perfection is not the lot of human institutions; that which has the most 
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excellencies and fewest faults, is the best that we can expect” (as cited in Sheehan & 
McDowell, 1998, Letter VII, p. 480). It should be noted that the Constitution only called 
for a “more perfect union” (US Constitution, 1789). 
Rule of the Best Men 
 Federalists and Anti-Federalists agreed that virtuous men ought to govern, and 
that only virtuous men would govern well. Turner of Massachusetts hoped, “that we may 
be blessed with sober, solid, upright men in Congress. I wish that we may be favored 
with such rulers; but I fear they will not all, if most, be the best moral or political 
characters” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 2, p. 31). General Brooks was not so much 
concerned that good men would administer well, but he asked, “But what will prevent 
bad men from mischief, is the question?” (vol. 4, p. 44). A Citizen of Philadelphia 
explained the goal of the convention: 
the grand secret of forming a good government, is, to put good men into the 
administration: for wild, vicious, or idle men, will ever make a bad government, 
let its principle be ever so good; but grave, wise, and faithful men, acting under a 
good constitution, will afford the best chance of security, peace, and prosperity, to 
the citizens. (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, Letter V, p. 195) 
 
Cato explains that the rule of the best men is not adequate security for a 
government: “In Plato’s imaginary one, perhaps such an assertion might have had its 
weight; but in other Republics, and in modern times, I deny that Virtue alone is adequate 
to tumultuous operations” (as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 5, p. 142). 
 Madison reasoned that although the best men are preferable, they will not always 
rule. He wrote: “Enlightened Statesmen will not always be at the helm” (Federalist 10, p. 
132). Instead, we may have to settle for “the best we can get” (a citizen of Philadelphia as 
cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, p. 187). 
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 Some were more forceful in their sentiments. General Thompson said, “I 
extremely doubt the infallibility of human nature. Sir, I suspect my own heart, and I shall 
suspect our rulers” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 2, p. 34). Captain Snow, in the 
Massachusetts Convention claimed that if a leader attempted treason, “I stand ready to 
leave my wife and family, sling my knapsack, travel westward, to cut their heads off” 
(vol. 2, p. 34).  
Personal Character Is Insufficient 
 The Statesmen believed that men of good character should be in office. Yet, none 
of the Statesmen believed that the personal character was sufficient. Noah Webster wrote, 
“Virtue, patriotism, or love of country, never was and never will be, till men’s natures are 
changed, a fixed, permanent principle and support of government” (as cited in Sheehan & 
McDowell, 1998, p. 400). James Wilson also remarked in the Convention that, “the virtue 
& good sense of those who compose [the legislature]” is an “inadequate [check]” 
(Madison, 1840/1987, p. 109).  
A dividing line between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists became much clearer 
on this point. The Federalists believed that better men would be brought to office through 
the filter of representation. Madison explained that the goal of the Constitution: 
The aim of every political Constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers 
men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common 
good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions 
for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust. 
(Federalist 57, p. 383) 
 
Patrick Henry railed against the Constitution because he believed it depended too 
much on the virtue of rulers. In the Virginia convention on June 5, 1788 he said, “Show 
me that age and country where the rights and liberties of the people were placed on the 
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sole chance of their rulers being good men, without a consequent loss of liberty!” He 
objected to the Constitution because, “The preservation or our liberty depends on the 
single chance of men being virtuous enough to make laws to punish themselves” (as cited 
in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, pp. 59, 61). Four days later he thundered, “Virtue will 
slumber. The wicked will be continually watching: Consequently you will be undone,” 
and again, “If you depend on your President’s and Senators patriotism, you are gone” (as 
cited in Frohnen, 1999, p. 725).  
The Passions 
 The passions were the effective psychology of the founding fathers. They 
discussed them in the same way that modern thinkers discuss Freudian slips or Pavlovian 
responses. The passions account for all of the evils that plague mankind. The lust, greed, 
malice and ambition that we universally experience stem from those passions that reside 
in man. Hamilton discussed, “the unruly passions of the human heart” (Federalist 31, p. 
237). At the Constitutional convention he said, “Take mankind in general, they are 
vicious--their passions may be operated upon” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 1, p. 
438).  
All men are governed by the passions. Denatus explained, “Had the creator of the 
universe thought proper to form mankind without selfish and dissocial passions, I think I 
can maintain, that we would be happy, and in little need of human government” (as cited 
in Storing, 1981, vol. 5, pp. 263-264). Mr. Locke8 thought both state and federal officers 
will have the, “same passions, dispositions, and failings of humanity” (as cited in Elliot, 
                                                 
8 This is not John Locke, Author of Two Treatises of Civil Government, but a delegate to the North 
Carolina ratification convention. 
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1836/1974, vol. 4, p. 169). As a Freeman explained, “To fight battles and vanquish 
enemies is far less difficult than to curb selfish passions, to liberalize the narrow-minded, 
to eradicate old prejudices” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, p. 283). 
Hamilton believed that understanding human nature and the passions was 
fundamental to forming the checks found in the Constitution. When submitting his plan 
for the Constitution, he explained, “Gentlemen differ in their opinions concerning the 
necessary checks, from the different estimates they form of the human passions” 
(Madison, 1840/1987, p. 116).  
Serious consequences flow from a failure to guard against the passions. Madison 
pointed to “The danger of disturbing the public tranquility” (Federalist 49, p. 349), 
Gouverneur Morris worried about oppression (Madison, 1840/1987, p. 204). An Old 
Whig foresaw the people losing their liberties (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Essay I, p. 320), 
and Hamilton feared the Union itself was at stake (Federalist 22, pp. 197-198). 
Let Reason Govern 
 The Statesmen believed that reason should guide the government. They deduced 
that since God created reason, they could build their system of government successfully 
on the reason he had granted to them. A [Maryland] Farmer wrote, “The all-wise and all-
bountiful Author of Nature, could never have created human reason unequal to the happy 
regulation of human conduct” (ac cited in Frohnen, 1999, Essay V, p. 595).  
 The Statesmen knew that the passions were unstable, and they were loath to use 
force except when absolutely necessary. According to Hamilton, reason must prevail in 
the debates, “For in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making 
proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution” 
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(Federalist 1, p. 90). Governor Randolph added, “Religion, the dearest of all interests, has 
too often sought proselytes by fire rather than by reason; and politics, the next in rank, is 
too often nourished by passion, at the expense of the understanding.” (as cited in Elliot, 
1836/1974, vol. 3, pp. 23-24). Yet there was one small but significant problem. Reason 
too was flawed.  
Self-interest 
 While reason may be flawed, the passions would certainly lead to error. Yet, 
human nature was a dependable ally. Hamilton reasoned, “This depends on principles of 
human nature that are as infallible as any mathematical calculations” (as cited in Elliot, 
1836/1974, vol. 2, p. 366).  
 Henry made the most eloquent defense of this check of self-interest, or as he 
called it, “self love.” On June 9, 1788, Henry declared on the floor of the Virginia 
ratification convention, “Tell me not of checks on paper; but tell me of checks founded 
on self-love.” Henry explained, “The real rock of political salvation is self-love 
perpetuated from age to age in every human breast, and manifested in every action. If 
they can stand the temptations of human nature, you are safe.” He concluded, “All checks 
founded on any thing but self-love, will not avail” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, p. 725, 
727).   
 The key to self-interest was to couple the individual good of the leader with the 
corporate good of society. Hamilton explained, “We must take man as we find him, and if 
we expect him to serve the public must interest his passions in doing so. A reliance on 
pure patriotism had been the source of many of our errors” (Madison, 1840/1987, p. 150). 
Hamilton continued,  
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This position will not be disputed so long as it is admitted that the desire of 
reward is one of the strongest incentives of human conduct; or that the best 
security for the fidelity of mankind is to make their interests coincide with their 
duty. (Federalist 72, p. 464) 
 
Leaders May Be Dangerous 
A fundamental assumption of the Statesmen was that men are universally the 
same. This means that the passions operate on all, power corrupts all, virtue alone is an 
inadequate guardian, and self-interest is common to all. Williams, in the New York 
convention asked his colleagues, “What reasons have we to suppose that our rulers will 
be more sympathetic, and heap lighter burdens upon constituents than the rulers of other 
countries?” (Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 2, p. 340). Franklin held an even more bleak view. 
He inquired in the Constitutional convention in Philadelphia: 
And of what kind are the men that will strive for this profitable pre-eminence, 
through all the bustle of cabal, the heat of contention, the infinite mutual abuse of 
parties, tearing to pieces the best of characters? It will not be the wise and 
moderate; the lovers of peace and good order, the men fittest for the trust. It will 
be the bold and the violent, the men of strong passions and indefatigable activity 
in their selfish pursuits. These will thrust themselves into your government and be 
your rulers. (Madison, 1840/1987, p. 44) 
 
 The Federal Farmer asserted, that men who believe leaders will not fall into 
temptation, “must be very uninformed, or suppose they are talking to children. In the first 
place, the members will be governed by all those motives that govern men” (as cited in 
Frohnen, 1999, Letter X, p. 226). He continued, “Even good men in office, in time, 
imperceptibly lose sight of the people, and gradually fall into measures prejudicial to 
them” (Letter XI, p. 235). 
This characteristic was magnified in a legislative body. Madison explained that a 
man’s opinion is, “timid and cautious when left alone, and acquires firmness and 
confidence in proportion to the number with which it is associated” (Federalist 49, p. 
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349). He continued: “In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever character composed, 
passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a 
Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob” (Federalist 55, p. 376).  
States Act Like Men 
 In the same way that leaders are not different from other men, states take on all 
the characteristics of men since they are composed of the same depraved, corrupt human 
beings. The [Maryland] Farmer explained, “There can be no fixed and permanent 
government that does not rest on the fixed and permanent orders and objects of mankind” 
(as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Essay V, p. 598). Noah Webster wrote, “All public bodies 
have these fits of passion, when their conduct seems to be perfectly boyish; and in these 
paroxisms, a check is highly necessary” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, p. 375, 
377).  
A Federal Republican lamented that we cannot rationally expect governors to, 
“restrain their own power and abridge their own authority.” He continued, “We would 
willingly pay a complement to human nature by supposing the best, if experience did not 
rise up against us” (as cited in Storing, 1981, vol.3, p. 74). 
 According to Jay, nations have human characteristics and may “distrust,” have 
“good-will,” or “individual jealousies,” “envy,” and “fear” (Federalist 5, p. 106). 
Governor Randolph explained, “Nations have passions like men. It is the disposition of 
nations to attack where there is a demonstrable weakness” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, 
vol. 3, p. 196). Consequently, “If one nation maintains constantly a disciplined army” 
wrote Madison, “it obliges the most pacific nations who may be in reach of its enterprises 
to take corresponding precautions” (Federalist 41, p. 295).  
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Experience is the Best Teacher 
 The Statesmen were astute students of history. The Statesmen found experience 
more reliable than reason itself. George Mason called experience the “best of all tests” 
(Madison, 1840/1987, p. 54). Hamilton referred to “that best oracle of wisdom, 
experience” (Federalist 15, p. 160). He claimed that ignoring history was to “to set at 
defiance the accumulated experience of ages” (Federalist 6, p. 109). A Citizen of 
America concluded, “Experience is the best instructor--it is better than a thousand 
theories” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, p. 376). The only thing they thought 
was more reliable than experience was human nature itself. 
The Constitution and Human Nature 
 There is no greater shibboleth to divide the Federalist and Anti-Federalist than 
whether the Constitution was in conformity with human nature. The Anti-Federalists 
were afraid that the Constitution was defective. Melancton Smith on the floor of the New 
York ratifying convention called it a “government of oppression” (as cited in Storing, 
1981, vol. 6, p. 158). Cato wrote that it, “will as readily produce a Caesar, Caligula, Nero, 
and Domitian in America, as the same causes did in the Roman empire” (as cited in 
Frohnen, 1999, Letter V, p. 21). 
 The Federalists, on the other hand, took the position that the Constitution was the 
best document that could have been created by man. “The real wonder,” Madison 
remarked, “is that so many difficulties should have been surmounted, and surmounted 
with a unanimity almost as unprecedented as it must have been unexpected” (Federalist 
37, p. 271). Hamilton concurred, claiming it was unwise not to ratify, “in the chimerical 
pursuit of a perfect plan. I never expect to see a perfect work from imperfect man” 
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(Federalist 85, p. 544). But Franklin, the senior statesman, summarized the Statesmen’s 
view of the nature of man best when, on the last day of the Constitutional convention he 
said: 
I doubt too whether any other Convention we can obtain, may be able to make a 
better Constitution: For when you assemble a Number of Men to have the 
Advantage of their joint Wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those Men all 
their Prejudices, their Passions, their Errors of Opinion, their local Interests, and 
their selfish Views. From such an Assembly can a perfect Production be 
expected? It therefore astonishes me, Sir, to find this System approaching so near 
to Perfection as it does. (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, p. 155) 
 
Summary 
 The Statesmen very often agreed on issues related to the nature of man. They 
agreed that man was depraved, reason should rule over the passions, man was not perfect, 
and human nature was a powerful ally in self-defense against corporate governmental 
corruption. Human nature, when properly energized with constitutional checks function 
much like white blood cells to the body politic. The Statesmen also agreed that leaders 
were simply men elevated to positions of power. They knew that power corrupts, and 
leaders need restraint. Disagreement was more often about the method of defense than the 
assumptions about the nature of man.  
The Nature of Power 
The Statesmen were more concerned with the use and abuse of power than any 
other aspect of civil government.9 The Statesmen understood the nature of power. They 
knew that men love power, that power was difficult to give up, and that the more 
concentrated the power, the more dangerous it was. Exhibit IV.2 outlines the order in 
which concepts from the nature of power have been arranged. These concepts fall into 
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four categories: primary assumptions, secondary assumptions, soft restraints, and hard 
restraints. Assumptions are the foundations upon which the restraints of the Constitution 
were built. Soft restraints are informal and more theoretical (e.g., separation of powers). 
Hard restraints are the institutionalized controls (e.g., separation of the legislature). 
The Nature of Power 
The Statesmen shared a common base of assumptions on the nature of man. 
Similarly, there is widespread agreement that power should not be abused. However, 
there was a substantial difference between what the Federalists and Anti-Federalists 
emphasize and why. Quite often, only one side of an argument on any particular point is 
heavily discussed. This lopsidedness becomes clear as each subsection of power is 
examined below. Federalist and Anti-Federalist alike would ultimately agree that the 
people were he ultimate source of power. Madison wrote that, “the ultimate authority, 
wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone” (Federalist 46, p. 
330). 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 This can be demonstrated quantitatively based on the sheer volume of quotations isolated in this study. 
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Exhibit IV.2 Assumptions about the Nature of Power 
Overview of the 
Nature of power 
The Abuse of Power 
Office Holders 
aggrandize themselves
Nations, like men, war 
when they can get 
something from it 
Liberty abused 
becomes License 
Great Men are 
Interested Men 
Jealousy as a virtue 
The People and the 
leader - same interest
Virtue is insufficient 
Term Limits 
Impeachment 
Electoral College 
Bill of Rights 
Constitution 
State vs. Federal 
State vs. State 
Men Love Power 
Power difficult to 
relinquish 
The influence of 
Christianity on the use 
and abuse of Power 
Majority oppresses a 
minority 
Power must be 
tempered by Duration
Size of Representation
Separation of Power
Representation as the 
best security 
Or State men are 
interested Men 
Responsibility
Faction 
Well-structured 
Government necessary
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Primary 
Assumptions 
Secondary 
Assumptions 
Soft 
Restraints 
Hard  
Restraints 
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Power May Be Mishandled 
 
The Statesmen were well aware that power is difficult to contain, and may be 
abused. Henry exclaimed in the Virginia convention, “Nine-tenths of our fellow men 
have been, and are now depressed by the most intolerable slavery, in the different parts of 
the world; because the strong hand of power has bolted them in the dungeon of 
despotism” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, p. 735).  
Authority requires necessary power. In the Constitutional convention, Wilson 
defined two primary types of abuse: “Bad Governts. are of two sorts. 1. That which does 
too little. 2. That which does too much: that which fails thro’ weakness; and that which 
destroys thro’ oppression” (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 192). The Statesmen knew 
that either scenario could be fatal.  
The Federalists were very interested in establishing a Federal government with 
enough power to meet the demands placed upon it. Hamilton wrote that, “The MEANS 
ought to be proportioned to the END; the persons, from whose agency the attainment of 
any END is expected, ought to possess the MEANS by which it is to be attained” 
(Federalist 23, p. 200). Hamilton considered it, “a just principle that every government 
ought to possess the means of executing its own provisions by its own authority” 
(Federalist 80, p. 502). Madison elaborated on this thought:  
No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the 
end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to do a thing 
is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included. (Federalist 44, 
p. 322) 
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Love of Power 
One outstanding point of agreement between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists 
was that men love power. Anti-Federalists believed it was a, “Principle of human nature, 
which is more powerful and operative than all the others combined; it is that lust of 
dominion that is inherent in every mind, in a greater or less degree” (Centinel as cited in 
Frohnen, 1999, Letter VI, p. 85). A [Maryland] Farmer explained that this love of fear is 
located in, “the human breast” (as cited in Frohnen, Essay V, p. 605). The Centinel 
claimed it was “inherent in the mind of man” (Letter V, p. 82). The Federal Farmer wrote 
that men, “from the monarch down to the porter, are constantly aiming at the power and 
importance, and this propensity must be as constantly guarded against in the forms of the 
government” (as cited in Frohnen, Letter XIV, p. 262).  
The Federalists held a similar a position on man’s love of power. Nicholas 
discussed, “a love of power natural to all” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 13). 
This same view was shared by Hamilton (as cited in Elliot, vol. 1, p. 418), and Franklin 
(as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 43).  
Power is Difficult to Relinquish 
The Statesmen understood that power is difficult to relinquish. Mason claimed, 
“that those who have power in their hands will not give it up while they can retain it. On 
the contrary we know that they will always when they can rather increase it” (as cited in 
Madison, 1840/1987, p. 232).  
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 The Statesmen considered power as an external force that was similar in its effect 
to a drug addiction. Agrippa wrote, “Ambition is in a governour what money is to a 
miser--he can never accumulate enough” (as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 4, p. 103).  
 Men do not willingly give up power. The Anti-Federalists appealed to history to 
prove that power once gained is rarely given up voluntarily. The Centinel asked, “Does 
history abound with examples of a voluntary relinquishment of power, however injurious 
to the community?” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Letter II, p. 58). Brutus explained that, 
“Many instances can be produced in which the people have voluntarily increased the 
powers of their rulers; but few, if any, in which rulers have willingly abridged their 
authority” (Essay I, p. 374). An Old Whig added, “There is not one instance on record in 
all history of a number of men voluntarily abandoning the powers of an aristocracy” 
(Essay III, p. 359).  
The Statesmen also appealed to human nature. Henry exclaimed, “Human nature 
never will part from power” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 174). Charles 
Pinkney said, “Men do not easily wean themselves” from power (vol. 4, p. 257). John De 
Witt explained that leaders “grow fond of it, and are loath to resign it” (as cited in 
Frohnen, 1999, Essay III, p. 503).  
 The Statesmen reasoned that Constitutional provisions should not tempt the 
leader. Instead, the system ought to provide the leader with a solution to the problem of 
his natural desire for power through legal means. In the Convention, Madison explained, 
“If we expect to call forth useful characters, we must hold out allurements; nor can any 
great inconveniency arise from such inducements. The legislative body must be the road 
to public honor” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 1, p. 441).  
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A properly geared Constitution could enlist the nature of man as an ally for the 
stability of the system. Smith pointed out that, “Men who are ambitious for places will 
rarely be disposed to render those places unstable. A truly ambitious man will never do 
this, unless he is mad” (as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 6, p. 168). An Old Whig concluded, 
“It is justly observed that the possession of sovereign power is a temptation too great for 
human nature to resist” (Essay II, p. 323).  
 The Framers were creating a system that would concentrate more power into 
centralized hands. Federalist and Anti-Federalist alike wanted to set limits and prevent 
abuse. The solution to the abuse of power would be greater protection under the rule of 
law in a system that accounted for it by minimizing power and defending the people with 
the nature of man. A [Maryland] Farmer considered rule by man’s will the “summit of 
imperfection in human legislation” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Essay VII, p. 619). 
Nations War When They Can Get Something from It 
 According to Jay, one reason for union was the European example of continual 
fighting which would be repeated on the American continent. Jay explained, “As in 
Europe, neighboring nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests and 
unfriendly passions, would frequently be found taking different sides.” (Federalist 5, pp. 
107-108). Randolph explained, “Nations have passions like men. It is the disposition of 
nations to attack where there is a demonstrable weakness” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, 
vol. 3, p. 196). Jay concluded, “It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human 
nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting 
anything by it” (Federalist 4,  p. 101).  
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Christianity and the Use and Abuse of Power 
 As deeply religious men, the Statesmen quite naturally related their religion to the 
Constitution. The Anti-Federalists spent more time with themes concerning the relation 
of Christianity to power.10 The Anti-Federalists charged the Federalists with using 
religion to cloak ill-intentions. An Old Whig wrote of, “those who have covered their 
ambitious designs under the garb of a fiery zeal for religious orthodoxy” (as cited in 
Frohnen, 1999, Essay V, p. 341).  
Nonetheless, most of the Statesmen believed that Christian principles were 
necessary for handling power. Singletary, “Hoped to see Christians [in office],” (as cited 
in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 2, p. 44). Samuel wrote, “If civil rulers won't acknowledge 
God, he won't acknowledge them” (as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 4, p. 196). This type of 
statement cannot be simply written off as religious rhetoric. It was a great practical 
concern to the Statesmen. A Friend to the Rights of the People wrote, “When a man has 
no regard to God and his laws nor any belief of a future state; he will have less regard to 
the laws of men” (vol. 4, p. 242).  
Secondary Assumptions about Power 
 The primary assumptions of the Statesmen lead naturally to certain secondary 
assumptions. For example, the Statesmen believed that men would abuse power if they 
had the opportunity. They understood that power is intoxicating, and money is 
                                                 
10 By this the researcher is not implying that the Federalists were not religious men. The balance of this 
paragraph refutes such a concept, and all of the evidence is quite to the contrary. However, it is not within 
the scope of this work to deal with each instance of the statesmen’s discussion on religion--a topic for 
another scholar’s dissertation. 
91 
corrupting. They knew that a majority would oppress a minority if they could, and that 
office holders universally seek to increase their power.   
The Statesmen understood the dynamic tension between liberty and tyranny. But 
they were also aware that liberty abused became license. Finally, in a fascinating 
application of theory, the Anti-Federalist claimed that the advocates of the Constitution 
are interested men, and the Federalists counter-charged state leaders (primarily Anti-
Federalists) with the same. Hence, they demonstrated their assumptions in their own 
actions. 
The Abuse of Power 
To the Statesmen, it was a foregone conclusion that men would abuse power if 
they had the opportunity. All agreed that power is dangerous, necessary and should be 
guarded against with adequate checks, though, the Anti-Federalists are more vocal on 
these points. This is followed by a list of expected abuses, and the Constitutional solution 
to these evils.  
Power is dangerous. The Statesmen believed that power corrupts. It was, 
according to the Federal Farmer, “A disagreeable truth, that power perverts mens views 
in a greater degree, than public employments inform their understandings” (as cited in 
Frohnen, 1999, Letter VIII, p. 211). “Give the opportunity,” said Bedford, “and ambition 
will not fail to abuse it” (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 199).  
Power granted is power abused. Any grant of power could lead to abuse. Symmes 
said, “I hold to this maxim, that power was never given, (of this kind especially), but it 
was exercised; nor ever exercised but it was finally abused” (as cited in Elliot, 
1836/1974, vol. 2, p. 74). Brutus wrote, “I take it for granted, as an axiom in politic, that 
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the people should never authorise their rulers to do anything, which if done, would 
operate to their injury” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Essay VIII, p. 432). Turner urged, 
“instead of giving Congress powers they may not abuse; we ought to withhold our hands 
from granting such, as must be abused if exercised” (vol. 4, p. 219).  
 As a point of principle, the Statesmen felt power must be limited. Cornelius, 
“presumed that men, whether individuals, or publick bodies, will generally exercise as 
much power as they are legally vested with, and as much to their own private advantage 
as they have a constitutional right to do” (as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 4, p. 139).  
Guard against abuse. Because of the potential danger of power--even necessary 
power, the Statesmen were careful to guard against abuse. Madison’s formula was to, 
“First enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to 
control itself” (Federalist 51, p. 356).  
Federalist and Anti-Federalist alike were determined to guard against abuse. An 
Old Whig and Madison sound very much in agreement, albeit for different reasons. An 
Old Whig wrote, “Wise and prudent men always take care to guard against danger 
beforehand, and to make themselves safe whilst it is yet in their power to do it without 
inconvenience or risk” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Essay V, pp. 339-340). Likewise, in 
the Virginia Convention, Madison said, “The best way to avoid danger is to be in a 
capacity to withstand it” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 309). 
A catalogue of abuse. The Statesmen were guarding, “against the intrigues of 
artful or ambitious men” (Mercy Warren, as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 5, p. 262).11 
Henry discussed those rulers who would, “abuse their powers.” and he urged, “Let us put 
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it out of their power to do mischief” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol.1, p. 436, vol. 3, p. 
387). Smith was afraid that our government would degenerate into a, “A system of 
corruption . . . practiced without blushing” (as cited in Storing, vol. 6, p. 160). The 
Federal Farmer warned against the, “The hankerings, biasses, and contagion of offices,” 
the “licentious, assuming, and overbearing men,” and, “biass of interest and passions, 
against interested combinations, secret or open” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Letter XIII, p. 
254, Letter V, p. 185, Letter IX, p. 221). The Statesmen perceived dangers from many 
quarters as described below:  
Abuse could come through sudden changes or gradual usurpation. Hamilton 
wrote, “In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit” 
(Federalist 70, p. 454). Smith warned, “I believe were we to create a despot, he would not 
immediately dare to act the tyrant” (as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 6, p. 160). Madison 
summarized this view of gradual corruption when he wrote, “Tyranny has perhaps 
oftener grown out of the assumptions of power, called for, on pressing exigencies, by a 
defective constitution, than out of the full exercise of the largest constitutional 
authorities” (Federalist 20, p. 184). 
Those who had power could abuse it through money as easily as through political 
power. Morris explained, “Wealth tends to corrupt the mind & to nourish its love of 
power, and to stimulate it to oppression” (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 282). 
Franklin added, “Some of the greatest rogues he was ever acquainted with, were the 
richest rogues. We should remember the character which the Scripture requires in Rulers, 
that they should be men hating covetousness” (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 374). 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 While not one of the Founding Fathers, the historian Mercy Warren was included as a contemporary 
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The Minority of the Pennsylvania convention wrote, “Length of purse will too often 
prevail against right and justice” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, p. 542).  
Salary and taxation were two potential financial abuses. The Federal Farmer 
worried that, “Congress may put the pay of the members unreasonably high, or so low as 
that none but the rich and opulent can attend” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Letter X, p. 
228). As Brutus explained, “The command of the revenues of a state gives the command 
of every thing in it.--He that has the purse will have the sword, and they that have both, 
have everything” (as cited in Frohnen, Essay V, p. 410). 
The Statesmen guarded against abuse by bad men. They assumed the depravity of 
their leaders (or potential leaders). Brutus wrote of, “Ambitious and designing men” (as 
cited in Frohnen, 1999, Essay I, p. 383). Hamilton likewise spoke of, “Ambitious and 
unprincipled men” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 2, p. 365). A [Maryland] Farmer 
explained this idea when he wrote, “Laws are cobwebs, catching only the flies and letting 
the wasps escape. The great and powerful, can easily bring to justice, the poor and 
humble offender; but who is to lead to punishment the great?” (as cited in Frohnen, Essay 
VII, p. 616).  
The Anti-Federalists particularly were concerned that great men would become an 
entrenched aristocracy. Dollard defined an Aristocracy as, “A few ale and designing 
men,” who sought to “enslave the rest” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 4, pp. 337-
338). Brutus felt that an aristocracy would, “Abuse their power to the purpose of 
aggrandizing themselves, and oppressing [the people]” (Essay I, p. 383). 
                                                                                                                                                 
reference. She was Married to Joseph Warren, and she was the Daughter of James Otis. 
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 During the debates, the legislature received more attention than the executive and 
far more attention than the judiciary. All of the Statesmen wanted good representatives, 
but few expected a situation in which we would always have good representatives.  
Bedford said, “I do not, gentlemen, trust you. If you posses the power, the abuse of it 
could not be checked; and what then would prevent you from exercising it to our 
destruction?” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 1, p. 472).  
 Lenoir feared a “dangerous combination” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 4, p. 
202). Wilson and Mason both used the phrase, “cabal & corruption” (pp. 509, 510). 
Henry was troubled that the Virginia delegation may, “make a bargain with the northern 
delegates” (as cited in Elliot, vol. 3, p. 327). Lansing eloquently summarized, “The 
poison always finds a channel, and never wants an object” (vol. 2, p. 295). 
Federalist and Anti-Federalist alike worried about abuse from the Executive. 
Hamilton wrote that, “Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable 
obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption” (Federalist 6, p. 441). 
Randolph warned, “The Executive will have great opportunitys of abusing his power” (as 
cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 292).  
 The Statesmen saw potential abuse in the veto power, pardon power, the military 
power as commander-in-chief, and in the election process. Hamilton wrote, “That there 
would be greater danger of his not using his [veto] power when necessary, than of his 
using it too often, or too much” (Federalist 73, p. 471). He admitted that, “the power of 
preventing bad laws includes that of preventing good ones,” but he felt that, “The injury 
which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws, will be amply compensated 
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by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones” (p. 470). This was the general 
attitude of the Statesmen on the veto.  
Pardon power could also be abused. Mason worried that, “He may frequently 
pardon crimes which were advised by himself….If he has the power of granting pardons 
before indictment, or conviction, may he not stop inquiry and prevent detection?” (as 
cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 497). As for military power, Hamilton conceded, “It 
is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative 
authority” (Federalist 8, p. 121). Finally, the election process was particularly prone to 
abuse. Madison worried about “instability and encroachments,” and he felt that, “The 
candidate would intrigue with the Legislature” (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 273; 
pp. 318-319). 
Though the judiciary was acknowledged to be the weakest branch, it was still 
considered a potent source of abuse. The Federal Farmer wrote, “When the legislature 
makes a bad law, or the first executive magistrates usurps upon the rights of the people, 
they discover the evil much sooner, than the abuses of power in the judicial department” 
(as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Letter XV, p. 269). Hamilton wrote, “The courts must declare 
the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of 
JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that 
of the legislative body” (Federalist 78, p. 493).   
A standing army under the control of leaders that were so clearly prone to 
corruption was considered as a menace to liberty. The Federal Farmer reported, “In 
despotic governments, one man or a few men, independent of the people, generally make 
97 
the laws, command obedience, and inforce it by the sword” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, 
Letter VII, pp.197-198).  
The Statesmen were concerned with abuse from foreign powers. Butler spoke of, 
“influence from abroad” as a great evil (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 321). 
Hamilton said, “Men of little character, acquiring great power become easily the tools of 
intermeddling Neibours” (as cited in Madison, p. 117).  
The Federalists maintained that any power was prone to abuse, and that the 
greater evil was the abuse that they were currently experiencing because the federal 
government was too weak. On this particular topic, the Anti-Federalists fell silent. Across 
the board, the Federalists made two basic claims about the abuse of power. Marshal held, 
“All delegated powers are liable to be abused” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 
226). Iredell explained, “No power, of any kind or degree, can be given but what may be 
abused; we have, therefore, only to consider whether any particular power is absolutely 
necessary” (vol. 4, p. 95). The Federalists’ second argument was that the potential for 
misuse was not an adequate reason to withdraw necessary power from public officials. 
Bowdin said, “A possibility of abuse, as it may be affirmed of all delegated power 
whatever, is by itself no sufficient reason for withholding the delegation. If it were a 
sufficient one, no power could be delegated” (as cited in Elliot, vol. 2, p. 85). 
Again, the Federalists demanded that in spite of the potential for abuse, the 
government must have the power commensurate with its authority. Hamilton argued, 
“Few persons will be so visionary as seriously to contend that military forces ought not to 
be raised to quell a rebellion or resist an invasion” (Federalist 26, p. 218). Atticus wrote, 
“Too, too long it hath been the humour of our countrymen, to be so fearful of giving their 
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rulers power to do hurt, that they never have given them power to do good” (as cited in 
Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, Essay III, p. 339). Iredell held that abuse is a misapplication 
of power. It is not a defect in the system so much as a defect in the leader. He said, 
“Possible abuse, and neglect of attendance, are objections which may be urged against 
any government which the wisdom of man is able to construct” (as cited in Elliot, 
1836/1974, vol. 4, p. 130).  
A Majority Will Oppress A Minority 
A great concern was that the majority, when they came to power, would oppress 
the minority. Marshall said, “The passions of men stimulate them to avail themselves of 
the weakness of others” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 227). An American 
asked, “What is a Tyranny, but a government forced by the stronger upon the weaker?” 
(vol. 4, p. 227). Henry asked pointedly, “Will the oppressor let go the oppressed? Was 
there ever an instance? Can the annals of mankind exhibit one single example where 
rulers overcharged with power willingly let go the oppressed, though solicited and 
requested most earnestly?” (as cited in Elliot, vol. 3, p. 52). Mason, “Went on a principle 
often advanced & in which he concurred,” that “a majority when interested will oppress 
the minority” (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 441).  
A minority would oppress a majority. Consistent with their other assumptions, the 
Statesmen also worried that a strong minority would oppress the majority if they could 
get their hands on enough power. Brutus claimed that the Constitution, “will literally be a 
government in the hands of the few to oppress and plunder the many” (as cited in 
Frohnen, 1999, Essay III, p. 397). The Federal Farmer reminded his readers, “That the 
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interest of the few is opposed to the public interest, but the interest of the many, is the 
public interest” (Essay VII, p. 633).  
 The Statesmen feared oppression from both the majority and the minority. Their 
interests were in opposition to each other. In the Convention, Hamilton said: 
In every community where industry is encouraged, there will be a division of it 
into the few & the many. Hence separate interests will arrive. There will be 
debtors & creditors &c. Give all power to the many, they will oppress the few. 
Give all power to the few, they will oppress the many. (as cited in Madison, 
1840/1987, p. 116)  
 
Hamilton offered an additional example that would appear counter-intuitive to the 
modern, rationalistic mind: 
It is harsh doctrine that men grow wicked in proportion as they improve and 
enlighten their minds. Experience has by no means justified us in the supposition 
that there is more virtue in one class of men than in another. Look through the 
poor and the rich of the community, the learned and the ignorant. Where does 
virtue predominate? The difference indeed consists, not in the quantity, but kind, 
of vices which are incident to various classes (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 2, 
p. 257) 
   
Office Holders Seek to Aggrandize Themselves 
 It was no secret that leaders would use their power to advance themselves. This 
was a principle upon which the Statesmen based their calculations. Morris plainly stated, 
“The Legislature will continually seek to aggrandize & perpetuate themselves” (as cited 
in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 282).  
This was not the way that the government should work. According to the 
Statesmen, leaders would actively use the system to their own personal benefit. The 
Federal Farmer explained, “Men who govern, will in doubtful cases, construe laws and 
constitutions most favorably for increasing their own powers” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, 
Letter IV, p. 175). 
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Not only would leaders use the law for their own benefit, but will do it at the 
expense of the people. Cato wrote, “You must risque much, by indispensably placing 
trusts of the great magnitude, into the hands of individuals, whose ambition for power, 
and aggrandizement, will oppress and grind you (As cited in Frohnen, 1999, Letter III, p. 
11). 
Yet, all would have agreed with Sherman that, “The Constitution shd. lay as few 
temptations as possible in the way of those in power” (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, 
pp. 398-399).  
Liberty Abused Becomes License 
 Though the Statesmen were primarily concerned with the actions of leaders, they 
reasoned that leaders may abuse the people if the people gave them a pretext. While the 
Statesmen did everything in their power to preserve liberty, they were well aware that 
liberty taken to an extreme could produce tyranny as well. Madison wrote, “That liberty 
may be endangered by the abuses of liberty as well as by the abuses of power” (Federalist 
63, p. 418). Dawson brilliantly reminded his colleagues, “The favorite maxim of tyrants, 
that ‘mankind cannot govern themselves’” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 606).   
License was a pretext through which bad men historically had seized power. Rev. 
Thatcher explained “how nearly licentiousness and tyranny are allied . . . that 
demagogues, in all free governments, have at first held out an idea of extreme liberty, and 
have seized on the rights of the people under the mask of patriotism” (as cited in Elliot, 
1836/1974, vol. 2, p. 147).  
On June 5, 1788, Henry, in the Virginia convention, acknowledged that, 
“licentiousness is dangerous.” He continued, “I acknowledge also the new form of 
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Government may effectually prevent it: Yet, there is another thing it will as effectually 
do; it will oppress and ruin the people” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, p. 679). The next day, 
Madison rebuked his arch-rival, Henry, for being short-sighted. Madison, who had spent 
three years studying ancient republics proceeded to give Henry a history lecture. Madison 
declared: 
He [Mr. Henry] has suggested that licentiousness has seldom produced the loss of 
liberty; but that the tyranny of rulers has almost always effected it. Since the 
general civilization of mankind, I believe there are more instances of the 
abridgment of the freedom of the people by gradual and silent encroachments of 
those in power, than by violent and sudden usurpations; but, on a candid 
examination of history, we shall find that turbulence, violence, and abuse of 
power, by the majority trampling on the rights of the minority, have produced 
factions and commotions, which, in republics, have, more frequently than any 
other cause, produced despotism. (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 87).  
 
 On June 14, 1788, Henry would join in condemning the “baneful consequences,” 
of “individual licentiousness” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 397), and then 
again, 10 days later, he would state, “When men are free from restraint, how long will 
you suspend their fury? The interval between this and bloodshed is but a moment. The 
licentious and wicked of the community will seize with avidity every thing you hold” 
(vol. 3, p. 593).  
Great Men are Interested Men 
 In no other regard did the researcher find more of a practical application of the 
beliefs and basic assumptions of the Statesmen than on this topic. They practiced what 
they preached. Although they ironically aimed their criticism at each other, they 
demonstrate what they thought leaders would do and why.12 
                                                 
12 A third interesting point may be that these men knew how to pour invective upon their opponents as well 
as any modern political campaign. Even a cursory review of their writings will disabuse the reader of the 
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The men who framed the Constitution were America’s best men. They were 
lawyers, doctor, ministers, generals, Delegates to the Continental Congress, governors, 
and future presidents. Jay wrote that, “some of the most distinguished members of that 
Congress, who have been since tried and justly approved for patriotism and abilities, and 
who have grown old in acquiring political information, were also members of this 
convention” (Federalist 2, p. 96). Brutus Jr. explained that members of the Convention, 
“were men of the first talents and integrity in the union,” but he was concerned, “that 
many of them are possessed of high aristocratic ideas” (as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 6, 
pp. 38-39).  
 While the members of the Convention were, by any rational standard, the nation’s 
best men, the Anti-Federalist certainly didn’t attribute to them the virtues or prerogatives 
the ancient philosophers would have given to the best men.13 Maynard & Field reminded 
their readers that, “‘Great men are not always wise’” (as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 4, p. 
264).  
Cincinnatus referred to, “A few proud, intriguing, aristocratical men” (as cited in 
Storing, 1981, vol. 6, p. 24). The Centinel talked of, “The conspirators against our 
liberties” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Letter VIII, p. 91). An Old Whig called the Framers, 
“interested men” (as cited in Frohnen, Essay VII, p. 352). The Centinel condemned them 
as men, “who had assumed the garb of patriotism, with an insidious design of enslaving 
and robbing their fellow citizens” (as cited in Frohnen, Letter XVII, p. 132). 
                                                                                                                                                 
notion that the Founding Fathers all got along in the warm and affectionate, albeit it statesmanlike, way that 
they are painted by John Trumball.  
13 It should be noted that the only other candidates for the best men would be the current leaders of the state 
government. It also should be noted that the Federalists held these men in similar contempt. It should 
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 In the process of defending the merits of the Constitution the Federalists counter-
sued. The other best men may be bad men too. “Afraid of investigating the constitution 
itself, [Anti-Federalists] prejudice you against it by charging the patriotic members of the 
convention with a design ‘of lording it over their fellow-creatures’ and with ‘long 
meditated schemes of power and aggrandizement’” (a Federalist as cited in Sheehan & 
McDowell, 1998, p. 39).  
The favorite counter-charge of the Federalists was that the State leaders were 
opposed to the Constitution because it would lessen their influence. Yet, in charging and 
counter-charging such selfish motives, the Statesmen demonstrated their assumptions of 
leaders. Hamilton explained in Federalist 1 that the greatest obstacle to the Constitution 
may be, “the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes 
which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices 
they hold under the State establishments” (Federalist 1, pp. 89-90). Wilson talked about, 
“the interest of a very numerous, powerful, and respectable body, to counteract and 
destroy the excellent work produced by the late convention.” (as cited in Sheehan & 
McDowell, 1998, p. 107). Hamilton wrote, “Men often oppose a thing, merely because 
they have had no agency in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those 
whom they dislike” (Federalist 70, p. 454). Madison summarized the Federalist view of 
the Anti-Federalists when he offered the following analogy: 
A patient who finds his disorder daily growing worse… The physicians attend; 
the case of the patient is carefully examined;… The prescription is no sooner 
made known, however, than a number of persons interpose, and, without denying 
the reality or danger of the disorder, assure the patient that the prescription will be 
                                                                                                                                                 
further be noted that the Framers summoned every legitimate means possible to bind down the best men 
with the Constitution. 
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poison to his constitution, and forbid him, under pain of certain death, to make 
use of it. (Federalist 38, pp. 274-275) 
  
Soft Restraints  
 The primary assumptions about power lead to secondary assumptions, which in 
turn lead to two phases of systemic controls. The first are soft restraints. These are the 
conceptual building blocks upon which the hard restraints of the Constitution are built. If 
a soft restraint, like the theory of the separation of powers is the cause, the effect is the 
hard restraint of a bi-cameral legislature. Soft (indirect) restraints deal with virtue, 
distrust of officeholders, time in office, the size of representation, responsibility to the 
people, the separation of powers and the nature of faction. 
Virtue is Insufficient 
 The Statesmen agreed that more restraint than the virtue of the leaders was 
necessary to prevent tyranny. Patrick Henry was the most vocal on this subject. On 
Thursday, June, 5 1788 in the Virginia Convention, he challenged his colleagues, “Show 
me that age and country where the rights and liberties of the people were placed on the 
sole chance of their rulers being good men, without a consequent loss of liberty?” (as 
cited in Frohnen, 1999, pp. 691-692). On June 9, 1788, he warned his colleagues not to 
rely on patriotism of leaders for security (p. 725). Three days later he warned that leaders, 
“are bound by honor and conscience to act with integrity, but they are under no 
constitutional restraint” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 316). Later the same day 
he said, “I wish to guard against it by proper checks, and trust nothing to accident or 
chance. I will never depend on so slender a protection as the possibility of being 
represented by virtuous men” (vol. 3, p. 327). Eight days later he took up the same cause 
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asking, “Are we to go so far as to concede every thing to the virtue of Congress? Throw 
yourselves at once on their mercy; be no longer free than their virtue will predominate” 
(vol. 3, p. 544). The following Monday he concluded, “Your rights and liberties rest upon 
men. Their wisdom and integrity may preserve you; but on the contrary, should they 
prove ambitious and designing, may they not flourish and triumph upon the ruins of their 
country?” (vol. 3, p. 577-578).  
Jealousy as a Virtue 
The Statesmen were jealous of power. This was especially true of the Anti-
Federalists. To their minds, jealousy of power was a virtue. White said, “We ought to be 
jealous of rulers” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 2, p. 28).  
Distrust could be good. Cato cited Demosthenes who said, “That there is one 
common bulwark with which men of prudence are naturally provided, the guard and 
security of all people, particularly of free states, against the assaults of tyrants--What is 
this? Distrust” (p. 32). Henry stated, “But, sir, suspicion is a virtue as long as its object is 
the preservation of the public good” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 45). Madison 
concluded, “The truth was that all men having power ought to be distrusted to a certain 
degree” (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 237).  
Yet, many Federalists felt that excessive jealousy and distrust may be dangerous 
too. Iredell explained, “Jealousy in a free government ought to be respected; but it may 
be carried to too great an extent” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 4, p. 195). Later 
Iredell would add, “Unlimited jealousy is very pernicious” (as cited in Elliot, vol. 4, p. 
221).  
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Representation as the Best Security 
The Statesmen would agree that representation was a bulwark of liberty, but 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists would disagree over just how well representation was 
secured by the Constitution. Mason stated the goal clearly, “We wish to shut the door 
against corruption in that place where it is most dangerous--to secure against the 
corruption of our own representatives” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 271).   
Randolph asked, “Shall we not choose men respectable for their good qualities? 
Or can we suppose that men tainted with the worst vices will get into Congress?” (as 
cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 68). “Congress can never get more power than the 
people will give, nor hold it any longer than they will permit,” Peletiah Webster added, 
because if they became tyrannical, “they would soon atone for their temerity, with shame 
and disgrace, and probably with their heads” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, p. 
291). Lee (of Westmoreland) said, “As long as the privilege of representation is well 
secured, our liberties cannot be easily endangered. I conceive this is secured in this 
country more fully than in any other” (as cited in Elliot, vol. 3, p. 185). 
Anti-Federalists had numerous objections to the way in which representation was 
secured under this Constitution. The size of representation was a problem for the Anti-
Federalists. Philadelphiensis complained that, “their number is too small, their powers too 
great, their accountability to the people not properly secured” (as cited in Storing, 1981, 
vol. 3, p. 133). The size of the district also posed a problem to the Anti-Federalists. 
Larger district sizes meant that it would be harder for local, private citizens to gain power 
under this system. In contrast, Wilson asserted that under the Constitution, “Nothing but 
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real weight of character can give a man real influence over a large district” (as cited in 
Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 2, p. 474).   
In the Federalist view, systemic restraints built upon the Statesmen’s 
understanding of the nature of man and the nature of power would sift much of the 
potential corruption from the legislature. Randolph asked, “Is it not notorious that virtue 
and ability have been preferred generally, here, to virtue and connections?” (as cited in 
Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 126).  
Frequent elections would preserve the purity of the legislature. Livingston thought 
corrupt, “Measures will be easily defeated, even if the people are unapprised of them. 
They will be defeated by that continual change of members, which naturally takes place 
in free governments, arising from the disaffection and inconstancy of the people” (as 
cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 2, p. 345). Madison explained, “The natural cure for an ill-
administration”, in a popular or representative constitution, is a change of men” 
(Federalist 21, p. 188). 
Gerry explained that the House of Representatives was to be chosen directly by 
the people to prevent, “demagogues and corrupt members [who] will creep in” (as cited 
in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 1, p. 397). Nicholas concluded, “Power lodged in the hands of 
representatives, chosen as ours must be, cannot be abused. The truth of this cannot but 
strike every gentleman in the committee” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 20).     
Power Must be Tempered by Duration 
 Another great division between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists was their 
rationale for the length of time that representatives should serve. They shared a general 
assumption that the greater power, the shorter the duration. Madison wrote, “It is a 
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received and well-founded maxim, that . . . the greater the power is, the shorter ought to 
be its duration; and, conversely, the smaller the power, the more safely may its duration 
be protracted” (Federalist 52, p. 363). General Heath appealed to Montesquieu for 
support on this point. He said:  
I will produce one observation from this celebrated writer, Baron Montesquieu; it 
is as follows: “The greatness of power must be compensated by the brevity of the 
duration; most legislatures have fixed it to a year; a longer space would be 
dangerous.” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 2, p. 13) 
 
The Anti-Federalists were particularly concerned with the lengthy terms of the 
executive and the Senate. The president was called an “ELECTIVE KING” (an Officer of 
the Late Continental Army as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 3, pp. 93-94), a “King for life” 
(a Farmer and Planter as cited in Storing, vol.5, pp. 76-77), a “potentate” (Vox Populi as 
cited in Storing, vol. 4, p. 52), and a “president-General” (Philadelphiensis as cited in 
Storing, vol. 3, p. 131). They felt the Senate would become an American aristocracy.  
During the Convention, the Senate received a great deal of attention because of 
the large quantity of power that it would wield. Many different terms of office were 
suggested. Pierce suggested 3-year terms for the Senate (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, 
p. 95), Ghorum and General Pinkney proposed 4 years (p. 165) Williamson and King 
proposed 6 years (pp. 165, 292), Sherman, Randolph, and Madison proposed 7 years (p. 
95), and Hamilton and Morris sought life terms with good behavior (pp. 117, 203). 
The Anti-Federalists generally felt a 6 year term was far too long. Nason 
continued, “The term, sir, for which the Senate is chosen, is a grievance. It is too long to 
trust any body of men with power. It is impossible but that such men will be tenacious of 
their places” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 2, p. 135).  
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The Federalists, in contrast, felt that longer terms created stability and increased 
responsibility. Iredell explained, “Responsibility, also, would be lessened by a short 
duration; for many useful measures require a good deal of time, and continued 
operations” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 4, p. 41).  
Size of Representation 
The numerical size of representation also became a bitter partisan issue for the 
Statesmen. Randolph expressed the problem, “It is an established maxim, that such a 
body ought to be numerous enough to be well acquainted with the interest of the people, 
to prevent corruption, and give a chance to men of merit to be elected” (as cited in Elliot, 
1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 125).  
The Anti-Federalists sought safety in numbers, so they desired a larger 
representation than Constitution permitted. Henry attacked the Constitution on this issue 
when he said, “One hundred and eighty representatives, the choice of the people of 
Virginia, cannot be trusted with their interests. They are a mobbish, suspected herd. . . . 
These must be referred to the chosen ten” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 156). 
Richard Henry Lee mocked, “If ten men are better than one hundred and seventy, it 
follows of necessity that one is better than ten--the choice is more refined” (vol. 3, p. 
167). The Anti-Federalists felt that the number of representatives had an inverse 
relationship to the potential for corruption. The fewer the men, the greater chance of 
corruption. Henry claimed that, “The number will be smaller, and they will be 
consequently the more easily corrupted” (vol. 3, p. 319).  
In sharp contrast, the Federalists felt that greater potential for corruption lie in a 
representation that is too large. Wilson explained, “Bad elections proceed from the 
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smallness of the districts which give an opportunity to bad men to intrigue themselves 
into office” (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 63).  
To the Federalist mind, larger districts would create a filtering process in which 
better men would matriculate to office. This would thwart the designs of petty tyrants. 
Wilson explained, “It is only in remote corners of a government, that little demagogues 
arise. Nothing but real weight of character can give a man real influence over a large 
district” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, p. 204). Madison explained that in 
larger districts, “it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success 
the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried” (Federalist 10, p. 134).   
Where Anti-Federalists felt the representation was too small, Federalists felt that 
the size of the legislature was about as safe as it could be. Madison believed that the 
representation was neither too small nor too large. He wrote, “The federal Constitution 
forms a happy combination in this respect” (Federalist 10, pp. 134-135).  
The People and Leader Must Have the Same Interest 
The Framers constructed the American system in such a way that the path to 
power was not the sword but persuasion. It is in the leader’s best interest to behave 
because the people will reward or punish him with the ballot. The Statesmen felt that the 
leader’s self-interest was also a key to preventing corruption. Noah Webster wrote, “The 
first and almost only principle that governs men, is interest, Love of our country is a 
powerful auxiliary motive to patriotic actions; but rarely or never operates against 
interest” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, Letter V, p. 222). Cato wrote, “that 
rulers in all governments will erect an interest separate from the ruled, which will have a 
tendency to enslave them” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Letter I, p. 32).  
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The Federalists also made statements that demonstrated their concurrence on this 
point. Madison explained that where a leader had a distinct interest, “there was the same 
reason for being jealous of them, as there was for relying on them with full confidence, 
when they had a common interest” (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 374).  
Responsibility 
 The Statesmen agreed that a government was only safe to the degree that leaders 
were responsible to the people. A [Maryland] Farmer called responsibility, “the only test 
of good government” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Essay II, p. 570). Likewise, Richard 
Henry Lee asked, “Will any sensible man say, that great power without responsibility can 
be given to rulers with safety to liberty?” (as cited in Frohnen, p. 365).  
 As long as representatives were accountable to the people, they were safe. Captain 
Snow argued, “For, as the man is accountable for his conduct, I think there is no danger” 
(as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 2, p. 35). Since elections were fixed and regular, 
Federalists felt secure. The Centinel wrote, “Liberty is only to be preserved by a due 
responsibility in the government, and by the constant attention of the people” ( Letter VI, 
p. 86).  
Responsibility was further strengthened by the rule of law. Under the 
Constitution, Representatives are bound by the laws they have created. Madison wrote 
that, “It creates between them that communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments, 
of which few governments have furnished examples; but without which every 
government degenerates into tyranny” (Federalist 57, p. 385). 
 The Federalists also enlisted the nature of man in their quest for responsibility. 
They calculated that within the confines of the Constitution, they were safe as long as it 
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was true that men love power. To the Federalists, two layers of protection secured 
responsibility--the carrot and the stick. Peletiah Webster listed “personal reputation,” 
“approbation of their fellow citizens,” and “dread of centure and shame,” as “strong 
inducements to noble, upright and worthy behavior” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 
1998, p. 188). Madison discussed the leader’s “sensibility to marks of honor, of favor, of 
esteem, and of confidence,” which “is some pledge for grateful and benevolent returns.” 
Yet, he also felt that his, “pride and vanity” would cause him to act responsibly 
(Federalist 57, p. 384). Gouverneur Morris made a remarkable statement that summarized 
the Statesmen’s thoughts on the subject. He “did not hesitate therefore to say that loaves 
& fishes must bribe the Demagogues. They must be made to expect higher offices” (as 
cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 203). 
Therefore, there was little danger from their leaders under the Constitution as long 
as they had the ability to turn them out for misbehavior. Sedgwick asked, “Can a man . . . 
go home to his constituents, after having robbed them by voting himself an exorbitant 
salary? This principle will be a most powerful check” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 
2, p. 53). Mason claimed, “Nothing so strongly impels a man to regard the interest of his 
constituents as the certainty of returning to the general mass of the people, from whence 
he was taken, where he must participate in their burdens” (vol. 3, p. 485). Ames 
explained, “rulers will always be dependent upon the people, like the insects of a 
sunshiny day, and may, by the breath of their displeasure, be annihilated” (as cited in 
Elliot, vol. 2, p. 105).  
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The Separation of Power  
The Statesmen employed the military principle: “divide and conquer” to conquer 
tyrants before they could rise. By restricting the amount of power that any individual or 
group could gain, they preemptively struck at the very heart of tyranny--the accumulation 
of power. Wilson wrote, “A single body, not constituted with checks, like the proposed 
one, who possess not only the power of making treaties, but executive powers, would be 
a perfect despotism” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 2, p. 476). Anti-Federalists 
understood this, but they did not believe that this Constitution was sufficiently checked to 
remedy these problems. Monroe articulated these sentiments: 
Why is the government divided into different branches? For a more faithful and 
regular administration. Where is there a check? We have more to apprehend from 
the union of these branches than from the subversion of any; and this union will 
destroy the rights of the people. There is nothing to prevent this coalition. (as 
cited in Elliot, vol. 3, p. 219).  
 
Federalists believed a division of power was a great security. This concept was 
based on their view of man. Hamilton explained, “Power being almost always the 
rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to check the 
usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition 
towards the general government” (Federalist 28, p. 225)  
 
 Federalist and Anti-Federalist alike believed that checks were necessary and 
useful. Brutus likewise wrote, “WHEN great and extraordinary powers are vested in any 
man, or body of men, which in their exercise, may operate to the oppression of the 
people, it is of high importance that powerful checks should be formed” (as cited in 
Frohnen, 1999, Essay XVI, p. 443). 
 The Federalists created checks by identifying two different, interested, parties 
who sought the same thing--power. Then, they had to ensure that competition, not 
cooperation, was the only available means to that end. A secure system required each 
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branch to have the strength to check the others while simultaneously being weak enough 
to be checked by the others.  
 The Senate could check the president and the House of Representatives 
simultaneously. Of the Senate, Wilson explained, “If the powers of either branch are 
perverted, it must be with the approbation of some one of the other branches of 
government. Thus checked on each side, they can do no one act of themselves” (as cited 
in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, p. 244). The Senate was expected to check the House of 
Representatives--to be a more deliberative, cooling body. Madison explained the need for 
the Senate as a check on the House: “The people . . . may possibly be betrayed by the 
representatives of the people” (Federalist 63, p. 416). But the Senate was also to be 
watched. The House of Representatives would likewise be the principal check upon the 
Senate. If the Senate were to, “transform itself, by gradual usurpations, into an 
independent and aristocratic body,” wrote Madison, “the House of Representatives, with 
the people on their side, will at all times be able to bring back the Constitution to its 
primitive form and principles” (Federalist 63, p. 420).  
 By constitutional design, the judiciary can check the legislature and the legislature 
can check the judiciary. The judiciary can check the Legislature by declaring an act 
unconstitutional.14 Likewise, the Legislature has checks over the Judiciary in the power 
of impeachment (US Constitution, Article I, Section 2) and the power to pass 
constitutional amendments (Article V).  
                                                 
14 The word unconstitutional does not appear in the text of the Constitution. This doctrine of judicial 
review, however implied in the Constitution, and discussed by the Federalists. It would later be formally 
established in Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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Some overlap of powers was permitted to the degree that they created additional 
checks. The most obvious form of intermixed powers, were those between the President 
and the Senate in making treaties and appointing officers. (US Constitution, Article II, 
Section 2). Hamilton wrote, “The joint possession of the power in question, by the 
President and Senate, would afford a greater prospect of security, than the separate 
possession of it by either of them” (Federalist 75, p. 478).  
The Anti-Federalists had difficulty understanding the federal system. Anti-
Federalists who clung to the notion that states ought to retain their sovereignty, and they 
thought it was illogical for two sovereign powers (federal and state) to co-exist. The 
Minority of Pennsylvania wrote, “We apprehend that two co-ordinate sovereignties 
would be a solecism in politics” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, p. 535). Monroe said, “For in 
government it is, as in phisicks, a maxim, that two powers cannot occupy the same space 
at the same time” (as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 5, p. 291). Brutus also wrote: 
It appears to me a solecism, for two men, or bodies of men, to have unlimited 
power respecting the same object. It contradicts the scripture maxim, which saith, 
“No man can serve two masters,” the one power or the other must prevail, or else 
they will destroy each other, and neither of them effect their purpose. (as cited in 
Frohnen, Essay VI, p. 419) 
 
Madison agreed with the charge calling the existing confederacy a “monster,” and 
“a system of government founded on an inversion of the fundamental principles of all 
government; it would have seen the authority of the whole society every where 
subordinate to the authority of the parts” (Federalist 44, p. 323).  
 Within this framework of divided powers, Hamilton could say, “That two 
supreme powers cannot act together, is false. They are inconsistent only when they are 
aimed at each other, or at one indivisible object” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 2, pp. 
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355-356). He continued, “The convention thought the concurrent jurisdiction preferable 
to that subordination” (Federalist 34, p. 253). He concluded: “The States will retain all 
pre-existing authorities which may not be exclusively delegated to the federal head” 
(Federalist 82, p. 515). 
Theory of Faction 
 The separation of powers were developed upon the Statesmen’s understanding of 
the nature of man and developed from a theory of factions. Madison defined a faction as 
follows:  
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority 
or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse 
of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the 
permanent and aggregate interests of the community. (Federalist 10, p. 130) 
 
Faction was acknowledged by all to be a danger. Madison explained, “One of, the 
greatest evils incident to Republican Govt. was the spirit of contention & faction” (as 
cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 391). Ames explained that, “Faction and enthusiasm are 
the instruments by which popular governments are destroyed” (as cited in Sheehan & 
McDowell, 1998, p. 199).  
 Factions within the government were known to be dangerous, and the Statesmen 
believed they should be guarded against. The Federal Farmer emphasized this point: “I 
repeat it, it is interested combinations and factions we are particularly to guard against in 
the federal government” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Essay XI, p. 233).  
According to Madison’s definition, a faction can be any group united for any 
purpose. They may be a majority or a minority. Madison wrote, “There are two methods 
of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by 
controlling its effects” (Federalist 10, p. 130). But removing the causes would violate 
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either human nature or human liberty. Madison continued, “It could never be more truly 
said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease” (Federalist 10, p. 130) 
Madison reasoned that faction was simply a dimension of the human condition. 
He wrote, “The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man” (Federalist 
10, p. 131). He concluded, “The causes of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is 
only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects” (Federalist 10, p. 132). By 
embracing faction, Madison enlisted human nature as an ally in his cause. Interest was set 
against interest to balance power. As Hamilton wrote, “The rivalships of the parts would 
make them checks upon each other, and would frustrate all the tempting advantages” 
(Federalist 11, p. 139). Morris also recommended that, “Vices as they exist must be 
turned agst. each other” (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 202).15 
In such a scenario, more factions would dilute the overall strength of any 
particular leader or group. Thus, Madison’s solution was to, “Extend the sphere, and you 
take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority 
of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens” 
(Federalist 10, p. 135).  
 Rather than attempt a transformation of human nature, the Federalists believed 
that the Constitution would provide security through a natural condition of faction to 
provide security. Madison wrote, “AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well 
constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to 
break and control the violence of faction” (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 356).  
                                                 
15 Notice the realism in which the statesmen did not seek to change the nature of man, but to use it and 
incorporate his own nature as a means of self defense. 
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Hard Restraints 
Hard (direct) restraints are the checks and balances found within the Constitution 
itself. These checks were built upon the need for representation, the concept of the 
separation of powers and the theory of factions. Hard restraints included: 
• The electoral college  
• Term limits 
• Impeachment 
• The systematic rivalry between states 
• The systematic rivalry and between states and the federal government 
• The Bill of Rights 
• The Constitution 
Well Structured Government is Necessary 
The Statesmen considered a well-structured government to be of primary 
importance. Cornelius wrote, “The strength and energy of government does not, I 
conceive, so much consist in particular men, being vested with unlimited powers, as it 
does in a due regulation of the necessary powers with which they are vested” (as cited in 
Storing, 1981, vol.4, pp. 144-145).  
The Electoral College 
An electoral college was created to prevent potential corruption during the 
presidential election. The Framers worried that the people could be deceived by 
intriguing politicians. Pinkney felt that in this situation: “An Election by the people being 
liable to the most obvious and striking objections. They will be led by a few active & 
designing men” (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 268). To alleviate this threat, the 
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Framers decided to check this threat with representation. A separate body of 
representatives, elected by the people solely for the temporary purpose of electing the 
president was devised. Pinkney concluded:  
The mode of electing the President rendered undue influence almost impossible; 
and it would have been imprudent in us to have put it out of our power to reelect a 
man whose talents, abilities, and integrity, were such as to render him the object 
of the general choice of his country. (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 4, p. 315) 
 
Impeachment  
Impeachment is a formal accusation of misconduct. The Statesmen all agreed that 
some mode of removing an unfit official was necessary. The Federal Farmer wrote, “It is 
one important mean to make the government just and honest, rigidly and constantly to 
hold, before the eyes of those who execute it, punishment, and dismission from office, for 
misconduct” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Essay XIII, p. 254). In the Convention, Gerry, 
“urged the necessity of impeachments. A good magistrate will not fear them. A bad one 
ought to be kept in fear or them” (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 356). As Davie 
pointed out, “If he be not impeachable whilst in office, he will spare no efforts or means 
whatever to get himself re-elected” (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 356). 
Term Limits  
A minority was in favor of term limits. The Federal Farmer believed that term 
limits would cause the leader to view his office in terms of his legacy. He wrote, “No 
man will wish to be a mere cypher at the head of government: the great object of each 
president then will be, to render his government a glorious period in the annals of his 
country” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Letter XIV, p. 264).  
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This was very different from the general sentiment of the Federalists. They 
believed term limits created a number of disadvantages. Among these disadvantages was 
the self-selected preclusion of some good men, the exclusion of good men who could 
serve no longer, and creating opportunity for the ambition of bad men. Rush wrote, “The 
custom of turning men out of power or office, as soon as they are qualified for it, has 
been found to be absurd in practice, as it is virtuous in speculation” (as cited in Sheehan 
& McDowell, 1998, p. 3). Hamilton wrote, “How unwise, therefore, must be every such 
self-denying ordinance as serves to prohibit a nation from making use of its own citizens 
in the manner best suited to its exigencies and circumstances!” (Federalist 72, p. 465). 
Morris summarized the dangers of term limits: 
What effect will this have? 1. It will destroy the great incitement to merit public 
esteem by taking away the hope of being rewarded with a reappointment. It may 
give a dangerous turn to one of the strongest passions in the human breast. The 
love of fame is the great spring to noble & illustrious actions. Shut the Civil road 
to Glory & he may be compelled to seek it by the sword. 2. It will tempt him to 
make the most of the short space of time allotted him, to accumulate wealth and 
provide for his friends. 3. It will produce violations of the very constitution it is 
meant to secure. In moments of pressing danger, the tried abilities and established 
character of a favorite Magistrate will prevail over respect for the forms of the 
Constitution. (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 286) 
 
State v. Federal Government 
The Statesmen expected conflict between the federal and the state governments 
under the new system. Anti-Federalists felt that the federal government would dominate 
the states. Martin wrote that, “The states would be opposed to the general government, 
and at enmity with It” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol.1, p. 372). A Countryman did, 
“not see, why we are to expect honester men in the general government, than in the state 
governments” (as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 6, p. 87).  
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 The Federalists objected. Noah Webster asked, “Is there any spell or charm, that 
instantly changes a delegate to Congress from an honest man into a knave--a tyrant? I 
confess freely that I am willing to trust Congress with any powers that I should dare 
lodge in a state-legislature” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, p. 392). Federalists 
were more concerned with state encroachment upon the federal government. State 
encroachment on Congress was the primary problem that led to the Constitutional 
Convention. The States did not fulfill obligations requested by Congress during and after 
the Revolution. 
Wilson explained, “No sooner were the States Governments formed than their 
jealousy and ambition began to display themselves. Each endeavored to cut a slice from 
the common loaf, to add to its own morsel” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, p. 
xxvi). Hamilton wrote, “There is greater probability of encroachments by the members 
upon the federal head, than by the federal head upon the members” (Federalist 31, p. 
240). 
State vs. State 
 The Federalists had another major concern about conflict between governments. 
Sovereign states, with no judge between them may oppress each other. While the Anti-
Federalists were remarkably silent on this issue, Hamilton called it a “Utopian 
speculation,” to “seriously doubt that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or 
only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be thrown 
would have frequent and violent contests with each other” (Federalist 6, p. 108). Madison 
drew on historical examples of ancient confederacies, writing, “Athens and Sparta, 
inflated with the victories and the glory they had acquired, became first rivals and then 
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enemies; and did each other infinitely more mischief than they had suffered from Xerxes” 
(Federalist 18, p. 173). The Federalists maintained that history would repeat itself.  
 Among the potential threats was the conflict between large and small states, 
evidenced by the introduction of the New Jersey plan (15 June, 1787) as a rival to the 
Virginia Plan (29 May, 1787). Franklin held, “An apprehension that the greater States 
would then swallow up the smaller” (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 85).  
A threat from smaller states was possible too. Consistent with their assumptions, 
Williamson argued, “Small states, if they had a plurality of votes would have an interest 
in throwing the burdens off their own shoulders on those of the large ones” (as cited in 
Madison, 1840/1987, p. 176). The Statesmen reasoned that corruption and conflict was 
no respecter of persons--individual or corporate.  
Bill of Rights 
The Bill of Rights may be considered the Anti-Federalist’s Constitution. It 
provides the people and states with an extra layer of protection from the Federal 
government. Anti-Federalists complained that the Constitution did not adequately secure 
rights and liberties. The Impartial Examiner wrote, “For it is a maxim …that when men 
establish a system of government, in granting the powers therein they are always 
understood to surrender whatever they do not so expressly reserve” (as cited in Frohnen, 
1999, Essay I, pp. 643-644).  
However, this was not the Federalist position. In Federalist 38, Madison reasoned, 
“The Confederation places them both in the hands of Congress. Is a bill of rights essential 
to liberty? The Confederation has no bill of rights” (Federalist 38, p. 278).  
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The Constitution  
The Statesmen all sought the prevention of the abuse of power. Anti-Federalists 
opposed the Constitution because they felt that it left the people at the mercy of tyrants 
who would emerge to abuse them. Philadelphiensis wrote, “This constitution, in the first 
instance, will lop off above one half of our sacred rights and privileges, for which we 
bled and conquered; and the remainder are generally left insecure, and therefore must 
eventually be lost too” (as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 3, Letter IV, p. 120).  
Anti-Federalist uniformly agreed that the Constitution would create an 
aristocracy. John De Witt called the Constitution, “a System purely Aristocratical, 
calculated to find employment for men of ambition, and to furnish means of sporting with 
the sacred principles of human nature” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Essay IV, p. 507). 
Anti-Federalists felt the federal branches of government were all too powerful. An Old 
Whig wrote, “The new constitution vests Congress with such unlimited powers as ought 
never to be entrusted to any men or body of men” (as cited in Frohnen, Essay II, p. 323).  
  If adequate checks had been provided, the Anti-Federalists may have consented 
more readily. Monroe conceded, “All restraints that were necessary for the wise 
administration of a good and virtuous government, would have my ready assent” (as cited 
in Storing, 1981, vol. 5, p. 292). But, Barnwell reminded his colleagues, “Nothing would 
be more completely farcical than a government completely checked” (as cited in Elliot, 
1836/1974, vol. 4, p. 293).  
 Federalists, on the other hand felt that the Constitution remedied the diseases 
inherent in the Articles of Association. While they implemented every check they could 
conceive of to prevent abuse, they understood that any Constitution can be abused. The 
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State Soldier wrote, “Men in power may usurp authority under any constitution” (as cited 
in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, Essay I, p. 119). The difference was that under the 
Constitution, to abuse others, leaders must violate the Constitution. Ellsworth concluded: 
Some men are mightily afraid of giving power lest it should be improved for 
oppression; this is doubtless possible, but where is the probability. The same 
objection may be made against the constitution of every state in the union, and 
against every possible mode of government; because a power of doing good 
always implies a power to do evil if the person or party be disposed. (as cited in 
Sheehan & McDowell, Letter III, pp. 292-293) 
 
 A government must have the power to secure liberty or anarchy will result. 
Madison reasoned, “But is not the fact an alarming proof of the danger resulting from a 
government which does not possess regular powers commensurate to its objects? A 
dissolution or usurpation is the dreadful dilemma to which it is continually exposed” 
(Federalist 38, p. 279). He concluded, “A weak constitution must necessarily terminate in 
dissolution, for want of proper powers, or the usurpation of powers requisite for the 
public safety” (Federalist 20, p. 184). Ellsworth said, “A government which can 
command but half its resources is like a man with but one arm to defend himself” (as 
cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 2, p. 191).  
Summary 
 The Statesmen built the mechanisms of the Constitution around a number of 
assumptions of the nature of power. Because men love power, and power is difficult to 
corrupt, they created systems calculated to pit man’s nature against tyranny. More 
importantly, they reaffirmed their assumptions by their actions as during the debates. 
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The Nature of the People 
A study of leadership in government would be incomplete without considering the 
ultimate leaders--the people. The Statesmen held certain primary and secondary 
assumptions on the nature of the people. They formed conclusions about their 
government upon these assumptions. This is visually illustrated in Exhibit IV.3.  
Federalist and Anti-Federalist quotations demonstrate basic agreement on the 
nature of the people as the basic building blocks of society. The whole of the people was 
far greater than the sum of the parts. The Foreign Spectator wrote, “In the republican 
edifice, the people are not inanimate materials, but living stones” (as cited in Sheehan & 
McDowell, 1998, Essay XV, p. 425). The people generally would not support tyranny, 
though they could be misled. They were not hungry for office, but they sought good 
government. They were hard working and industrious, though few were wealthy. The 
Federal Farmer wrote of, “The honest, the modest, and the industrious part of the 
community content themselves, generally, with their private concerns; they do not solicit 
those offices which are perpetual sources of cabals, intrigues, and contests among men” 
(as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Letter XIII, p. 249). Atticus explained the position of the 
people:  
They cannot become soldiers themselves, unless they leave their families to 
perish, and they have not money to hire others to fight for them. They cannot 
bring the rich down to their class, nor prevent the dependant sort from feeling the 
influence of money. (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, Essay III, p. 341) 
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The People are Sovereign 
The Statesmen’s first fundamental assumption about the people was that the 
people are sovereign. Federalist and Anti-Federalists agreed on this point with little 
difference or distinction. The Federal Farmer wrote, “The supreme power is in the 
people, and rulers possess only that portion which is expressly given them” (as cited in 
Frohnen, 1999, Letter VI, p. 192). The impartial examiner wrote, “It will not be denied, 
that all power is originally vested in the people, and that it should be exercised either 
immediately by themselves, or immediately by their representatives” (as cited in Frohnen, 
Essay III, p. 665).  
Federalists also felt that the people were sovereign. But they focused on the 
authority of the people to approve of the Constitution. Wilson declared, “In THIS 
CONSITUTION, all authority is derived from the PEOPLE” (as cited in Sheehan & 
McDowell, 1998, p. 87). Coxe explained, “The people will remain, under the proposed 
constitution, the fountain of power and public honour” (Letter IV, p. 470). Madison 
explained, “The ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the 
people alone” (Federalist 46, p. 330).  
The people are not only sovereign, but they alone may delegate their power to 
their representatives. Randolph continued, “[The Constitution] declares that all power 
comes from the people, and whatever is not granted by them, remains with them” (as 
cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 598).   
 Since sovereign power resides originally with the people, the Statesmen reasoned 
the people must approve of the government. Brutus wrote, “In every free government, the 
people must give their assent to the laws by which they are governed. This is the true 
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criterion between a free government and an arbitrary one” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, 
Essay I, p. 380).  
The Statesmen agreed that the government must be based on the affection of the 
people. Henry claimed, “No government can flourish unless it be founded on the 
affection of the people” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 151). A Foreign 
Spectator agreed, “It is an old maxim, that no Republican Government can be lasting 
without the good will of its subjects” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, Essay I, p. 
406). 
 The people also control their representatives. Henry said, “Rulers are the servants 
and agents of the people; the people are their masters” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 
3, p. 324). Marshall agreed, writing, “The people hold all powers in their own hands, and 
delegate them cautiously, for short periods, to their servants, who are accountable for the 
smallest mal-administration” (vol. 3, p. 232).  
The People as a Defense 
 The Statesmen, Anti-Federalist and Federalist alike, saw the people as a natural 
defense against tyrants. However, the people must be vigilant. The Centinel wrote, 
“liberty is only to be preserved by a due responsibility in the government, and by the 
constant attention of the people” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Essay VI, p. 86).  
 Federalists agreed in this analysis. Iredell reminded his colleagues:  
The only real security of liberty, in any country, is the jealousy and 
circumspection of the people themselves. Let them be watchful over their rulers. 
Should they find a combination against their liberties, and all other methods 
appear insufficient to preserve them, they have, thank God, an ultimate remedy. 
(as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 4, p. 130).  
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If abuse or mal-administration were to take place, the people must watch and 
defend. Fabius argued, “It is their duty to watch, and their right to take care, that the 
constitution be preserved; or in the Roman phase on perilous occasions--to provide; that 
the republic receive no damage” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, Letter IV, p. 
218).  
The people had the authority and power to rise up if leaders attempt to take away 
their liberties. The Centinel asked, “Does history abound with examples of a voluntary 
relinquishment of power, however injurious to the community? No; it would require a 
general and successful rising of the people to effect any thing of this nature” (as cited in 
Frohnen, 1999, Letter II, p. 58).  
In more drastic situations, the people may need to resort to force. Armed 
resistance was the ultimate check on the government. The Federal Farmer wrote, “To 
preserve liberty, it is essential that the whole body of the people always possess arms, and 
be taught alike, especially when young, how to use them” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, 
Letter XVIII, p. 305).  
Leaders are Chosen by the People 
Under a free government, the people are the masters of their leaders. Hamilton 
said that the support of the government rested on, “an active & constant interest in 
supporting it” (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 112). Dickenson referred to the people 
as the, “best & purest source” (as cited in Madison, p. 323). He continued, “The best 
defense lay in the freeholders who were to elect the Legislature. Whilst this Source 
should remain pure, the public interests would be safe. If it ever should be corrupt, no 
little expedients would repel the danger” (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 328).   
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Secondary Assumptions about the People 
Leaders Should be Close to the People 
 The Statesmen universally agreed that leaders should remain close to the people. 
Noah Webster wrote, “The choice of men is placed in the freemen or electors at large; 
and the frequency of elections, and the responsibility of the members, will render them 
sufficiently dependent on their constituents” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, 
Letter, p. 405).  
Representatives would govern diligently as long as they were closely connected to 
the people. A Columbian Patriot wrote, “A frequent return to the bar of their Constituents 
is the strongest check against corruptions to which men are liable, either from the 
intrigues of others of more subtle genius, or the propensities of their own hearts” (as cited 
in Storing, 1981, vol. 4, p. 275). Monroe concluded, “They should therefore be kept as 
dependent on them as possible, having in all respects the same interests with themselves” 
(as cited in Storing, vol. 5, p. 294). 
Public Opinion is Generally True 
 The Statesmen agreed that the public usually judged correctly. The Federal 
Farmer wrote, “The freemen of a country are not always minutely skilled in the laws, but 
they have common sense in its purity, which seldom or never errs in making and applying 
laws to the condition of the people” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Letter XV, p. 275) 
 Federalists acknowledged the common sense wisdom of the people too. Morris 
said, “If the people should elect, they will never fail to prefer some man of distinguished 
character, or services” (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 267). Ames summed up the 
Statesmen’s view when he said, “The people always mean right, and, if time is allowed 
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for reflection and information, they will do right” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 
1998, p. 199). 
The People Cannot Always Judge Well 
 While the people generally do judge well, the Statesmen felt that they may be 
deceived by unscrupulous leaders. Hamilton explained, “The people commonly INTEND 
the PUBLIC GOOD. This often applies to their very errors. But their good sense would 
despise the adulator who should pretend that they always REASON RIGHT about the 
MEANS of promoting it” (Federalist 71, p. 459).  
Additional Considerations about the People 
Corruption of the Electorate is Possible 
Though the people mean well, they still may be corrupted. Hamilton worried 
about the people being deceived by, “the wiles of parasites and sycophants, by the snares 
of the ambitious, the avaricious, the desperate, by the artifices of men who possess their 
confidence more than they deserve it” (Federalist 71, p. 459). Morris said, “It may be the 
case that the people will not be deluded and misled . . . But experience teaches another 
lesson” (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 297).  
The People Need Protection From Their Leaders 
 Under such conditions, it is not surprising that the Statesmen felt that the people 
must be guarded from their leaders. The Federal Farmer wrote, “It is extremely difficult 
to secure the people against the fatal effects of corruption and influence” (as cited in 
Frohnen, 1999, Letter III, p. 162). Madison concluded, “The people can never wilfully 
betray their own interests; but they may possibly be betrayed by the representatives of the 
people” (Federalist 63, p. 416). 
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The People Need Protection From Other People 
 A primary purpose of government is to protect the people from other people who 
would injure their rights and liberties. Hamilton explained that the people, “do not 
possess the discernment and stability necessary for systematic government” (as cited in 
Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 2, p. 302).  
 The Statesmen reasoned that the people are fickle, and they also must be checked 
to prevent them from injuring themselves. Hamilton wrote that the voice of the “people 
has been said to be the voice of God; and, however generally this maxim has been quoted 
and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom 
judge or determine right” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 1, pp. 421-422).  
Democracy vs. Aristocracy 
The Statesmen all sought a system where liberty was preserved for all except tyrants. 
Monarchies had been rejected as an option; democracies were turbulent and republics, 
thus far in history, had been small or unstable. The Anti-Federalists talked frequently 
about the merits of democracy, but Federalists raised objections. Madison wrote, 
“democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been 
found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property” (Federalist 10, p. 
133).  
In contrast, the Anti-Federalists worried about the emergence of an aristocracy if 
this Constitution was ratified. Bloodwoorth explained, “Aristocracies grow out of the 
combination of a few powerful families” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 4, p. 67). 
Cincinnatus wrote that these men would provide, “much cunning and little wisdom,” and 
that such a system, “must necessarily produce a baneful aristocracy, by which the 
democratic rights of the people will be overwhelmed” (as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 6, 
Letter IV, p. 22).  
The Federalist response was two-fold. Some, like Madison, asserted frequently 
that the Constitution would prevent evils such as an aristocracy. Others, like Wilson and 
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Livingston, embraced the concept of an open aristocracy. Wilson said, “An aristocracy 
means nothing more or less than a government of the best men in the community . . . 
consist[ing] of those most noted for wisdom and virtue. Is there any danger in such 
representation?” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, p. 203).  
The Evils of Democracies 
Democracy, in the pure sense of the word, was not held in high esteem by the 
Statesmen. Even the three men who refused to sign the Constitution (Gerry, Randolph, 
and Mason) each disparaged democracy. Gerry said, “The evils we experience flow from 
the excess of democracy. The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended 
patriots” (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 32). He talked of, “Democracy, the worst he 
thought of all political evils” (as cited in Madison, p. 582). Randolph found, “That in 
tracing these evils to their origin every man had found it in the turbulence and follies of 
democracy: that some check therefore was to be sought for agst. this tendency of our 
Governments” (as cited in Madison, p. 34). Likewise, Mason explained that we were 
creating a government built upon the people, “Notwithstanding the oppressions & 
injustice experienced among us from democracy” (as cited in Madison, p. 54). 
Federalists were less kind to pure democracies. Madison talked of, “the 
inconveniencies of democracy” (p. 64) and the, “danger of disturbing the public 
tranquillity by interesting too strongly the public passions” (Federalist 49, p. 349). 
Hamilton wrote, “Their very character was tyranny; their figure, deformity” (as cited in 
Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 2, p. 253). 
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The Virtue of the People is Necessary 
 The Statesmen agreed that virtue was necessary to build and preserve an 
American government that would protect rights and liberties. The starting point was self-
government. Self-government is the capacity to rule oneself personally in such a way that 
no external force is necessary for control. A Foreign Spectator listed these virtues as, 
“Knowledge, prudence, temperance, industry, honor, decency, justice, benevolence--all 
those qualities, which enable men to govern themselves, to regard the rights of others, to 
respect superior merit, to love order and tranquility” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 
1998, Letter I, p. 408).  
Virtuous people make virtuous laws. The Federal Farmer wrote, “A virtuous 
people make just laws, and good laws tend to preserve unchanged a virtuous people” (as 
cited in Frohnen, 1999, Letter VII, pp. 199-200) The Centinel also claimed, “A 
republican, or free government, can only exist where the body of the people are virtuous” 
(as cited in Frohnen, Essay I, p. 38). Federalists felt that virtue was necessary and that the 
American people still possessed enough virtue to sustain the weight of the government. A 
Foreign Spectator wrote: 
It is evident, that a people of tolerable virtue would never become tools for 
enslaving themselves: would any man be ordered to kill himself by his own 
sword? Who but an idiot or a most dastardly wretch would not plunge it in the 
heart of the tyrant. (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, Essay XXV, p. 50) 
 
 However, if the people lose their virtue, the government cannot last. During the 
Virginia convention, Henry said, “If the number of vicious characters will preponderate, 
you are undone” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 165). Madison asked, “Is there 
no virtue among us? If there be not, we are in a wretched situation. No theoretical checks, 
no form of government, can render us secure” (as cited in Elliot, vol. 3, p. 536)  
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The Constitution is a Sovereign Compact with the People 
The role of the people as leaders in establishing the Constitution was primary. The 
Democratic Federalist pointed out that, “Under the old Confederation, the people at large 
had no voice in the election of their rulers” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, p. 
353). Marshall traced the powers of the states back to the people, saying, “The state 
governments did not derive their powers from the general government; but each 
government derived its powers from the people, and each was to act according to the 
powers given it” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 419). 
 The Constitution was a deal between the people and their leaders that bound 
themselves and their posterity. The [Maryland] Farmer wrote, “This constitution is to be 
the act of the individual members of the American empire--the highest source of 
terrestrial power with us” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Essay I, p. 557). It could be 
accepted or rejected only by those who had the power to enter into such a contract. 
Madison concluded, “As the plan to be framed and proposed was to be submitted to the 
people themselves, the disapprobation of this supreme authority would destroy it forever; 
its approbation blot out antecedent errors and irregularities” (Federalist 40, p. 292). The 
people are the ultimate leaders in the American governmental system. 
The Nature of Government 
The focus of all the Constitutional and ratification debates was whether the 
government under the new Constitution was adequate to administer justice and prevent 
tyranny. The Statesmen’s assumptions directed them to create the specific mechanisms in 
the government that we recognize today as checks and balances. The most basic 
assumptions are on the nature, size, and strength of government (see Exhibit IV.4). 
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The Science of Government 
 
The Statesmen spoke about government as a science that was reducible to basic 
principles. Hamilton wrote, “The science of politics, however, like most other sciences, 
has received great improvement. The efficacy of various principles is now well 
understood, which were either not known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients” 
(Federalist 9, p. 125). The Centinel wrote, “The science of government going the most 
abstruse and unobvious of all others, mankind are more liable to be imposed upon by the 
artful and designing in systems and regulations of government, than on any other subject” 
(as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Letter XV, p. 124).  
The government’s primary function is to ensure justice. Neither growth nor 
efficiency were desirable in government. Philadelphiensis wrote: 
The only thing in which a government should be efficient is to protect the 
liberties, lives, and property of the people governed, from foreign and domestic 
violence. This, and this only is, what every government should do effectually. For 
any government to do more than this, is impossible, and every one that falls short 
of it is defective. (as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 3, p. 110) 
 
 Governments are either built upon force or consent. The Federal Farmer wrote 
that the government’s, “whole force is reducible to two principles--the important
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springs, which alone move the machines, and give them their intended influence and 
control, are force and persuasion” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Letter VII, p. 197).  
Federalists agreed with this sentiment, but they were more optimistic that a just 
society could be achieved through reason even though history was not favorable to such a 
position. Wilson expanded this idea before the Pennsylvania Convention: 
Permit me to add, in this place, that the science even of government itself seems 
yet to be almost in its state of infancy. Governments, in general have been the 
result of force, of fraud, and of accident, After a period of six thousand years has 
elapsed since the Creation, the United States exhibit to the world the first 
instance, as far as we can learn, of a nation unattacked by external force, 
unconvulsed by domestic insurrections, assembling voluntarily, deliberating fully, 
and deciding calmly, concerning that system of government, under which they 
would wish that they and their posterity should live. (as cited in Sheehan & 
McDowell, 1998, p. 75) 
 
The Purpose of Government               
 
 The Statesmen, at the very core, held similar beliefs about what the civil 
government should and should not do. In 1783, George Washington in a circular letter to 
the states enumerated the essential purposes of government: 
There are four things, which I humbly conceive, are essential to the well being, I 
may even venture to say, to the existence of the United States as an Independent 
Power:  
1st. An indissoluble Union of the States under one Federal Head.  
2ndly. A Sacred regard to Public Justice.  
3rdly. The adoption of a proper Peace Establishment, and  
4thly. The prevalence of that pacific and friendly Disposition, among the People of 
the United States, which will induce them to forget their local prejudices and 
policies, to make those mutual concession which are requisite to the general 
prosperity, and in some instances, to sacrifice their individual advantages to the 
interest of the Community. (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, p. 15) 
  
Federalists and Anti-Federalists emphasized different nuances, but they 
propounded the same basic role of government. Civil government was to protect the 
people from the evils of oppression and tyranny while maintaining liberty. The Centinel 
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wrote, “Therefore the great end of civil government is to protect the weak from the 
oppression of the powerful, to put every man upon the level of equal liberty” (Letter VI, 
p. 85). Brutus wrote that the purpose of government was, “to protect the rights and 
promote the happiness of the people” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Essay III, p. 435).  
 Federalists agreed that government was established to prevent tyranny and 
oppression. Hamilton asked, “Why has government been instituted at all? Because the 
passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint” 
(Federalist 15, p. 160). Madison explained, “Justice is the end of government. It is the 
end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until 
liberty be lost in the pursuit” (Federalist 51, p. 358). Jay added, “Among the many 
objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of 
providing for their SAFETY seems to be the first” (Federalist 3, p. 97).  
Federalists went further than Anti-Federalists in the letter, but not necessarily in 
the spirit, of the purpose of the law. Both sides wanted government to have enough power 
to establish justice, but they differed as to how much power was requisite for that 
purpose.  
Good government. A good government results from just laws. Atticus wrote, “If a 
government shall contain a good system of laws, then it is a good one, if these laws can 
be executed, and guarded from abuse” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, Essay I, 
p. 330). Hamilton reminded his readers, “‘the true test of a good government is its 
aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration’” (Federalist 76, p. 480).  
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Government Must Be Limited 
 
Government also must be limited. The Impartial Examiner explained, “that the 
liberty of a nation depends, not on planning the frame of government, which consists 
merely in fixing and delineating the powers thereof; but on prescribing due limits to those 
powers, and establishing them upon just principles” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Essay I, 
pp. 646-647). Noah Webster wrote, “It appears to me that Congress will have no more 
power than will be necessary for our union and general welfare; and such power they 
must have or we are in a wretched state” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, p. 
389).  
Government Should Neither be Too Strong nor Too Weak 
 
Officials without power were doomed to administer poorly. Hamilton wrote, “A 
feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but 
another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in 
theory, must be, in practice, a bad government” (Federalist 70, p. 466). Ellsworth added, 
“A people cannot long retain their freedom whose government is incapable of protecting 
them” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, Letter V, p. 300).  
Being too weak could invite trouble. Hamilton listed a number of potential 
problems that may result from weakness. He complained, “We have neither troops, nor 
treasury, nor government. Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with dignity. . . . 
The imbecility of our government even forbids them to treat with us” (Federalist 15, p. 
156). Madison concluded, “Governments destitute of energy will ever produce anarchy” 
(as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 131).  
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Size of Government and the Size of the Republic 
 The Statesmen agreed that the Federal government should not be too large. But 
size of government was relative to function. Nonetheless, all agreed it should not be 
larger than the function demanded. The Centinel wrote, “It is a maxim that a government, 
ought to be cautious not to govern over much, for when the cord of power is drawn too 
tight, it generally proves its destruction (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Letter IV, p. 71).  
The size of the union also would affect the size of government. Anti-Federalists 
reasoned that a large, consolidated American government would lead to tyranny. They 
appealed to history for support. Agrippa referred to Montesquieu when he wrote: 
It is the opinion of the ablest writers on the subject, that no extensive empire can 
be governed upon republican principles, and that such a government will 
degenerate to a despotism, unless it be made up a confederacy of smaller states, 
each having the full powers of internal regulation. This is precisely the principle 
which has hitherto preserved our freedom. (as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 4, Letter 
IV p. 76) 
 
The Federalists responded by refuting Montesquieu’s assertion by using the 
Constitution to overcome the deficiencies. Hamilton dashed the Anti-Federalists’ 
objection in Federalist 9 when he used the Montesquieu’s logic against them. He wrote: 
When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the standards he had 
in view were of dimensions far short of the limits of almost every one of these 
States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, North 
Carolina, nor Georgia can by any means be compared with the models from 
which he reasoned and to which the terms of his description apply. (Federalist 9, 
p. 126)  
 
There had been numerous uprisings in the states since the revolution. The 
Federalist solution to the problem was not to reduce, but enlarge the sphere of 
government. Pinkney explained, “We begin now to suppose that the evils of a republic--
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dissention, tumult, and faction--are more dangerous in small societies than in large 
confederate states” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 4, pp. 326-327).  
A Paper Form but Men Must Rule 
Although the Statesmen wanted good laws in the new system of government, they 
realized that it was as important that good men presided. They believed that good 
administration is as necessary to a good government as good laws.16  
The best government the people can receive. The Statesmen were aware that man 
was depraved and that consequently, nothing man created would be perfect. This 
included the forms of government that man created. Brutus wrote, “You are not however 
to expect, a perfect form of government, any more than to meet with perfection in man” 
(as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Essay III, p. 392). Yet, Madison believed that through the 
Constitution we would have a “remedy for the diseases most incident to republican 
government” (Federalist 10, p.136). Nonetheless, as Butler explained, “We must follow 
the example of Solon who gave the Athenians not the best Govt. he could devise; but the 
best they wd. receive” (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 61). 
 For forms and administration let the wise contest. Alexander Pope wrote a poem 
on the nature of government: “For forms of government let fools contest, That which is 
best administered, is best.” However, this view was not embraced by the Statesmen. A 
[Maryland] Farmer referred to it as, “What Mr. Pope has wrote, and what many good, but 
                                                 
16 This reasoning is remarkably similar to the text of the Frame of Government of Pennsylvania (1682). 
Penn Concluded:  
liberty without obedience is confusion, and obedience without liberty is slavery. To carry this 
evenness is partly owing to the constitution, and partly to the magistracy: where either of these 
fail, government will be subject to convulsions; but where both are wanting, it must be totally 
subverted; then where both meet, the government is like to endure. Which I humbly pray and hope 
God will please to make the lot of this of Pennsylvania. Amen. 
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mistaken men, both in Europe and America, have thought and now think” (as cited in 
Frohnen, 1999, Essay II, p. 572).  
Hamilton called it a “political heresy,” though he conceded, “yet we may safely 
pronounce, that the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce 
a good administration” (Federalist 68, p. 443).  
The Statesmen felt that there were two facets to good government: the laws and 
the administration. Good laws without good leaders was a formula for bad government. 
Mercer explained, “The paper will only mark out the mode & the form. Men are the 
substance and must do the business” (as cited in Madison, 1840/1987, p. 400). Hamilton 
added, “I believe it may be laid down as a general rule that their confidence in and 
obedience to a government will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of 
its administration” (Federalist 27, p. 219).   
Structures of Government 
The structures of government were built upon assumptions about government and 
conclusions drawn from assumptions about man, power, and the people. The Statesmen 
sought to use organizational design to prevent corruption. They calculated the length of 
office, and the size of representatives. They tied their representatives to the people 
through responsibility. They separated powers to check government and mixed other 
powers to add additional defensive power. They further checked corruption with the 
Electoral College and impeachment power. This would all take place under the rule of 
law, where the leaders were bound by the same burdens that they imposed upon the 
people. The following section outlines the US Constitution. 
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Legislative Powers 
The Statesmen considered the legislature to be the great bulwark of freedom. The 
colonists fought the revolution to maintain the rights of representation that they traced 
back to the Magna Carta (Magna Carta, Article 14, 45, 61).  
Article I of the Constitution establishes legislative powers. Section 1 divides the 
power of lawmaking from execution or judgment of the law.   
Article I, Section 2 addresses qualifications for members of the legislature. These 
are safeguards to prevent corruption in the legislature. Age requirements were 
implemented to prevent the errors of youth. Representation was tied to taxation. In this 
way power was directly tied to the burden of government.  
 Article I, Section 3 sets the parameters for the Senate. As a more deliberate, 
cooling body, they were to have lengthier terms for stability. For additional stability, the 
elections were set so that only one third of the Senate was removable at any time. The 
Senate also had higher age requirements and residency requirements than the House of 
Representatives. Separated powers were slightly blended between the executive and 
legislative in the role of the Vice President who has an active role presiding over the 
Senate, though he may only vote in the case of a tie. Like the House of Representatives, 
the Senate was to be a self-governing body.  
  The Framers defended against abuse from every direction. The House had the 
“sole Power of Impeachment.” The Senate had the power to try the case. The Framers 
expected leaders may be corrupt, and they prepared for such an occasion. The Framers 
prescribed the most capable judge--the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Additionally, 
a supermajority of the jury (the Senate) was required so the President could not be 
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impeached for light reasons. Impeachment only involves a penalty of losing the ability to 
serve in government. The Senate was the proper body to judge such a case since further 
judicial action could lead to double jeopardy. 
 Article I, Section 4 also deals with the election process. The Framers would use 
the state mechanisms that were already in place. However, the Federal government 
reserved the right to defend itself by making a uniform law if the states encroached. Since 
the people must have representation, the Constitution required congress to meet annually.  
Article I, Section 5 deals with self-government and responsibility of the 
legislature. Both branches were to govern themselves. A Quorum was required so a 
minority could not tyrannize the majority. Each body was to operate under its own rules. 
Representatives were responsible to the people through public records. In this provision, 
self-government, the prevention of abuse, and responsibility to the public were all 
combined. 
Article I, Section 6 dealt with legislators’ privileges. First, they are to be paid for 
their service to their country. To prevent abuse of the sacred right of representation, a 
representative cannot be arrested or prosecuted for his speech on the floor of the 
legislature. To prevent the legislators from abusing their powers, they cannot hold an 
office that they created. This abuse had been rampant in Great Britain, and the Framers 
sought to end such corruption. 
  Article I, Section 7 deals with the passage of laws. Since the House of 
Representatives were direct representatives of the people, the Statesmen placed the purse 
(jurisdiction over money bills) in the hands of the House of Representatives--the direct 
representatives of the people. All bills had to pass a series of checks to become a law. 
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First, it had to be passed by a majority of both houses. Then, in a blending of power for 
additional security, it was sent to the president for his approval. If the president neither 
signs it nor sends it back, after ten days, the bill becomes a law. 
None of the Statesmen would have thought of offering the president a positive 
power of making the law, but the President had a negative power to defeat bad laws 
through the veto process. However, to prevent abuse by the executive, the legislature was 
armed with the power of overriding the president if they could muster a supermajority.  
Therefore, to become a law, every bill must follow these steps. First, the House 
and Senate must both pass the bill. Then, the bill is presented to the President to sign. If 
the President signs, it becomes a law; but if he vetoes the bill, it goes back to the 
legislature. If the legislature can assemble a two-thirds, supermajority, the bill may 
become a law. The last clause of Article I, Section 7 summarizes the process.  
 Article I, Section 8 itemizes the specific powers of the Federal government. 
Article I, Section 9 deals with specific rights of citizens. Ironically, it begins with a raw 
political compromise on slavery. The importation of slaves, according to the first sub-
section, was constitutionally out of reach of the arm of the federal government for 20 
years.17  
 Specific rights of Englishmen that had been transmitted through the British legal 
heritage were engraved in the Constitution. Among these were the protections of Habeas 
Corpus, and the protection from bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. Habeas Corpus18 
was a protection of the rights of the individual that the state must provide public legal 
                                                 
17 Congress outlawed the importation of slaves on 1 January 1808. 
18 Habeas Corpus literally means that you have the body in custody. 
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notice if they took a man to jail. Bills of attainder19 were not permitted because such a 
law penalized the children for a crime that the father had committed. Ex post facto20 laws 
were also not permitted because such a law was created after the point that someone had 
already committed the act. The Statesmen felt that such laws were unjust since the 
individual had no defense against these laws being promulgated. This would reduce the 
laws to the rule of men, not laws. 
 Laws must be just and taxes must be proportional.21 Since taxes were primarily to 
be derived by “Duties, Imposts and Excises” (Article I, Section 8), such duties were to be 
uniform. For the sake of responsibility, taxes had to be publicly appropriated and 
recorded. To prevent the emergence of an aristocracy, titles of nobility were not 
permitted. To prevent foreign corruption, American officials were not to accept any gift 
from foreign officials.  
 Article I, Section 10 placed restrictions on the states. It is largely a review of the 
powers granted in Article I, Sections 8 and 9. Powers that are either ceded to the Federal 
government or abhorrent to Federal power were restricted. 
                                                 
19 To attaint is to corrupt or taint 
20 Ex Post Facto is a law made after the fact 
21 This clause would be changed by the 16th Amendment (1913): 
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each state, elected by the 
people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each state shall 
have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislatures.  
When vacancies happen in the representation of any state in the Senate, the executive authority of 
such state shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, that the legislature of any 
state may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the 
vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.  
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen 
before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution. 
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Executive Powers 
 
Article II dealt with the powers of the executive. Under the American system of 
government, our chief executive officer would be called the President. The president was 
to have a four-year term to balance stability with responsibility. Under the original 
Electoral College system,22 layers of checks were instituted to prevent corruption. First, 
the electors were decentralized among the states. To protect the smaller states from larger 
states, electors were to vote for two persons, but one of the two could not be from their 
own state. The electors would then seal their vote and send it to the Senate. To prevent 
corruption, the sealed vote was to be opened and counted in the presence of the entire 
                                                 
22 This original system was later changed by the 12th Amendment (1804): 
The electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President and Vice-
President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they 
shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person 
voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, 
and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists 
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, 
directed to the President of the Senate;--The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;-
-the person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such 
number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have such 
majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those 
voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the 
President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from 
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from 
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the 
House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve 
upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as 
President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President. The person 
having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number 
be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then 
from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for 
the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the 
whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office 
of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States. 
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Senate. The candidate with the majority wins the election. However, if there is a tie, the 
House of Representatives votes on the candidates that remain.  
A quorum was required to ensure that a minority of representatives would not 
trample on the rights of the others. Originally, the vice president was the candidate who 
received the next greatest number of votes. The Framers thought a possibility could 
emerge where there would be a tie between the vice presidential candidates. In such a 
scenario, the vote would go to the Senate. To prevent corruption by the states, Congress 
reserved the right to choose the day on which the election was to be held. Yet, to prevent 
federal corruption, the day had to be uniform throughout the entire country.  
Age and residency requirements were enlarged for the president. The president 
must have been born as a United States citizen. He must be at least thirty-five years old. 
He also must have lived in the country for 14 years.  
Foreseeing every conceivable contingency imaginable, the Framers prepared for a 
scenario in which the president could not attend to the duties of his office. His 
responsibility would transfer to the vice president.23 
                                                 
23 This clause would be changed by the 25th Amendment (1967): 
Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the 
Vice President shall become President.  
Section 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall 
nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both 
Houses of Congress.  
Section 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the 
powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, 
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.  
Section 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the 
executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the 
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written 
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice 
President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.  
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall 
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The President was to be compensated for his services with a salary that cannot be 
changed over his term of office. This protects against bribery through an increase of his 
salary and abuse through the threat of reducing his salary. The President also must take 
an oath to defend the Constitution of the United States.24  
 Article II, Section 2 deals with the powers of the President. The President is the 
Commander-in-Chief of the military. As the head of the executive department, he may 
ask for formal advice from his cabinet. He has the power of pardon, which is a means for 
him to check the abuses of the judiciary. The President also has a blended power to make 
treaties and appoint officers with the representatives of the state governments--the Senate. 
Finally, he has the power to fill these offices temporarily when the Senate is not in 
session.  
 Article II, Section 3 discusses the presidents duties. These duties included the 
state of the union address, the power to convene the legislature when an emergency 
requires it, and the responsibility of meeting with foreign heads of state. The ultimate 
function of the executive is to see to it that the laws created by the legislature are carried 
out.  
                                                                                                                                                 
resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the 
principal officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law 
provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the 
powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within 
forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after 
receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days 
after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the 
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall 
continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the 
powers and duties of his office. 
 
24 George Washington added the phrase, “So help me God.” This phrase, though not constitutionally 
mandated, has been added by custom to the president’s oath. 
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 Article II, Section 4 concludes the section on the executive with a threat of 
punishment for abuse or corruption through the impeachment process.  
Judicial Powers 
  Article III deals with the judicial power of the United States. A Federal Supreme 
Court was created. Judges serve for life terms unless they behave improperly. Like the 
president, the salary of the judges may not be decreased during their tenure, though it 
may be increased since they serve much longer terms.  
 Article III, Section 2 outlines the jurisdiction of the Federal court. The Supreme 
Court was to have original jurisdiction in specific cases of high importance. It was also to 
function as a check within the judiciary on lower court. The right of the trial by jury was 
protected in all criminal cases. Trials were to be held locally to prevent the government 
from removing defendants to distant places where they would not receive a fair trial.25  
 Article III, Section III defines treason as a material act on the part of the 
treasonous individual. There must be witnesses or a confession. This limited definition 
made treason more difficult to prosecute, but it was a check on potential governmental 
abuse. A second check was the limits of the punishment, which only extended to the 
individual and only for this lifetime.  
Additional Defenses 
 Articles IV through VII contain additional safety features of the Constitution. 
Article IV, Section 1 dealt with the relationship between states in the new Federal union. 
Each state was bound to respect the judgments and laws of the others.  
                                                 
25 In the Colonial experience, Americans had faced this oppression in the removal the defendant to a distant 
venue for judgment under the administration of Justice Act (1774): “it shall and may be lawful for the 
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Article IV, Section 2 is similar in protection of privileges and immunities of 
citizens. Rights are coupled with responsibilities. The government of one state has an 
obligation to extradite individuals attempting to escape from justice in another state. The 
final paragraph of Article IV, Section 2 dealt with slavery.26 Though no longer 
applicable, this provision was based on the principle of extradition. 
                                                                                                                                                 
governor, or lieutenant-governor, to direct, with the advice and consent of the council, that the inquisition, 
indictment, or appeal, shall be tried in some other of his Majesty's colonies, or in Great Britain” 
26 This clause would be changed by the 13th Amendment (1865), 14th  Amendment (1868) and the 15th 
amendment (1870): 
Amendment XIII (1865)  
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the 
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to 
their jurisdiction.  
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.  
 
Amendment XIV (1868)  
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.  
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not 
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice 
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a 
state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such 
state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, 
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be 
reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number 
of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state.  
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and 
Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any state, 
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United 
States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion 
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of 
two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.  
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts 
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or 
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay 
any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be 
held illegal and void.  
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of 
this article. 
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Article IV, Section 3 provided for future states to enter the Union on an equal 
basis with other states. However, specific regulations governed this process. States could 
not split or merge to form other states without the consent of Congress.27 The 
Constitution also granted the Congress power to directly oversee the needs of federal 
territories. Congress was also to be a referee between the Federal and State government.   
Article IV, Section 4 made specific Federal guarantees to the states. They were 
promised representation and federal protection from foreign invasion and internal 
rebellion.  
 Article V provided a safety valve through the amendment process. The Framers 
knew that future, unforeseen events would arise which would call for one of three 
responses: amend the Constitution, create a new Constitution, or usurp the constitution. 
The amendment process was the safest course. The safety of the amendment process was 
bolstered by additional checks. First, a super majority of both houses or a supermajority 
of the states would be required to propose an amendment. But this amendment would 
then have to be passed by an even larger supermajority (three-fourths) of the states. Two 
qualifications were added in this section. According to an earlier provision, the 
importation of slavery was untouchable for 20 years. Additionally, each state government 
must be represented in the Senate.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Amendment XV (1870)  
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.  
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. 
 
27 The singular exception to this rule was the state of West Virginia. During the Civil War, a number of 
Western counties of the State of Virginia refused to secede from the Union with Virginia in 1861. On June 
20, 1863, West Virginia seceded from the Commonwealth of Virginia.  
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 Article VI dealt with Federal obligations. The Federal government would bear the 
burden of debt of the several states carried into the union. The Constitution would be the 
highest law of the land. Treaties would be next in authority, since they are contracted 
between our government and foreign governments (and individual states ought not 
disrupt the foreign policy of the union). Finally, all federal officers were to be bound by 
an oath to support the Constitution.28 
Article VII, dealt with the ratification process and the conclusion of the 
Constitution. The Framers understood when they created the Constitution that they 
should not force the Constitution on the people. A ratification process was a check on the 
Framers. Although unanimous consent of the legislatures of each state had previously 
been required for changes under the Articles of Confederation,29 the Framers were 
guarded against the tyranny of the minority by using a supermajority of nine states to 
adopt the Constitution instead of being bound by unanimous consent.30 Near the end of 
the article, minor corrections were added to the text of the document. Finally, the 
Constitution was signed, sealed, and delivered. 
                                                 
28 A full discussion on the lack of a religious test follows in the subsection on the Nature of Society. 
29 According to Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation (1777): 
Every State shall abide by the determination of the United States in Congress assembled, on all 
questions which by this confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this 
Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor 
shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed 
to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every 
State. 
30 The nine state figure was the same number of the Committee of States previously set up by the Articles 
of Confederation to do business in lieu of the whole congress: 
Article X. The Committee of the States, or any nine of them, shall be authorized to execute, in the 
recess of Congress, such of the powers of Congress as the United States in Congress assembled, 
by the consent of the nine States, shall from time to time think expedient to vest them with; 
provided that no power be delegated to the said Committee, for the exercise of which, by the 
Articles of Confederation, the voice of nine States in the Congress of the United States assembled 
be requisite.  
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Conclusions about Government 
Principles of Government 
 The Statesmen held contrasting beliefs about the ability of the Constitution to 
uphold principles of government. While Anti-Federalists felt that the Constitution would 
violate the great principles of government, the Federalists found security under the same 
document.  
Nonetheless, the Statesmen all agreed that the Constitution must rest on solid 
principles that accounted for the nature of man. Henry explained, “When about forming a 
Government, if we mistake the principles, or commit any other error, the very 
circumstance promises that power will be abused” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, p. 704). 
Hamilton concurred, “Bad principles in a Government tho slow are sure in their 
operation, and will gradually destroy it” (as cited Madison, 1840/1987, p. 114). 
Anti-Federalists felt these bad principles meant the destruction of the union in the 
form of abuse, tyranny, or the absorption of the states into national departments. If the 
states were absorbed, they reasoned, there would be no defense against the central 
government.  
Anti-Federalists did not see any beneficial outcome under the Constitution. If the 
Constitution did not consolidate as they feared, it would surely leave the people 
subservient to two conflicting sovereign governments. Agrippa wrote, “We shall be 
subject to all the horrors of a divided sovereignty, not knowing whether to obey the 
Congress or the state. We shall find it impossible to please two masters. In such a state 
frequent broils will ensue” (as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 4, Letter V, p. 79).  
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Federalists, in contrast, did not perceive a violation of principles, since they were 
not constructing a sovereignty over sovereignties, but a federal union. Rush explained, 
“The people of America have mistaken the meaning of the word sovereignty: hence each 
state pretends to be sovereign” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, p. 3). Madison 
concluded, “If the plan of the convention, therefore, be found to depart from the 
republican character, its advocates must abandon it as no longer defensible” (Federalist 
39, p. 280). 
The Constitution 
 The Statesmen believed that the Articles of Confederation were too weak. 
However, Anti-Federalists believed that the Constitution was too strong. An Old Whig 
complained that, “The new constitution vests Congress with such unlimited powers as 
ought never to be entrusted to any men or body of men” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Essay 
II, p. 323). Monroe asked, “May not some middle course be struck, some plan be adopted 
to give the general government those rights of internal legislation necessary for its safety, 
and well being in all cases, and yet leave to the states other powers” (as cited in Storing, 
1981, vol. 5, p. 290).  
But, the Federalists saw a great hope for the future in the Constitution. They felt 
that unity was the greatest need, and the Constitution would provide that cohesion. 
Zacheriah Johnson admitted, “There can be no human institution without defects. We 
must go out of this world to find it otherwise. The annals of mankind do not show us one 
example of a perfect constitution” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 648).  
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Yet, Madison wrote, “Where no Constitution, paramount to the government, 
either existed or could be obtained, no constitutional security, similar to that established 
in the United States, was to be attempted” (Federalist 53, p. 365). 
The Framers created the Constitution not only for themselves, but for future 
generations of Americans. They saw the Constitution as necessary and providential. 
Washington wrote, “My decided Opinion of Matter is, that there is no alternative between 
adoption of it and anarchy” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, p. 135). Caesar 
credited God with preserving the convention in spite of the factional interests. He wrote, 
“For my own part, I sincerely esteem it a system, which, without the finger of God, never 
could have been suggested and agreed upon by such a diversity of interests” (Letter II, p. 
324). Bowdoin concluded:  
Shall we, then, let causeless jealousies arise, and distract our councils? shall we 
let partial views and local prejudices influence our decisions? or shall we, with a 
becoming wisdom, determine to adopt the federal Constitution proposed, and 
thereby confirm the liberty, the safety, and the welfare of our country? (as cited in 
Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 2, p. 130) 
 
The Nature of Society 
 The Statesmen were primarily concerned with building a stable government, and 
the dynamics of power. Nonetheless, they discussed the nature of society in pursuit of 
their goal, “to form a more perfect Union” (US Constitution, Preamble). Exhibit IV.5 
outlines the Statesmen’s assumptions and the conclusions they drew about society. 
The Statesmen agreed that society is man’s natural state. Fabius explained:  
We may with reverence say, that our Creator designed men for society, because 
otherwise they cannot be happy. They cannot be happy without freedom; nor free 
without security; that is, without the absence of fear; nor thus secure, without society. 
(as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, Letter II, p. 67).  
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Wilson wrote, “Our wants, our talents, our affections, our passions, all tell us that we 
were made for a state of society. But a state of society could not be supported long or 
happily without some civil restraint” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, p. 79). 
Equality 
 
 Consistent with earlier assumptions, the Statesmen reasoned that equality was 
also man’s natural state. This theory of the equality of man destroyed the doctrine of the 
divine right of kings. It also permitted the Continental Congress to make the bold 
statement that, “all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness” (Declaration of Independence) 
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Exhibit IV.5 Assumptions about society 
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Noah Webster ranked the equality of circumstances very highly among the 
protections of liberty. He wrote, “The liberty of the press, trial by jury, the Habeas 
Corpus writ, even Magna Charta itself, although justly deemed the palladia of freedom, 
are all inferior considerations, when compared with a general distribution of real property 
among every class” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, p. 401). 
However, the Statesmen’s view of equality was not a vision of modern 
egalitarianism. Rather, all men were equal before the law, though talents and treasure 
made men inherently unequal. This inequality was the price of liberty. Hamilton claimed, 
“It was certainly true: that nothing like an equality of property existed: that an inequality 
would exist as long as liberty existed, and that it would unavoidably result from that very 
liberty itself” (Madison, 1840/1987, p. 356). Madison denounced those who sought to 
impose equality by government fiat when he wrote:  
Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have 
erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political 
rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their 
possessions, their opinions, and their passions. (Federalist 10, p. 133) 
 
Secondary Assumptions 
 Secondary assumptions focused on the Statesmen’s understanding of liberty. 
This included the nature of liberty, economic liberty as understood in property rights and 
free trade, and the freedom of the press.  
Nature of Liberty 
 Liberty was the end that government was instituted to preserve. Henry spoke of, 
“Liberty the greatest of all earthly blessings--give us that precious jewel, and you may 
take everything else” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, p. 677). Liberty, by definition, involves 
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restraint. Ames defined liberty as follows: “The liberty of one depends not so much on 
the removal of all restraint from him, as on the due restraint upon the liberty of others.  
Without such restraint, there can be no liberty” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, 
p. 198). Noah Webster added, “Many people seem to entertain an idea, that liberty 
consists in a power to act without any control. This is more liberty than even the savages 
enjoy” (p. 396).  
Liberty is so precious it may demand the ultimate sacrifice. Henry said, “View the 
most affectionate father--the most tender mother--operated on by liberty, nobly 
stimulating their sons--their dearest sons--sometimes their only son, to advance to the 
defence of his country” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, p. 723).  
Liberty could be lost in a number of ways such as mutations in government, or 
when the government failed to provide justice. A [Maryland] Farmer feared that the 
external form may appear to protect liberty when in reality, no protection existed. He 
wrote, “Nothing, perhaps, has contributed more towards interrupting the repose of 
mankind than a curious attention to the names and shadows of things, whilst the real 
essence and substantial parts have been disregarded” (Essay II, p. 662). Liberty could 
also be lost by what Bastiat (1850/1968) would later term “legal plunder” (p. 13).  
Free Trade and Industry 
 The Statesmen discussed economics in terms of industry and idleness. Wilson 
explained, “INDUSTRY appears next among the virtues of a good citizen. Idleness is the 
nurse of villains. The industrious alone constitute a nation’s strength” (as cited in 
Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, p. 507). Henry concurred, “The evils that attend us lie in 
extravagance and want of industry, and can only be removed by assiduity and economy” 
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(as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 157). As the individual produced and benefited, 
the overall standard of living of the community increased. Thus, when the individual 
legally sought his own good, he indirectly benefited others. Agrippa explained: 
No man when he enters into society, does it from a view to promote the good of 
others, but he does it for his own good. All men having the same view are bound 
equally to promote the welfare of the whole. (as cited in Storing, 1981, vol.4, 
Letter VII, p. 82) 
 
The Statesmen believed free trade under a government that encouraged trade and 
industry led to a higher standard of living.31 John De Witt explained, “Where freedom 
prevails, industry and science there also prevail” (as cited in Frohnen, 1999, Essay IV, p. 
515). Agrippa summarized the relationship between free trade and liberty when he wrote: 
 I ascertained from the state of other countries and the experience of mankind, that 
free countries are most friendly to commerce and to the rights of property. This 
produces greater internal tranquillity. For every man, finding sufficient 
employment for his active powers in the way of trade, agriculture and 
manufactures, feels no disposition to quarrel with his neighbour, nor with the 
government which protects him, and of which he is a constituent part. (as cited in 
Storing, 1981, vol. 4, p. 72) 
 
The Freedom of the Press 
 The press was a social defense mechanism by which demagogues could be 
thwarted. Morris wrote, “It may be the case that the people will not be deluded and 
misled in the latter case. But experience teaches another lesson. The press is indeed a 
great means of diminishing the evil” (as cited Madison, 1840/1987, p. 297). Cincinnatus 
appealed to the great philosophers and their opinion of the press to make his case: 
But such men as Milton, Sidney, Locke, Montesquieu, and Trenchard, have 
thought it essential to the preservation of liberty against the artful and preserving 
encroachments of those with whom power is trusted. You will pardon me, sir, if I 
                                                 
31 Notwithstanding protective tariffs, the statesmen generally agreed that greater production within the 
several states was an economically sound policy. 
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pay some respect to these opinions, and wish that the freedom of the press may be 
previously secured as a constitutional unalienable right, and not be left to the 
precarious care of popular privileges which may or may not influence our new 
rulers. (as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. II, Essay II, p. 11) 
 
 The Statesmen viewed a free press as directly related to the liberties of the people. 
The very debate they had over the Constitution was only possible in a free media. Neither 
Federalist nor Anti-Federalist felt restricting the press was wise.  
Yet, the same freedom that could prevent tyranny could be used for abuse, libel or 
blasphemy. Nonetheless, the Statesmen considered this as a calculated risk. Noah 
Webster wrote: 
Yes, gentlemen, you know, that under such a general licence, a man who should 
publish a treatise to prove his maker a knave, must be screened from legal 
punishment. I shudder at the thought! – But the truth must not be concealed. The 
constitutions of several states guarantee that very licence. (as cited in Sheehan & 
McDowell, 1998, p. 172) 
 
Conclusions About Society 
The Statesmen drew conclusions about a good or just society from their 
assumptions of the nature of society and their ideas about liberty. The two most salient 
conclusions were the connection between religious and civil liberties and the connection 
between virtue and the good society.  
Civil and Religious Liberty are Tied Together 
 To the Statesmen, liberty could not be compartmentalized. Religious liberty was 
as important as civil liberty, economic liberty or the freedom of the press. As economic 
liberty had a tendency to make men industrious and thereby increase the nation’s 
prosperity, religious liberty had a similar tendency to make men good. In fact, they 
counted on this as a primary social support of government. Huntingdon wrote, “While the 
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great body of freeholders are acquainted with the duties which they owe to their God, to 
themselves, and to men, they will remain free. But if ignorance and depravity should 
prevail, they will inevitably lead to slavery” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 2, p. 200). 
Church and state issues were close to the minds of the Statesmen. Most of the 
states had state supported churches. Religious qualifications pervaded the state 
constitutions (see Appendix F). The Statesmen reasoned that men who believed in God 
and an afterlife would be morally bound in this life by penalties in the next. However, the 
Constitution provided that no religious test be required.  
Some of the Statesmen took issue with this clause. A running debate spread across 
the several states. In New Hampshire, A Friend of the Rights of the People complained:  
But no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office, or 
public trust under the United States, according to this we may have a Papist, a 
Mohomatan, a Deist, yea an Atheist at the helm of Government. . . . But will this 
be good policy to discard all religion? It may be said the meaning is not to discard 
it, but only to shew that there is no need of it in public officers; they may be as 
faithful without as with--this is a mistake--when a man has no regard to God and 
his laws nor any belief of a future state; he will have less regard to the laws of 
men, or to the most solemn oaths or affirmations; it is acknowledged by all that 
civil governments can't well be supported without the assistance of religion. (as 
cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 4, p. 242) 
 
Others argued for the removal of a religious test. In Massachusetts, Parsons 
reasoned that the matter should be left to the people. He acknowledged that under this 
government, we may acquire, “unprincipled men, atheists and pagans” for leaders (as 
cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, p. 90). He continued, “No man can wish more ardently than I 
do that all our public offices may be filled by men who fear God and hate wickedness; 
but it must remain with the electors to give the government this security” (vol. 2, p. 90). 
In Connecticut, Wolcott left the matter to God. Wolcott reasoned that the Constitution 
recognized His authority by the way the oath was construed. He said that the 
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Constitution, “enjoins an oath upon all the officers of the United States. This is a direct 
appeal to that God who is the avenger of perjury. Such an appeal to him is a full 
acknowledgement of his being and providence” (vol. 2, p. 202).  
In the North Carolina debates, Iredell explained that an oath, “is considered a 
‘solemn appeal to the Supreme Being, for the truth of what is said, by a person who 
believes in the existence of Supreme Being and in a future state of rewards and 
punishments’” (vol. 4, p. 196). Iredell argued that a religious test would not meet the ends 
it was designed to achieve. He said, “Were we to judge from the examples of religious 
tests in other countries, we should be persuaded that they do not answer the purpose for 
which they are intended” (vol. 4, p. 193). Spencer supposed that bad men would ignore 
such tests, and good men would be excluded: 
Religious tests, said he, have been the foundation of persecutions in all countries. 
Persons who are conscientious will not take the oath required by religious tests, 
and will therefore be excluded from offices, though equally capable of 
discharging them as any member of the society. It is feared, continued he, that 
persons of bad principles, deists, atheists, &c., may come into this country; and 
there is nothing to restrain them from being eligible to offices. He asked if it was 
reasonable to suppose that the people would choose men without regarding their 
characters. Mr. Spencer then continued thus: Gentlemen urge that the want of a 
test admits the most vicious characters to offices. I desire to know what test could 
bind them. If they were of such principles, it would not keep them from enjoying 
those offices. On the other hand, it would exclude from offices conscientious and 
truly religious people, though equally capable as others. Conscientious persons 
would not take such an oath, and would be therefore excluded. This would be a 
great cause of objection to a religious test. But in this case, as there is not a 
religious test required, it leaves religion on the solid foundation of its own 
inherent validity, without any connection with temporal authority; and no kind of 
oppression can take place; I confess it strikes me so. I am sorry to differ from the 
worthy gentleman. I cannot object to this part of the Constitution, I wish every 
other part was as good and proper. (vol. 4, p. 200) 
 
Throughout these debates the common element was not hostility toward religion. 
Instead, the Statesmen sought security for both religion and government. All 
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acknowledged that the Christian religion was morally good. They believed that religion 
was a great support of civil society. Caldwell stated, “Even those who do not regard 
religion, acknowledge that the Christian religion is best calculated, of all religions, to 
make good members of society, on account of its morality” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, 
vol. 4, p. 199).   
To the Statesmen, religion, like the press, was a necessary non-governmental 
component of the government. A Foreign Spectator wrote, “A sermon every Sunday is a 
powerful antidote against selfish and malicious passions,--it would often dispose people 
for good government better than the wisest laws, and be promoting all the civil virtues” 
(as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, Letter VII, p. 419). Turner reminded his 
colleagues, “But I hope it will be considered, by persons of all orders, ranks, and ages, 
that, without the prevalence of Christian piety and morals, the best republican 
constitution can never save us from slavery and ruin” (as cited in Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 
2, pp. 171-172). If the people practiced the Christian religion, it would lighten the burden 
of governing and the laws would be few. Turner continued: 
May religion, with sanctity of morals, prevail and increase, that the patriotic 
civilian and ruler may have sublime, parental satisfaction of eagerly embracing 
every opportunity of mitigating the rigors of government, in proportion to the that 
increase of morality which may render the people more capable of being a law to 
themselves! (vol. 2, p. 172) 
 
The Statesmen concluded that the Christian religion powerfully supported 
government. Yet, because religion and government were so intertwined, good 
government would reciprocally permit religion and morality to thrive. Conversely, bad or 
tyrannical government would lead to religious persecution. A [Maryland] Farmer wrote:  
Civil and religious liberty are inseparably interwoven--whilst government is pure 
and equal--religion will be uncontaminated:--The moment government becomes 
167 
disordered, bigotry and fanaticism take root and grow--they are soon converted 
to serve the purposes of usurpation, and finally, religious persecution reciprocally 
supports and is supported by the tyranny of the temporal powers. (as cited in 
Frohnen, 1999, Essay VII, p. 626) 
 
Virtue and Society 
 What justice is to government, virtue is to society. The Statesmen believed that 
liberty was impossible without good manners and morals. A Foreign Spectator wrote, 
“the very competition of interests, and clashing of passions, teach the necessity of good 
manners, and moral government” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, Letter IV, p. 
410). He continued, “Manners ought then to be a capital object, in all the operations of 
government, and patriotic exertions of individuals” (Letter VI, p. 413). Dawson 
explained, “Some degree of virtue, sir, must exist, or freedom cannot live” (as cited in 
Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 3, p. 611). Wilson spoke of “FRUGALITY and TEMPERANCE.” 
He continued, “These simple but powerful virtues are the sole foundation, on which a 
good government can rest with security” (as cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, p. 
507).  
 The Statesmen likewise agreed that bad manners and lack of virtue would be a 
potent source of evils. Alfred asked, “May not our manners be the source of our national 
evils?” (as cited in Storing, 1981, vol. 3, p. 142). Linking earlier assumptions of the 
nature of man, power, and government, Turner concluded: 
If vice is predominant, it is to be feared we shall have rulers whose grand object 
will be (slyly evading the spirit of the Constitution) to enrich and aggrandize 
themselves and their connections, to the injury and oppression of the laborious 
part of the community; while it follows from the moral constitution of the 
DIETY, that prevalent iniquity must be the ruin of any people. The world of 
mankind have always in general, been enslaved in miserable, and always will be 
until there is a great prevalence of Christian moral principles; nor have I an 
expectation of this, in any great degree, unless some superiour mode of education 
shall be adopted. (vol. 4, p. 221). 
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In a pamphlet entitled Convention, an unknown Federalist explained, “It is in vain 
to expect a national trait in our characters, or a similitude of habits, but as the effect of a 
national efficient government--Virtue or good habits are the results of good laws” (as 
cited in Sheehan & McDowell, 1998, p. 356). Ellsworth concluded: 
How have the morals of the people been depraved for the want of an efficient 
government, which might establish justice and righteousness! For the want of this, 
iniquity has come in upon us like an overflowing flood. If we wish to prevent this 
alarming evil, if we wish to protect the good citizen in his right, we must lift up 
the standard of justice; we must establish a national government, to be enforced 
by the equal decisions of law, and the peaceable arm of the magistrate. (as cited in 
Elliot, 1836/1974, vol. 2, p. 197). 
 
Analysis 
In this study, the primary source documents were evaluated, and statements that 
contained assumptions on leadership were tagged, sorted, classified and analyzed. These 
concepts of leadership were arrayed across five dimensions--the nature of man, the nature 
of power, the nature of the people, the nature of government, and the nature of society.   
There were 2152 quotations selected and sorted (see Exhibit IV.6). This figure 
includes quotations that were duplicated in two or more categories because they were 
relevant to both (e.g., power and government). However, quotations were not used more 
than once within each sub-category. Results were tabulated based on the number of 
quotations identified rather than those cited in this study. Many quotations were not used 
because they were repetitious. This is displayed visually in Exhibit IV.7 below: 
Exhibit IV.6 Quotations by Category 
Category Numbers Percent 
Man 314 15%
Power 1173 55%
People 217 10%
Government 364 17%
Society 84 4%
Total: 2152  
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The Nature of Man 
Of the 2152 quotations, 15% dealt with the nature of man, 55% dealt with the 
nature of power, 10% dealt with the nature of the people, and 17% dealt with the nature 
of government. Only 4% dealt with the nature of society. Exhibit IV.7 visually displays 
these percentages. Dynamics of power were clearly the most frequently discussed.  
 
Exhibit IV.7 Visual Representation of Quotations by Category  
Quotations by Category
Man
15%
Power
54%
People
10%
Government
17%
Society
4%
 
Subcategories emerged into distinct clusters as the researcher classified each 
quotation. The numbers (see Exhibit IV.8) and percentages (see Exhibit IV.9) of the 
subcategories of the nature of man are identified below. Each has been classified by its 
source: the Constitutional Convention, the Ratification debates, the Anti-Federalist 
writings, the Federalist Papers, and the writings of other Federalists.  
Additionally, the final two columns highlight the percentage of the quotations 
within each category and the percentage of the total number of quotations in the overall 
study. This has also been visually illustrated in Exhibit IV.10  
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The greatest number of quotations in the section on the nature of man was on the 
passions (18%). This was followed by the nature of man (12%) and self interest (10%).
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Exhibit IV.8 The Nature of Man – Number of Quotations by Source and Subcategory 
 
        
  Federal Ratification The  Federalist   Other    
  Convention Debates Anti-Federalists Papers Federalists Totals: 
1 Nature of Man 3 8 18 3 5 37 
2 God Created Man 1 0 1 1 3 6 
3 Depravity of Man 2 5 4 1 1 13 
4 Corruption-the Result 14 3 6 1 2 26 
5 Man is not Perfectible 3 2 4 2 1 12 
6 The Rule of the Best Men 1 2 7 3 3 16 
7 Personal Character is Insufficient 3 9 10 3 2 27 
8 The Passions Rule Men 8 11 17 15 7 58 
9 Let Reason Govern 1 1 6 3 1 12 
10 Self-interest 4 7 13 6 1 31 
11 Leaders May Be Dangerous 3 2 8 2 1 16 
12 States Act Like Men 5 7 10 7 2 31 
13 Experience is the Best Teacher 1 0 4 5 2 12 
14 The Constitution and Human Nature 1 0 7 5 4 17 
 Total: 50 57 115 57 35 314 
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Exhibit IV.9 Nature of Man – Percentages of Quotations by Source and Subcategory 
 
 
       Total  Total   
  Federal Ratification The  Federalist  Other   Quotations Quotations
  Convention Debates Anti-Federalists Papers Federalists On Man Overall 
1 Nature of Man 6% 14% 16% 5% 14% 12% 2% 
2 God Created Man 2% 0% 1% 2% 9% 2% 0% 
3 Depravity of Man 4% 9% 3% 2% 3% 4% 1% 
4 Corruption-the Result 28% 5% 5% 2% 6% 8% 1% 
5 Man is not Perfectible 6% 4% 3% 4% 3% 4% 1% 
6 The Rule of the Best Men 2% 4% 6% 5% 9% 5% 1% 
7 Personal Character is Insufficient 6% 16% 9% 5% 6% 9% 1% 
8 The Passions Rule Men 16% 19% 15% 26% 20% 18% 3% 
9 Let Reason Govern 2% 2% 5% 5% 3% 4% 1% 
10 Self-interest 8% 12% 11% 11% 3% 10% 1% 
11 Leaders May Be Dangerous 6% 4% 7% 4% 3% 5% 1% 
12 States Act Like Men 10% 12% 9% 12% 6% 10% 1% 
13 Experience is the Best Teacher 2% 0% 3% 9% 6% 4% 1% 
14 The Constitution and Human Nature 2% 0% 6% 9% 11% 5% 1% 
  Total: 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 15% 
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Exhibit IV.10 visually represents the Statesmen’s assumptions about man. Because they 
began with largely Christian presuppositions, they reasoned that man was made in God’s 
image, that he was depraved according to Christian theology and the result was the abuse 
of power and corruption. This condition was universal. 
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Exhibit IV.10 Visual Representation of the Statesmen’s Assumptions about Man 
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The Nature of Power 
The nature of power received more attention than any other category (55%) The 
numbers (see Exhibit IV.11) and percentages (see Exhibit IV.12) of the subcategories of 
the nature of power are charted below. The greatest sub-category dealt with the abuse of 
power (19%). The second and third greatest categories dealt with the separation of power 
(9%) and responsibility (8%). Exhibit IV.13 visually illustrates the assumptions on power
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Exhibit IV.11 The Nature of Power – Number of Quotations by Source and Subcategory  
 
  Federal Ratification The  Federalist   Other    
  Convention Debates Anti-Federalists Papers Federalists Total: 
1 Nature of Power 1 2 18 17 5 43 
2 Men Love Power 2 6 13 0 0 21 
3 Power is Difficult to Relinquish 1 9 32 2 2 46 
4 Nations War When They Can 0 2 0 9 1 12 
5 Influence of Christianity 1 7 9 0 0 17 
6 The Abuse of Power 25 55 86 39 14 219 
7 Majority Oppresses Minority 15 8 11 4 1 39 
8 Officials Aggrandize Themselves 14 12 20 3 1 50 
9 Liberty Abused Becomes License 0 8 6 1 6 21 
10 Great Men are Interested Men 0 8 37 13 13 71 
12 Virtue is Insufficient 0 8 16 1 0 25 
13 Jealousy as a Virtue 1 11 9 6 2 29 
14 Representation as the Best Security 2 12 9 10 9 42 
15 Power Must be Tempered by Duration 0 9 6 4 0 19 
16 Size of Representation 9 18 16 9 3 55 
17 People and Leader - Same Interest 4 16 8 5 9 42 
18 Separation of Power 14 20 12 40 14 100 
19 Responsibility 7 40 27 16 8 98 
20 Theory of Faction 2 11 3 19 5 40 
21 Well Structured Government  1 3 9 3 1 17 
22 Electoral College 1 2 3 0 1 7 
23 Impeachment 4 1 2 4 2 13 
24 Term Limits 7 0 1 6 2 16 
25 State v. Federal Government 2 11 4 26 7 50 
26 State v. State 2 2 0 10 0 14 
27 Bill of Rights  0 0 6 0 0 6 
28 The Constitution  3 10 20 18 10 61 
  Total 118 291 383 265 116 1173 
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 Exhibit IV.12 Nature of Power – Percentages of Quotations by Source and Subcategory 
Total Total  
Federal Ratification The Federalist  Other  Quotations Quotations
Convention Debates Anti-Federalists Papers Federalists On Power Overall
1 Nature of Power 1% 1% 5% 6% 4% 4% 2%
2 Men Love Power 2% 2% 3% 0% 0% 2% 1%
3 Power is Difficult to Relinquish 1% 3% 8% 1% 2% 4% 2%
4 Nations War When They Can 0% 1% 0% 3% 1% 1% 1%
5 Influence of Christianity 1% 2% 2% 0% 0% 1% 1%
6 The Abuse of Power 21% 19% 22% 15% 12% 19% 10%
7 Majority Oppresses Minority 13% 3% 3% 2% 1% 3% 2%
8 Officials Aggrandize Themselves 12% 4% 5% 1% 1% 4% 2%
9 Liberty Abused Becomes License 0% 3% 2% 0% 5% 2% 1%
10 Great Men are Interested Men 0% 3% 10% 5% 11% 6% 3%
12 Virtue is Insufficient 0% 3% 4% 0% 0% 2% 1%
13 Jealousy as a Virtue 1% 4% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1%
14 Representation as the Best Security 2% 4% 2% 4% 8% 4% 2%
15 Power Must be Tempered by Duration 0% 3% 2% 2% 0% 2% 1%
16 Size of Representation 8% 6% 4% 3% 3% 5% 3%
17 People and Leader - Same Interest 3% 5% 2% 2% 8% 4% 2%
18 Separation of Power 12% 7% 3% 15% 12% 9% 5%
19 Responsibility 6% 14% 7% 6% 7% 8% 5%
20 Theory of Faction 2% 4% 1% 7% 4% 3% 2%
21 Well Structured Government 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1%
22 Electoral College 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 0%
23 Impeachment 3% 0% 1% 2% 2% 1% 1%
24 Term Limits 6% 0% 0% 2% 2% 1% 1%
25 State v. Federal Government 2% 4% 1% 10% 6% 4% 2%
26 State v. State 2% 1% 0% 4% 0% 1% 1%
27 Bill of Rights 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 1% 0%
28 The Constitution 3% 3% 5% 7% 9% 5% 3%
Total: 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 55%
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 The Statesmen added to their view of man the belief that men love power, that 
greater power leads to greater potential abuse, and that human nature (universal in nature) 
could be enlisted as a powerful and dependable ally to fight tyrants. This could be done 
by separating powers and connecting leaders to the people through responsibility.  
Exhibit IV.13 Visual Representation of the Statesmen’s Assumptions about Power 
 
The Nature of the People 
The nature of the people received 10% of the total quotations isolated in this 
study. The numbers (see Exhibit IV.14) and percentages (see Exhibit IV.15) of the 
subcategories of the nature of man are charted below.  
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Exhibit IV.14 The Nature of the People – Number of Quotations by Source and Subcategory  
 
  Federal Ratification The  Federalist  Other    
  Convention Debates Anti-Federalists Papers Federalists Total: 
1 Nature of the People 1 0 2 0 3 6 
2 The People are Sovereign 2 8 12 1 10 33 
3 The People as a Defense 2 8 10 5 5 30 
4 Leaders Chosen by the People 2 3 8 1 1 15 
5 Leaders Should be Close to the People 5 4 13 0 2 24 
6 Public Opinion is Generally True 3 0 3 0 1 7 
7 The People Cannot Always Judge Well 6 0 3 1 1 11 
8 Corruption of the Electorate Possible 3 3 1 0 0 7 
9 People Need Protection from Their Rulers 4 0 1 1 0 6 
10 People need protection from themselves 2 3 1 2 1 9 
11 Aristocracy v. Democracy 8 3 3 7 0 21 
12 Evils of Democracy 4 2 0 2 0 8 
13 Virtue of the People Necessary 6 5 9 1 5 26 
14 Constitution as a Compact With People 2 3 6 2 1 14 
  Total: 50 42 72 23 30 217 
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Exhibit IV.15 The Nature of the People – Percentages of Quotations by Source and Subcategory 
       Total  Total   
  Federal Ratification The  Federalist  Other   Quotations Quotations
  Convention Debates Anti-Federalists Papers Federalists On People Overall 
1 Nature of the People 2% 0% 3% 0% 10% 3% 0% 
2 The People are Sovereign 4% 19% 17% 4% 33% 15% 2% 
3 The People as a Defense 4% 19% 14% 22% 17% 14% 1% 
4 Leaders Chosen by the People 4% 7% 11% 4% 3% 7% 1% 
5 Leaders Should be Close to the People 10% 10% 18% 0% 7% 11% 1% 
6 Public Opinion is Generally True 6% 0% 4% 0% 3% 3% 0% 
7 The People Cannot Always Judge Well 12% 0% 4% 4% 3% 5% 1% 
8 Corruption of the Electorate Possible 6% 7% 1% 0% 0% 3% 0% 
9 People Need Protection from Their Rulers 8% 0% 1% 4% 0% 3% 0% 
10 People need protection from themselves 4% 7% 1% 9% 3% 4% 0% 
11 Aristocracy v. Democracy 16% 7% 4% 30% 0% 10% 1% 
12 Evils of Democracy 8% 5% 0% 9% 0% 4% 0% 
13 Virtue of the People Necessary 12% 12% 13% 4% 17% 12% 1% 
14 Constitution as a Compact With People 4% 7% 8% 9% 3% 6% 1% 
  Total: 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 10% 
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The people were meta-leaders. They were the king-makers. The greatest sub-
category dealt with the nature of the people (15%). The second dealt with the people as 
the great defense against tyranny (14%) and the third with responsibility--that leaders 
should be close to the people (11%). Exhibit IV.16 visually illustrates their assumptions. 
Exhibit IV.16 Visual Representation of the Statesmen’s Assumptions about the People 
The Nature of the Government 
The subsection on the nature of the government contained 17% of the total 
quotations isolated in this study. The numbers (see Exhibit V.17) and percentages (see 
Exhibit V.18) of the subcategories of the nature of man are charted below.  
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Exhibit IV.17. Nature of Government – Number of Quotations by Source and Subcategory 
 
Federal Ratification The Federalist  Other  
Convention Debates Anti-Federalists Papers Federalists Total:
1 Science of Government 0 2 5 2 1 10
2 Purpose of Government 1 3 31 8 7 50
3 Size of Government 2 1 8 8 2 21
4 Government Must Not be Too Weak 1 2 0 10 2 15
5 Paper Form,  But Men Must Rule 2 1 1 4 1 9
6 Legislative 23 2 9 11 3 48
7 Executive 9 0 6 6 1 22
8 Judiciary 1 0 9 5 2 17
9** Additional Provisions ** ** ** ** ** 0
10 Principles and Principles Violated 0 1 12 2 1 16
11 The Constitution 3 5 20 14 7 49
* Corruption 14 4 18 5 1 42
* Organizational barriers 9 0 23 22 2 56
* Individual Acts Same as Government 2 1 6 0 0 9
Total: 67 22 148 97 30 364
* These categories were not used in the section on government as they were largely duplicative
** This section was added after the categories were formed. In the text, this category dealt specifically with the Constitution (IV-VII)
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Exhibit IV.18 Nature of Government – Percentages of Quotations by Source and Subcategory 
       Total  Total   
  Federal Ratification The  Federalist  Other   Quotations Quotations
  Convention Debates Anti-Federalists Papers Federalists Government Overall 
1 Science of Government 0% 9% 3% 2% 3% 3% 0% 
2 Purpose of Government 1% 14% 21% 8% 23% 14% 2% 
3 Size of Government 3% 5% 5% 8% 7% 6% 1% 
4 Government Must Not be Too Weak 1% 9% 0% 10% 7% 4% 1% 
5 Paper Form,  But Men Must Rule 3% 5% 1% 4% 3% 2% 0% 
6 Legislative 34% 9% 6% 11% 10% 13% 2% 
7 Executive 13% 0% 4% 6% 3% 6% 1% 
8 Judiciary 1% 0% 6% 5% 7% 5% 1% 
9** Additional Provisions ** ** ** ** ** 0% 0% 
10 Principles and Principles Violated 0% 5% 8% 2% 3% 4% 1% 
11 The Constitution 4% 23% 14% 14% 23% 13% 2% 
* Corruption 21% 18% 12% 5% 3% 12% 2% 
* Organizational barriers 13% 0% 16% 23% 7% 15% 3% 
* Individual Acts Same as Government 3% 5% 4% 0% 0% 2% 0% 
 Total: 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 17% 
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According to the Statesmen, the civil leader was simply to establish justice and 
prevent tyranny. Consistent with previous assumptions, the greatest sub-category dealt 
with organizational barriers (15%), the second with the purpose of government (14%), 
and the third with the Constitution (13%). Exhibit V.19 visually illustrates this.  
Exhibit IV.19 Visual Representations of the Statesmen’s Assumptions about Government 
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The Nature of the Society 
The subsection on the nature of society contained only 4% of the total quotations 
isolated in this study. The numbers (see Exhibit IV.20) and percentages (see Exhibit 
IV.21) of the subcategories of the nature of man are charted below. Liberty was the great 
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end of society. When leaders established justice, the people enjoyed a great measure of 
liberty. 
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Exhibit IV.20 Nature of Society – Number of Quotations by Source and Subcategory  
        
  Federal Ratification The  Federalist  Other    
  Convention Debates Anti-Federalists Papers Federalists Total: 
1 Nature of Society 1 1 1 0 3 6 
2 Equality of Man 1 2 0 1 1 5 
3 Nature of Liberty 2 0 7 2 5 16 
4 Free Trade and Industry 1 0 3 0 2 6 
5 Freedom of the Press 0 0 3 3 5 11 
6 Civil and Religious Liberty Tied Together 0 4 8 0 2 14 
7 Virtue and Society 0 5 13 1 7 26 
  Total: 5 12 35 7 25 84 
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Exhibit IV.21 Nature of Society – Percentages of Quotations by Source and Subcategory 
 
       Total  Total   
  Federal Ratification The  Federalist  Other   Quotations Quotations
  Convention Debates Anti-Federalists Papers Federalists On Society Overall 
1 Nature of Society 20% 8% 3% 0% 12% 7% 0% 
2 Equality of man in society 20% 17% 0% 14% 4% 6% 0% 
3 Nature of liberty 40% 0% 20% 29% 20% 19% 1% 
4 Property rights and free trade 20% 0% 9% 0% 8% 7% 0% 
5 Freedom of the press 0% 0% 9% 43% 20% 13% 1% 
6 Civil and religious liberty tied together 0% 33% 23% 0% 8% 17% 1% 
7 Virtue and society 0% 42% 37% 14% 28% 31% 1% 
  Total: 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 4% 
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However, liberty was conditional upon virtue--the virtue of the leader and the 
virtue of the people. The greatest sub-category dealt with virtue and society (31%). The 
second dealt with the nature of liberty (19%). The third dealt with the notion that civil 
and religious liberties are tied together (17%). Exhibit IV.22 visually illustrates the 
Statesmen’s assumptions about the society. 
Exhibit IV.22 Visual Representations of the Statesmen’s Assumptions about Society 
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 By examining the data, the researcher can determine emphases, points of 
agreement or conflict between the Federalists and Anti-Federalist, and other nuances. 
This analysis supports the qualitative findings in chapter IV which are now summarized 
below.   
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Conclusions 
 The Statesmen operated under assumptions that covered the nature of man, 
power, the people, government, and society. The nature of man was the building block 
upon which the others (e.g., government and society) function through the dynamic of 
power. These assumptions were consistent and intertwined. Their conceptions of 
leadership can only be understood in light of these assumptions. The next chapter will 
outline a Statesmen’s school of leadership and contrast their thoughts to that of 
contemporary leadership literature.  
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CHAPTER V 
The Statesmen’s View of Leadership 
 
 The findings led the researcher to the conclusion that the Statesmen held a 
specific, distinct, and fundamentally different view of leadership than that espoused in the 
contemporary leadership literature. This chapter examines the Statesmen’s view of 
leadership and compares their view to contemporary leadership literature. 
The Statesmen’s View of Leadership 
 The Statesmen held a coherent and surprisingly consistent outlook on leadership. 
Exhibit V.1 outlines the Statesmen’s assumptions on the nature of leadership according to 
the five dimensions of the conceptual framework.  
Exhibit V.1 Assumptions on the Nature of Leadership 
A summary of the Statesmen’s view of leadership follows:  
Nature of Man 
• Leaders are everywhere. They are no different than other people.  
• They do not emerge by accident. They have won the esteem of the people.  
Nature of Man Man is depraved 
 Man’s condition is universal 
  
Nature of Power Men love power 
 The greater the power, the greater potential corruption 
 Therefore, enlist human nature as an ally in defense of liberty 
  
Nature of the People The people are the final defense of liberty 
  
Nature of Government The civil leader is to establish justice and prevent tyranny 
  
Nature of Society When civil leaders have succeeded, society enjoys a large 
measure of liberty 
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• They are capable of great things, but they are depraved like all men.  
• We are all capable of great depravity--including our leaders. 
• Remember that corruption comes from within.   
• The nature of man--especially his worst elements of depravity, selfishness, 
and ambition--can be a powerful defense.  
• Man’s nature has not and will not change. 
Nature of Power 
• All men love power.  
• The greater the power, the greater the potential for good or evil.  
• Power is intoxicating. The man who tastes it wants more.   
• Leaders love their power and they will strive to hold on to it.  
• They may have their power in exchange for serving the people well.  
• Like fire, leaders with power make great servants, but terrible masters.  
• The only difference between the leader and the tyrant is how he wields power.  
• Power grows to the degree that it is centralized. 
• You cannot make the leader too strong or he will become tyrannical.  
• Make the leader too weak and other tyrannical leaders will overpower him.  
• He should have enough power to perform his job, but not an ounce more. 
• Expect abuse from every quarter--individuals, legislative bodies, and nations. 
• Since all men are depraved and all men seek power, human nature can be 
enlisted as an ally to defend against tyranny.   
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Nature of Government 
• The civil leader is to maintain justice and prevent tyranny. 
• Structure the organization to minimize the concentration of power.  
• Create a system in which the degree to which leaders honorably serve the 
people is directly correlated to the degree to which they may ascend in 
political power.  
• Separate power, and make the parts independent of each other. 
• Vest a leader with power, then task another leader to watch and stand guard.  
• Each leader or body of leaders will guard the others as a dog guards a bone. 
• Human nature is as dependable as a mathematical equation in this regard.    
• Guard the people with capable leaders. Then, guard the people from those 
leaders. with other leaders. Then, guard those leaders with additional leaders.  
• Layer these protections so that no leader can abuse his power without 
violating the trust of many other leaders. Then, you are secure.  
• Every man is a potential tyrant. But, every other man made responsible to 
watch that man is a potential guardian.   
• Design the organization--the election process, the time, term, size, powers--to 
chain the leader to his task.   
• Tie him to his duties by noble sentiment, appeal to his base ambition, remind 
him of his responsibility to the people, and assure him of impeachment or 
removal in the next election if he violates his trust.  
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Nature of the People 
• If a leader still breaks these bonds, remember the people are the last great 
defense.  
• Divided they are easily conquerable, but united they can defeat any tyrant.  
• The leader is given performance reviews every few years. They either pass or 
fail.  
• The people judge the leader by his past behavior and weigh his performance 
against competitors who promise to do better. 
• The morality of the people will determine the morality of leaders.  
• While the people are moral, they will be vigilant and you are safe.  
• If the people become immoral, they will fail to watch or they will fail to 
remove immoral leaders who would subvert the system.  
Nature of Society 
• The goal of the leader should be to establish justice and prevent tyranny.  
• Religious, economic, and political liberties are inseparably connected. 
• Religious virtue supports the government, which in turn, supports society. 
• Society can only remain free if it remains virtuous. 
• At the end of the day, the leader can be judged by how well he preserves and 
defends liberty. 
Leadership Literature Comparison 
None of the contemporary leadership models match the Statesmen’s view of 
leadership. Following Bass’s (1990) outline in chapter II, a comparison can be made 
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between the Statesmen’s view of leadership thought and contemporary leadership 
theories. Few contemporary theories contain ideas similar to those held by the Statesmen. 
Current theories derived from business stand in sharp contrast. This is most evident in the 
personal and situational theories of leadership, as illustrated in visually in Exhibit V.2. 
There are very few points of congruence between the Statesmen’s perspective and 
the leadership literature. The discrepancies are greatest on the nature of man and the 
nature of power. The discrepancies across all dimensions are greatest between the 
Statesmen’s views and personal and situational theories. The Statesmen’s views present a 
competing perspective to contemporary leadership models. It is difficult to compare the 
Statesmen’s views of government and society against contemporary leadership literature 
since the latter rarely deals with these dimensions.  
Two important caveats should be noted. First, a comparison between the 
Statesmen’s view and the leadership literature is complicated by the purpose of the 
leader. Like the law, the civil leader has a primarily negative function. A civil leader’s 
role, according to the Statesmen, was to ensure justice and prevent tyranny. In contrast, 
most business models of leadership focus on a more active role of leadership. 
Second, it is important to recognize that the Statesmen crafted the Constitution 
214 years ago. Modern social sciences had yet to be developed. Darwin, Marx, Freud and 
Dewey would not emerge for several generations. Their heirs formed the disciplines of 
anthropology, sociology, psychology, and management from which leadership studies 
was derived.   
The primary conclusion drawn in the present analysis is that contemporary 
leadership literature and the American Statesmen of the Constitutional era operate from 
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fundamentally different assumptions. Secondary conclusions are that the leadership 
literature (in general) is ill-equipped for a task such as Constitution building; and, if a 
Constitution was structured under the basic assumptions of that literature, the system 
would not function or last.  
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Exhibit V.2 The Statesmen v. The Leadership Literature 
 
Man Discrepent Discrepent Discrepent Discrepent Discrepent 
Power Discrepent Discrepent Discrepent Discrepent Discrepent 
People Discrepent Congruent Congruent Congruent Discrepent 
Government Discrepent Non-Applicable Non-Applicable Non-Applicable Non-Applicable
Society Discrepent Non-Applicable Non-Applicable Non-Applicable Non-Applicable
Personal Interaction Interactive Perceptual Hybrid 
Situational Social learning Process Cognative Explanations
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Personal and Situational Theories 
Personal and situational theories include great-man theories, trait theories, 
personal-situational theories, psychoanalytic theories, political theories, and humanistic 
theories. The Statesmen would have denied the great-man theory. Though Washington 
was a great man, the Statesmen reasoned that he was an anomaly. Like the divine right of 
kings, the assumptions that support the great-man theory would have been dashed on the 
alter of the natural equality of man. 
Trait theories that presume that leaders emerge because of some special inborn 
traits would have faired no better on the same grounds. The Statesmen would have 
rejected these theories because leadership was determined by service to the community, 
and the door was open to all. In their minds, there was no such thing as a born leader. 
 Situational theories are the opposite of trait theories. They presuppose that a 
leader is made by his environment. However, the Statesmen did not believe that leaders 
were products of the right time and circumstance. Even tyrants were not products of 
circumstances, though they may seize an opportunity due to the timing of circumstances. 
Even so, the Statesmen would have reasoned that the timing was not the factor, but the 
leader’s depravity and his lust for power.  
Likewise, psychoanalytic theories, largely deterministic in nature, would not have 
fit. Political theories are closer than many other theories in the sense that they use a 
deductive, systematic interpretation of reality. In the same way that a Marxist-Leninist 
views class warfare in the historical dialectic, the Statesmen held a complete worldview 
of leadership that allowed them to construct a coherent system. This worldview was more 
theological than philosophical, but the dynamics are similar.  
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 Humanistic theories especially stand in sharp contrast to the Statesmen’s 
theological assumptions. Even the points of agreement built upon these different 
foundations would be considered only partially correct. For example, Bass (1990) 
explained humanist theories. He wrote, “The human being is by nature a motivated 
organism” (p. 43). While the Statesmen would agree that men universally aspire to gain 
more power, they would temper this view with their assumptions about depravity.  
Perhaps the conflict is best demonstrated by McGregor’s (1960, 1966) framework 
of theory X and theory Y. McGregor explained the basic assumptions of theory X:  
1. The average human being has an inherent dislike of work and will avoid it if he 
can” (p. 33). “2. Because of this human characteristic of dislike of work, most 
people must be coerced, controlled, directed, threatened with punishment to get 
them to put forth adequate effort toward the achievement of organizational 
objectives.” “3. The average human being prefers to be directed, wishes to avoid 
all responsibility, has relatively little ambition, wants security above all. (p. 34)   
 
In contrast, he writes of theory Y: 
1. The expenditure of physical and mental effort in work is as natural as play or 
rest. The average human being does not inherently dislike work. Depending upon 
controllable conditions, work may be a source of satisfaction (and will be 
voluntarily performed) or a source of punishment (and will be avoided if 
possible).  
2. External control and the threat of punishment are not the only means for 
bringing about effort toward organizational objectives. Man will exercise self-
direction and self-control in the service of objectives to which he is committed. 
3. Commitment to objectives is a function of the rewards associated with their 
achievement. The most significant of such rewards, e.g., (the satisfaction of ego 
and self-actualization needs, can be direct products of effort directed toward 
organizational objectives.  
4. The average human being learns, under proper conditions, not only to accept 
but to seek responsibility. Avoidance of responsibility, lack of ambition, and 
emphasis on security are generally consequences of experience, not inherent 
human characteristics.  
5. The capacity to exercise a relatively high degree of imagination, ingenuity, and 
creativity in the solution of organizational problems is widely, not narrowly, 
distributed in the population.  
6. Under the conditions of modern industrial life, the intellectual potentialities of 
the average human being are only partially utilized. (pp. 47-48) 
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Theory X assumes a low view of human nature. Theory Y assumes a high view of 
the nature of man. Yet, neither adequately explains the Statesmen’s view which is a 
mixture of both. The choice between theory X and theory Y is the logical fallacy of false 
alternatives. There may be more than two options. The Statesmen adopted a third way.  
They simultaneously embraced man’s depravity and the potential need for punishments 
(theory X) and his aspiration for power (theory Y). Armed with these assumptions they 
created a system of government able to bear the full weight of man.  
Argyris felt that the organization and the individual were inherently in conflict. 
Pugh and Hickson (1993) explain Argyris’ plight:  
Thus the typical organization members may be told: take initiatives but do not 
violate rules; think beyond the present but be rewarded and penalized on present 
performance only; think of the organization as a whole but do not cross into 
others’ areas of responsibility; cooperate with others but compete with others 
when required. (p. 215)  
 
The Framers sought to so align the nature of man to the organization of 
government that there would be no conflict between the system and the people. Instead, 
the natural conflict would be the system. The clash between depraved people who sought 
power would provide stability to the system.  
Only one theory in this category fits the assumption of the Statesmen well. Likert 
(1961) suggested that leaders should be considerate and supportive of their followers. 
Though Likert was dealing with industry not government, the ideas are easily 
translatable. Likert wrote: 
In the highly effective group,….The leader and members, as part of their roles in 
the group, establish and maintain an atmosphere and relationships which enable 
the communication, influence, decision-making, and similar processes of the 
group to be performed effectively. This means not only creating positive 
conditions, such as a supportive atmosphere, but also eliminating any negative or 
blocking factors. (p. 172) 
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Likert listed the characteristics of successful leaders who obtain superior results 
from their followers: 
The superiors who have the most favorable and cooperative attitudes in their work 
groups display the following characteristics:  
• The attitude and behavior of the superior toward the subordinate as person, 
as perceived by the subordinate, is as follows: 
o He is supportive, friendly, and helpful rather than hostile. He is 
kind but firm, never threatening, genuinely interested in the well-
being of subordinates and endeavors to treat people in a sensitive, 
considerate way. He is just, if not generous. He endeavors to serve 
the best interests of his employees as well as of the company.  
o He shows confidence in the integrity, ability, and motivations of 
subordinates rather than suspicion and distrust.  
o His confidence in subordinates leads him to have high expectations 
as to their level of performance. With confidence that he will not 
be disappointed, he expects much, not little. (This, again, is 
fundamentally a supportive rather than a critical or hostile 
relationship.)  
o He sees that each subordinate is well trained for his particular job. 
He endeavors also to help subordinates be promoted by training 
them for jobs at the next level. This involves giving them relevant 
experience and coaching whenever the opportunity offers. (p. 101) 
 
 The Statesmen ensured this same type of leader in the civil sphere through 
responsibility. The above list may be considered the moral equivalent of shaking hands, 
kissing babies, and constituent services. After all, an election is a popularity contest of 
both the leader and his ideas. The leader’s self-interest should drive him to remain close 
to the people. The Statesmen felt that a leader who did not have the same interest as the 
people was a menace.  
Finally, Blake and Mouton (1964) created a managerial grid in which they charted 
five different levels of the leader’s concern for production in contrast to their concern for 
people. Different types of managers graded along different levels:  
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1. The Impoverished Manager has low people skills and low production 
capability.  
2. The Country Club Manager has high on people skills, but low production 
capability. 
3. The Authority-Obedience manager has high production skills, but low people 
skills. 
4. The Organizational Man Manager has just enough of each to maintain the 
status quo. 
5. The Team Manager has high people skills and high production skills. 
The implicit conclusion was that Team Manager is the best type. However, the 
Statesmen were not very concerned with such a dynamic. Different leaders would be 
needed for different orientations. They were focused on a responsibility orientation. A 
production-oriented leader was as good or bad as a people-oriented leader. The key was 
to let the people decide. 
Interaction and Social Learning Theories 
Though interaction and social learning theories are rather different since they 
emphasize the relationship between the leaders and his followers, they contain a number 
of concepts that the Statesmen would have generally agreed with. According to Bass 
(1990), these theories include the leader-role theory, theories of attainment of the 
leadership role, reinforced change theory, path-goal theory, and contingency theory.  
The leader-role theory suggests that leaders “behave according to what is 
expected of them, and how they perceive their roles are defined” (Bass, 1990, p. 44). The 
Framers of the Constitution were working on this assumption when they created the 
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Constitution. According to theories of role attainment, expectations define the role of the 
leader. The Statesmen simply called this phenomenon responsibility to the people.   
Bass (1960) defined leadership as the effort by one to change the actions of the 
rest of the group. He claimed that leaders gain and retain their power when the group 
believes that the leader is capable of delivering what he has promised. This is the essence 
of reinforced-change theory. It is similar to path-goal theory. House’s (1971) path-goal 
theory claims that leaders come to power by demonstrating to followers the benefits they 
will receive from his leadership. He may use four different leadership styles to help 
followers reach their goals. He may be directive, supportive, participative, or 
achievement oriented. While the Statesmen were not concerned with the leadership 
styles, the balance of the path-goal theory is complementary to the Statesmen’s view. It 
roughly parallels the Statesmen’s expectations for the election process. 
Fielder’s (1967) contingency theory, however, was different in nature. 
Contingency theory, like Blake and Mouton’s (1964) managerial grid, divided leaders 
into task-oriented and relationship-oriented leaders. He further claimed that certain 
leadership styles are better for specific situation than others. While this may be true, this 
was secondary in the Statesmen’s thought process. The people would determine the 
leader requisite for the task.  
Theories and Models of Interactive Process 
Interactive process theories likewise may be complementary since they do not 
directly deal with the assumptions of the Statesmen. Yet, there are a number of 
similarities between the Statesmen’s assumptions and these theories. Yukl’s (1971) 
multiple-linkage model suggested that the leader’s concern for his subordinates leads to 
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greater follower satisfaction. Likewise, the Fielder and Leister (1977) suggested in the 
multiple-screen model that followers become more effective if they have good relations 
with their leaders. The Statesmen discussed this process in terms of being close to the 
people.   
The Statesmen, as a group, were quite concerned with the large-scale 
dissatisfaction the people would have with a tyrannical or corrupt government. They also 
realized that each leader would be concerned with his own constituency. They 
intentionally geared the Constitution to apply this pressure. Graen’s (1976) vertical dyad-
linkage model focuses on the relationship between the leader and individuals. The theory 
suggests that in-group members perform better than members of an out-group. The 
Statesmen would define follower performance as reelection. They believed that this tie 
between leader and followers offered the people a great security (as cited in Bass, 1990).  
 Exchange theories suggest a quid pro quo between the leader and the follower. 
This is also known as transactional leadership. Jacobs (1970) believed that the followers 
supply the leader with position, honor, and prominence in return for his effort as a leader. 
The Framers counted on this as they crafted the Constitution. They believed that leaders 
would do harm unless the system provided them greater benefits by doing right by the 
people. In the Convention, Morris, “did not hesitate therefore to say that loaves & fishes 
must bribe the Demagogues. They must be made to expect higher offices” (as cited in 
Madison, 1840/1987, p. 203). 
Behavioral theories deal with simple reward and punishment--the carrot and the 
stick. Although the Statesmen used reward and punishment (e.g., upward political 
mobility as a reward for good leadership, impeachment for bad behavior), they would 
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have considered such theories incomplete. Behavioral theories would not have considered 
the depravity of man, but would have begun with man as an animal in a stimulus-
response environment.  
Perceptual and Cognitive Theories 
Attribution or implicit theories of leadership suggest that followers have particular 
expectations of leaders and this shapes the leader’s behavior. Bass (1990) explained, 
“Implicit theories of leadership need to take into account the causal expectations that 
leaders have about themselves and their followers, as well as the complementary theories 
held by the followers” (p. 377). The Statesmen relied on the wisdom of the people to 
filter the leader’s actions. This was a primary reason for their great concern with the 
morality of the people.  
According to information processing theories, a leader bears a greater burden of 
solving problems or interpreting the problem. The Statesmen simply called this process 
representation. It was the difference between a democracy and a republic.  
The Statesmen also reasoned in ways similar to open-systems analysis. Open-
systems analysis sees the leader or body as part of a larger ecosystem. When the 
Statesmen argued about the effects of foreign intrigue, they were engaging in open-
systems analysis.  
Vroom and Yetton’s (1974) rational deductive approach dealt with the level of 
directive or participative behavior in which the leader should engage. Like contingency 
theory, the Statesmen reasoned that this type of question would be decided by the people. 
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Hybrid Explanations   
 There are a number of leadership theories that are a combination of two or more 
theories. Transformational leadership is one of the more well-known hybrid theories. It 
discusses a leadership style that goes beyond a simple quid pro quo between leader and 
follower (transactional leadership). Bass (1990) explained, “The transformational leader 
asks the followers to transcend their own self interests for the good of the group, 
organization or society” (p. 53). While Bass and Avolio (1988) considered 
transformational leadership to be the quintessential type of leadership, the Statesmen 
would not have thought in such terms. They solidly embraced a transactional system with 
rewards and penalties tied to performance. Charismatic leaders were more to be feared 
than welcomed.  
Conclusions 
In this chapter, the Statesmen’s school of leadership was summarized, and a 
comparison was made between the Statesmen and contemporary leadership theories. The 
quantitative tabulation demonstrates where emphasis lay as the Statesmen debated the 
merits of the Constitution. This was bolstered by a qualitative review of the Statesmen’s 
ideas in a summary of their views of leadership.  
By following the assumptions through each level of analysis from man to society, 
a pattern emerged. This summary was labeled the Statesmen’s view of leadership. This 
school of thought was then compared to Bass’s (1990) framework of basic leadership 
theories to determine similarity and contrasts. The researcher found the Statesmen’s view 
stands in sharp contrast to a number of personal and situational theories of leadership.  
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The Statesmen held clear and consistent views on leadership. They began with the 
premise that man was made in God’s image. From this assumption flowed concepts such 
as liberty for society and the equality of man. In regard to leadership, their understanding 
of the depravity of man, the universality of man’s nature, and man’s love of power 
directed their thinking to design a system where fundamental liberties would be preserved 
by dealing with the nature of man realistically.  
 Biblically, the civil leader’s job description is found in the book of Romans: 
For rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong. Do 
you want to be free from fear of the one in authority? Then do what is right and he 
will commend you. For he is God's servant to do you good. But if you do wrong, 
be afraid, for he does not bear the sword for nothing. He is God's servant, an agent 
of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer. Therefore, it is necessary to 
submit to the authorities, not only because of possible punishment but also 
because of conscience. This is also why you pay taxes, for the authorities are 
God's servants, who give their full time to governing. Give everyone what you 
owe him: If you owe taxes, pay taxes; if revenue, then revenue; if respect, then 
respect; if honor, then honor. (Romans 13: 3-7) 
 
The civil leader is God’s servant. He is to punish evil (v. 4) and commend good 
(v.3). This limited role of the civil leader is primarily negative. The civil leader does not 
have a very active role in the life of the ordinary citizen. That is, individuals are free to do 
what they please as long as it does not affect the liberty of others in society. Once this 
line is crossed, the civil leader must intervene. The Statesmen’s primary concern was 
preventing the leader from becoming an agent of evil. 
The Statesmen sought to shape a system in which civil leaders led the people 
justly instead of becoming tyrants. They used their assumptions about the nature of man 
to enlist human nature in the struggle against tyranny. Under the Constitution, the path to 
power is service, not abuse. We, the posterity of the Statesmen have been the 
beneficiaries of the Statesmen’s insight on leadership.  
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The Statesmen’s view and the leadership literature are discrepant in many ways. 
Though some of the social and interactive theories are complementary, there are great 
discrepancies between the Statesmen and contemporary leadership literature. The greatest 
conflict is among the Statesmen’s perspective and personal and situational theories. The 
Statesmen’s view of leadership could be classified in this category, but the Statesmen 
began with radically different premises. They did not believe that leaders were 
environmentally determined--biologically, psychologically, or environmentally.  
 Instead, beginning with the depravity of man, the equality of man, and the love of 
power, which were all common to man, the Statesmen believed that all men were 
potential leaders. Leaders would rise to the degree that they contributed to society. The 
people would reward or punish leaders with return to, or removal from, office depending 
upon the leader’s performance.   
The purpose of this study was to ascertain the leadership assumptions of 
American Statesmen during the Constitutional era. These assumptions emerged from 
careful review of the primary source documents. The assumptions were classified and 
summarized into a conceptual framework. 
Four fundamental conclusions can be drawn from this study. The first is that the 
American Statesmen of the Constitutional era held a distinctive view on leadership. This 
was labeled the Statesmen’s view of leadership. Their assumptions were clear and 
observable. Although they did not reduce these assumptions to a complete model, they 
operated from them as they structured the government.   
 Second, their assumptions were remarkably similar. This may not have great 
significance to the leadership literature, but it does have bearing on the historical 
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Federalist/Anti-Federalist debate. These virulent opponents actually agreed upon more 
than that in which they disagreed. They sought the same ends, though they differed on the 
means of attaining those ends.   
 Third, and most important, the Statesmen’s underlying assumptions about the 
nature of man (e.g., that men are depraved, that they love power, that this is man’s 
universal condition) directed them to fashion a government in which they realistically 
accounted for and defended against tyrants.32 A leadership theory built on faulty premises 
is not only worthless, but potentially dangerous. Where the Statesmen argued from 
political depravity, universality of man’s nature, and a lust for power, a Marxist-Leninist 
system would run on precisely the opposite assumptions. These two systems, based on 
different assumptions, led to different governmental systems. One led to the freest 
governmental system the world has ever known. The other led to one of the greatest 
systems of tyranny.   
 Fourth, the Statesmen’s view of leadership is a competing leadership theory. It 
cannot logically accept the premises of other contrasting theories. This is especially true 
of the base assumptions of personal and situational theories that are deterministic in 
nature. This competing view has been externally substantiated by 214 years of liberty.  
Opportunities for Future Research 
This study opens the door for a number of areas of potential research for others 
interested in studying leadership or the American Statesmen. That the Statesmen even 
held a distinctive view on the subject of leadership was not discussed by any of the other 
                                                 
32 These assumptions are consistent with a Biblical world-view.  The scripture reminds us, “The heart is 
deceitful above all things and beyond cure. Who can understand it?” (Jeremiah 17:9). 
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historians whose works were studied. It is true that scholars have, in successive waves, 
reinterpreted the Constitution through different lenses. However, these lenses ought to be 
examined carefully. It would be interesting to see what kind of Constitution Charles 
Beard and the Progressives would have created based on their assumptions.  
Application to Government  
Similar studies could be done using the same methods. Perhaps the most useful 
would be to perform the same type of analysis on the United Nations using the early 
speeches and writings. Emerging Eastern European countries also may be studied to 
determine the types of policies a particular regime is likely to employ. While the study on 
the American Statesmen’s assumptions is not generalizable to the overall population, the 
same methods could be employed.   
In a related vein, another scholar could trace the types of systems that would 
emerge from a different base of assumptions. For example, what type of system would 
have been created if the architects assumed that man’s nature was basically good? What 
if man’s nature was mutable and evolving? What if man did not lust for power? What 
types of governmental systems would be framed under these assumptions of leadership? 
The Statesmen’s assumptions were in harmony with a Biblical world-view. 
Another researcher may begin with an Islamic, Jewish, Hindu, or other worldview as a 
starting point to build a governmental system and predict its longevity and stability. One 
could as easily employ any philosophy to conduct such a study. This is the inverse of the 
method employed in this study. 
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Application to Leadership 
It may also be useful to further explore the Statesmen’s school of thought on 
leadership. This can be done in two ways. First, by extending into the Bill of Rights and 
back to the First Continental Congress, different nuances may emerge. Second, other 
disciplines (e.g., economics, sociology) could benefit from the same approach. Another 
scholar may find it rewarding to clearly refine these assumptions in other fields.  
Another fruitful field for further research may be the identification of underlying 
assumptions in the leadership literature. In the same way that the Statesmen were 
unusually similar on the assumption level, an examination of the assumptions of the most 
prominent leadership theorists may yield an extraordinary harvest. Even though they do 
not usually agree, and are often contradictory, they may agree on many assumptions 
about the nature of man, power, etc.  
 After such a study has taken place, additional studies to determine the worth of 
these assumptions would be useful. These studies should be tested to see that these 
assumptions are connected to reality, not just theory. For example, McGregor’s (1960, 
1966) theory X and theory Y are routinely taught in business schools as legitimate 
alternatives. Theory X is then castigated, and Theory Y is accepted as a basic premise for 
other theories. 
 Finally, another researcher may go beyond the Statesmen who based much of 
their theory of leadership on tenets of the Christian religion. Using the same methods, a 
Christian theory of leadership may be built independently upon the scriptures and the 
early church fathers unaided by the humanistic concepts that are so often embraced. This 
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type of original research may become a powerful rival to humanistic leadership theories, 
since it stands on a completely different foundation.  
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Afterward 
Planning 
 As the researcher set out to determine what he wanted to study, he knew only that 
he wanted to study leadership and that he wanted to study the American Founding 
Fathers. For years he had been troubled by conflicting ideas. In his undergraduate studies 
in government and his masters work in public policy, he had been taught the philosophy 
of the Founding Fathers. But in his masters of business administration and doctoral 
studies in leadership, he was taught theories that were antithetical to that which he had 
previously learned. This was frustrating. 
He was unsure exactly from what angle he would approach this dissertation. In 
the early phases, the researcher knew that he would have to read what the Statesmen read 
so that he could see through their eyes. He had been leaning toward a study of 
organizational design. But when he read the British pamphleteer, Cato (1723-1995), and 
his discussion of the passions, he knew that he wanted to learn to see leaders as the 
Statesmen saw them. They had a different perception, different vocabulary, and they 
drew different conclusions. 
 Research 
Two profound lessons were learned during this research. The first was technical, 
the second philosophical. As the researcher began to compile materials, he created a 
system in which he isolated quotations, and copied them into a Microsoft Word ® file. 
Each text was systematically covered. However, he did not initially add the full citation 
with each quotation and page number. This was costly since he not only had to go back to 
double check the spelling and punctuation of each citation, but he had to label each 
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citation. Unfortunately, this was done in a two-step process. However, the redundancy 
did allow the researcher more time to ponder. The researcher divided these citations 
electronically with a color-coding mechanism based on the five categories. Then they 
were manually separated into file folders in a storage box. Each folder contained one 
subcategory. This allowed the researcher to deal with manageable portions at any given 
moment. This system was incredibly useful in writing chapter 4 since all of the 
quotations were gathered systematically for the researcher to review. A research system 
must be worked out ahead of time in a large project or the researcher will become 
frustrated. 
The second research lesson was surprising. Over the course of the study the 
researcher’s position shifted significantly from an Anti-Federalist to a Federalist position. 
The primary source documents were the key to this movement. As the researcher read 
Madison’s notes on the Convention, he learned just how difficult the Convention was. 
Many of the objections raised by Anti-Federalist writers (e.g., the appeal for a second 
convention) were overcome mentally as the researcher read the Anti-Federalist’s 
arguments. The researcher’s initial conjecture that the Anti-Federalists were a key to 
unlocking these assumptions was wrongheaded. Nonetheless, the study was quite fruitful 
even though the answers did not arise in the way that the researcher had initially 
expected. 
The Process 
It was difficult to trust the process. This study was designed to allow the 
Statesmen’s assumptions to emerge. While the researcher tried not to bias this process 
(and some of his initial ideas of what would emerge were wrong), the answers were 
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ultimately revealed by faithful adherence to the process. Additionally, the process 
verified the conclusion through the massive support of over 2000 references from the 
debates.  
However, during most of the process, the researcher was not sure what would turn 
up, or for that matter, that anything coherent would emerge. This is a terrifying thought 
two years into a research study. Nonetheless, the process paid off handsomely. Any 
researcher beginning a large research project must formulate the process well in advance 
to determine what he seeks to find. If the process is solid, the researcher can place blind 
faith in it until the end results are gained. 
Findings    
 The results of this study ended many years of cognitive dissonance for the 
researcher. The research demonstrated that the Statesmen’s assumptions (e.g., a low view 
of human nature, universality of man’s nature, and the love of power) are keys to the 
stability of the Constitutional system. Yet, it raises a whole new set of questions. If the 
Statesmen’s view of leadership is correct, what implications does that have for other 
competing theories and those theories that are built upon erroneous premises? This closes 
one intellectual chapter of the researcher’s life and begins a brand new one. 
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All elected and 
appointed 
officials 
including the 
executive, 
legislative and 
judicial officers 
of the Federal 
government, 
all state and 
local officials; 
The people 
are also 
considered 
leaders in both 
the election 
process and 
as a force for 
corrupt 
leaders to 
recon with. 
As far as 
elected 
officials are 
concerned, 
there is not a 
great shift in 
the question of 
who are 
leaders;  
However, 
there is a 
significant shift 
in the theory of 
the people as 
a leader or the 
king-makers. 
This is 
particularly felt 
further one 
travels into 
ancient 
political 
philosophy. 
Though civil 
leaders carry a 
similar role, 
the dominant 
position of the 
people as the 
meta-leader 
and the 
Constitution 
that is geared 
so as to 
preserve the 
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the people and 
the civil 
leaders alter 
the system 
significantly in 
favor of rights 
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especially true 
if the 
Statesmen’s 
assumptions 
about what 
leaders will 
and will not do 
are correct. 
Compare 
governmental 
systems 
where the 
people are 
also 
considered 
leaders and 
see if: 
a) if the 
assumptions 
about the 
nature of man 
and power are 
the same 
b) if the people 
are leaders in 
fact, as 
opposed to on 
paper. 
C) to what 
degree they 
actually have 
liberty (e.g., 
economic 
liberties 
index); 
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-Civil officials , 
clergy 
 
The Prince, 
clergy 
____________ 
 
-Philosopher-
King; men made 
of gold 
 
-King; best men; 
most virtuous 
men 
 
Kings/ Rulers 
 
 
 
-The Prince (the 
audience for his  
text) 
 
The sovereign 
(king with 
absolute 
authority) 
 
 
The general will; 
 
 
Hooker 
 
 
Vattel 
 
____________ 
 
Plato 
 
 
 
Aristotle 
 
 
 
Aquinas 
 
 
 
Machiavelli 
 
 
 
Hobbes 
 
 
 
 
 
Rousseau 
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society; 
sovereign 
 
 
What were the 
assumptions 
of leadership 
held by 
American 
Statesmen 
during the 
Constitutional 
Convention 
and ratification 
debates? 
What were 
leaders 
expected to 
do? 
King – Rule the 
country best: his 
interest is the 
country’s interest; 
 
 
 
 
-Serve the people 
(king) or abuse 
the people 
(tyrant) 
 
 
-Become 
tyrannical if left to 
his own devices 
 
 
-A despot is best 
suited for a 
despotic regime; 
have certain 
political vices 
 
 
-Attempt to 
perpetuate their 
reign  and line; 
Blackstone  
 
 
 
 
Grotius 
 
 
Locke 
 
 
 
 
 
Milton 
 
 
 
 
Montesquieu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sidney 
 
 
Berelson 
(1952); 
Pool 
(1959); 
Mark 
(1996) 
 
Civil leaders 
were expected 
to love power, 
have a difficult 
time 
relinquishing 
power, and 
abuse power. 
They may 
abuse power 
through 
sudden 
changes or 
through 
gradual 
usurpation,  
through 
taxation, 
through an 
aristocracy, 
the legislature, 
the executive, 
the judiciary, a 
standing army, 
under foreign 
influence, 
aggrandizing 
themselves, or 
oppressing a 
Civil leaders 
were expected 
to do these 
things based 
upon a few 
specific 
assumptions 
that were held 
about leaders: 
a) Man is 
depraved 
b) Man’s 
condition is 
universal 
c) Men love 
power 
d) Greater 
power has a 
greater 
potential for 
abuse 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Because the 
Statesmen 
began with 
these 
assumptions, 
they 
intentionally 
developed a 
system (the 
Constitution 
and the 
subsequent 
Bill of Rights) 
that could 
brace the 
people and 
withstand the 
expected 
abuse 
Examine 
governmental 
systems with 
different base 
assumptions 
about the 
nature of man 
and the love of 
power. 
Compare the 
success of 
governmental 
systems with 
Constitutions 
that consider 
these 
assumptions 
(e.g., the 
United states) 
with 
Constitutional 
systems 
where the 
system or the 
people do not 
embrace these 
assumptions 
about the 
nature of man 
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Corruption in 
absolute 
government; act 
unjustly; Tyrants 
will use the cloak 
of legality to 
cover 
 
-Oppressors will 
masquerade;  
They will do evil 
in the name of 
good; They would 
be guided by the 
passions; corrupt 
men will charge 
the people with 
corruption; they 
do as much 
mischief as they 
can 
 
-Internal and 
external 
corruption 
correlated 
 
 
-Properly 
exercise right to 
make war/ 
receive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trenchard and 
Gordon  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hooker 
 
 
 
 
 
Vattel 
 
 
 
minority.  
 
 
 
In contrast, 
the people 
were expected 
to be alarmed 
by such abuse 
and become a 
defense 
against it. 
 
 
 
 
 
The people 
would defend 
themselves 
naturally 
because they 
also love their 
rights and 
liberties. 
 
(e.g., Weimar 
Republic; 
European 
Union; United  
Nations) 
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ambassadors 
 
 
____________ 
-Leader will be 
moral, virtuous, 
public minded 
men. Dictate 
what is best to 
lesser men; men 
of wisdom, 
courage and 
moderation; men 
of the best 
nature; love all 
equally 
 
 
-Behave 
reasonably in 
pursuit of the final 
goal of happiness 
 
Leaders will be 
corrupt if less 
than the most 
virtuous rule 
 
-Protect his power; 
imitate others; 
Harm others 
because of fear; 
 
 
 
____________ 
Plato 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aristotle 
 
 
 
 
Aquinas 
 
 
 
 
Machiavelli 
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appear to possess 
great qualities 
(though not always 
the case); He is 
successful if he is 
suited to the times. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The leader will 
pursue self-interest 
(so it must be tied 
to public interest as 
in the king) 
 
 
 
 
Embody the 
General will; act 
virtuously & 
selflessly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hobbes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rousseau 
 
 
 
 
What were the 
assumptions 
of leadership 
held by 
American 
What were 
leaders 
expected not to 
do? 
 
The King can do 
no wrong (a legal 
fiction). 
 
 
Blackstone  
 
 
 
Grotius 
Berelson 
(1952); 
Pool 
(1959); 
Mark 
Leaders were 
not expected 
be more 
virtuous or 
govern in such 
Based on the 
assumptions 
that: 
a) Man is 
depraved 
Because the 
Statesmen 
began with 
these 
assumptions, 
Examine 
governmental 
systems with 
different base 
assumptions 
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Statesmen 
during the 
Constitutional 
Convention 
and ratification 
debates? 
 
 
 
 
-Kings will not 
give up power or 
concept of 
hereditary right 
 
 
A leader cannot 
injure me without 
first making 
himself a tyrant 
 
 
One type of ruler 
will not function 
well in a different 
environment 
 
 
 
They will not 
promote justice 
when they stand 
to benefit; A body 
of eminent men 
will not make 
laws that will 
harm them 
 
 
 
 
 
Locke 
 
 
 
 
 
Milton 
 
 
 
 
 
Montesquieu 
 
 
 
 
Sidney 
 
Trenchard and 
Gordon  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hooker 
 
 
(1996) 
 
a way as to 
preserve rights 
and liberties 
unless bound 
to do so.  
 
In sum, 
leaders were 
not expected 
to do what 
they 
normatively 
should do  
b) Man’s 
condition is 
universal 
c) Men love 
power 
d) Greater 
power has a 
greater 
potential for 
abuse, 
they reasoned 
that  
civil leaders 
would not 
perform as 
expected 
without 
provocation by 
a Constitution 
they 
intentionally 
developed a 
system (the 
Constitution 
and the 
subsequent 
Bill of Rights) 
that would 
cause leaders 
to perform 
their proper 
role as leaders 
and minimize 
the danger of 
the abuse of 
power. 
about the 
nature of man 
and the love of 
power. 
Compare the 
success of 
governmental 
systems of 
ancient 
societies (e.g., 
philosophers 
of Greece and 
Rome) or 
modern 
systems 
(European 
Union; United  
Nations) that 
do not expect 
abuse from 
their leaders 
with 
Constitutions 
that consider 
these 
assumptions 
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____________ 
-They would not 
strive for private 
gain 
 
 
 
 
 
-Only a wise few 
will recognize 
problems early 
and deal with 
them 
 
They will not 
punish 
themselves or be 
punished by their 
subjects; they are 
not bound to 
obey the laws 
themselves 
 
 
 
They will do 
nothing apart 
from the general 
will 
Vattel 
 
____________ 
Plato 
 
 
 
Aristotle 
 
Aquinas 
 
Machiavelli 
 
 
 
 
 
Hobbes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rousseau 
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What were the 
assumptions 
of leadership 
held by 
American 
Statesmen 
during the 
Constitutional 
Convention 
and ratification 
debates? 
What should 
leaders do 
(normatively)? 
 
Represent his 
people; Make 
treaties 
 
Maintain justice; 
 
 
 
Maintain justice 
under the law; 
actively promote 
justice 
 
 
Kings must 
realize that they 
too are under law 
 
 
 
-Be virtuous; Be 
moderate 
 
 
-Always promote 
justice; submit to 
the laws 
themselves; he 
should chose 
judges; Seek the 
interest of the 
Blackstone  
 
 
 
Grotius 
 
 
 
Locke 
 
 
 
 
 
Milton 
 
 
 
 
 
Montesquieu 
 
 
 
Sidney 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Berelson 
(1952); 
Pool 
(1959); 
Mark 
(1996) 
 
According to 
the 
Statesmen, 
civil leaders 
should ensure 
justice, secure 
rights and 
liberty, and 
maintain the 
peace in a 
government 
built upon the 
consent of the 
people (the 
meta-leaders) 
Based on their 
assumptions 
and a realistic 
assessment of 
what leaders 
would and 
would not do, 
the Statesmen 
recognized a 
disparity 
between 
expected and 
normative 
behavior for 
leaders. 
This disparity 
between 
expected and 
normative 
would be 
closed by a 
constitutional 
system that 
would provide 
well-
developed, 
interlocked 
incentives for 
leaders to do 
what they 
should 
normatively 
Examine the 
success or 
failure of 
governmental 
systems 
where 
normative 
behavior is 
expected 
because 
assumptions 
about leaders 
are 
fundamentally 
different (e.g., 
man is 
basically good, 
man’s nature 
may evolve, 
etc.) 
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people 
 
Deal justly with the 
people; infuse 
virtue and 
patriotism; public 
and private morals 
are the same 
 
 
-Ministers as 
fathers to the 
people; Leaders 
should follow the 
scriptures to 
promote justice 
 
 
-Respect the law; 
punish those who 
disturb society; 
He may establish 
religion; But he 
must prevent 
abuse of 
established 
religion; Exercise 
government for 
the good of the 
state 
 
____________ 
 
 
Trenchard and 
Gordon  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hooker 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vattel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________ 
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-Expected and 
normative are the 
same if a 
philosopher-king 
is ruling. 
 
-Help men 
achieve the 
ultimate goal of 
human happiness 
 
 
-Rule under the 
law; Promote the 
4 cardinal virtues: 
moderation, 
courage, justice, 
prudence 
 
-Foment 
rebellions as 
diversions; live in 
the principality; 
use fear and 
terror to create 
obedience; 
perform cruel 
deeds well 
(quickly); make 
subjects 
dependent; 
concern himself 
Plato 
 
 
 
 
 
Aristotle 
 
 
 
 
 
Aquinas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Machiavelli 
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with war & read 
history; act 
immorally if 
necessary to 
preserve himself 
(this is moral); try 
to be thought 
merciful; use 
trickery; never 
lack for advice. 
 
-Distribute 
burdens equally 
and frugally 
 
-Suppress 
faction; Force 
man to be free if 
necessary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hobbes 
 
 
 
Rousseau 
 
What were the 
assumptions 
of leadership 
held by 
American 
Statesmen 
during the 
Constitutional 
Convention 
and ratification 
debates? 
What should 
leaders not do 
(normatively)? 
 
They should not 
misuse power 
w/o corrupt 
advisors 
 
 
 
 
-Should not act 
tyrannically/ for 
their own ends 
 
 
Blackstone  
 
 
 
 
Grotius 
 
 
Locke 
 
 
 
 
Berelson 
(1952); 
Pool 
(1959); 
Mark 
(1996) 
 
Ironically, 
leaders were 
normatively 
not supposed 
to do almost 
exactly what 
they were 
expected to 
do--abuse 
power. They 
should not 
abuse power 
through 
The 
Statesmen 
reasoned that 
civil leaders 
should not 
normatively 
abuse power, 
based on their 
own 
assumptions, 
they love 
power, have a 
difficult time 
They 
concluded that 
the bridge 
between 
expected and 
normative can 
be overcome 
by harnessing 
the nature of 
man as an ally 
to prevent 
leaders from 
abuse and 
Examine and 
compare 
governmental 
systems in 
which the 
expectation of 
what leaders 
should and 
should not do 
is 
fundamentally 
different (e.g., 
a tribal system 
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-To rule only for 
themselves is the 
definition of a 
tyrant; The king 
has no right to do 
wrong 
 
 
 
 
 
-King should not 
usurp the 
parliament with 
proclamations  
 
-Should not 
pervert the trust 
they have been 
given; should not 
govern for 
themselves alone 
(tyranny); 
exercise 
perogative; 
unnecessarily 
restrain natural 
liberty; shouldn 
not make 
bargains at the 
public expense 
 
Milton 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Montesquieu 
 
 
Sidney 
 
 
 
 
Trenchard and 
Gordon  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sudden 
changes or 
through 
gradual 
usurpation,  
through 
taxation, 
through an 
aristocracy, 
the legislature, 
the executive, 
the judiciary, a 
standing army, 
under foreign 
influence, 
aggrandizing 
themselves, or 
oppressing a 
minority.  
 
 
relinquishing 
power. 
 
corruption. in which a 
chief holds all 
power).  
Examine 
systems or 
confederations 
such as the 
United Nations 
in which the 
member states 
do not share 
consensus as 
to what 
leaders should 
and should not 
normatively 
do.  
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Leaders should 
not keep 
company with the 
wicked 
 
-Should not 
spread a taste for 
luxury and 
licentiousness; if 
he establishes 
religion, he 
cannot violate 
individual 
conscience; he 
should not 
consider tax 
money his own. 
 
____________ 
-He should not 
always tell the 
truth; He should 
not act but for the 
good of society 
 
-Avoid vices; 
don’t get bogged 
down in 
theoretical 
philosophical 
disputes 
 
Hooker, T. 
 
 
 
 
Vattel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________ 
Plato 
 
 
 
 
 
Aristotle 
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-He should not 
enable another 
leader to become 
powerful; He 
should not be 
generous--except 
with other 
people’s 
possessions; He 
should not be tied 
to his word. 
 
 
 
 
He should have 
no interests other 
than the General 
Will 
 
 
 
 
 
Aquinas 
 
 
Machiavelli 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hobbes 
 
 
Rousseau 
 
What were the 
assumptions 
of leadership 
held by 
American 
How can the 
gap between 
expected and 
normative 
behavior be 
The Constitution 
will protect the 
rights and 
liberties of the 
people by 
Framers of the 
Constitution 
(e.g., Madison) 
 
 
Berelson 
(1952); 
Pool 
(1959); 
Mark 
The 
Constitution 
was a device 
to close the 
gap through 
The 
mechanisms 
in the 
Constitution 
were only 
Through these 
elaborate 
mechanisms, 
the Statesmen 
reasoned that 
Examine the 
success or 
failure (as 
measured by 
rights and 
Appendix A 
  
Overarching 
Operational 
Research 
Questions 
Specific 
Research 
Questions 
Variable(s) 
Theory 
Supporting 
Hypotheses 
Data 
Collection 
Methods 
Findings Analysis Conclusions& Implications 
Future 
Research 
Statesmen 
during the 
Constitutional 
Convention 
and ratification 
debates? 
bridged under 
the US 
constitution? 
causing leaders 
to perform 
normative, not 
expected 
behaviors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1996) 
 
soft restraints 
and hard 
restraints. Soft 
restraints 
included: the 
jealousy of the 
people, the 
connection to 
the people 
through 
representation 
including 
duration of 
term, size of 
the 
representative 
body, 
maintaining 
the same 
interest as the 
leader, 
responsibility 
to the people, 
and the theory 
of faction.  
Hard restraints 
included three 
distinct, 
independent 
branches of 
the federal 
government 
necessary in 
light of the 
assumptions 
the Statesmen 
held about the 
nature of man, 
power, the 
people and 
government. 
 
leaders who 
were: 
a) depraved 
b) are 
universally the 
same  
c) love power 
would find that 
the path to 
their goals 
were more 
easily attained 
by following 
the normative 
rules for 
leaders than 
by attempting 
to subdue the 
meta-leader, 
the people 
liberties) of 
governmental 
systems that 
a) fail to bridge 
this gap 
between 
expected and 
normative 
behavior 
b) do not 
acknowledge 
a gap between 
expected and 
normative 
behavior 
c) have no 
mechanism 
such as a 
Constitution to 
control 
leaders. 
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armed with 
defensive 
powers, the 
sharp division 
between 
federal and 
state power, 
the electoral 
college, 
impeachment, 
and the 
Constitution 
itself.    
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Appendix B  
The Proverbs on Leadership 
Righteousness: 
Proverbs 11:11 Through the blessing of the upright a city is exalted, but by the mouth of 
the wicked it is destroyed. 
Proverbs 14:19 Evil men will bow down in the presence of the good, and the wicked at 
the gates of the righteous. 
Proverbs 14:34 Righteousness exalts a nation, but sin is a disgrace to any people.  
Proverbs 16:12 Kings detest wrongdoing, for a throne is established through 
righteousness.  
Proverbs 21:11 When a mocker is punished, the simple gain wisdom; when a wise man is 
instructed, he gets knowledge. 
Proverbs 29:2 When the righteous thrive, the people rejoice; when the wicked rule, the 
people groan.  
Proverbs 29:16 When the wicked thrive, so does sin, but the righteous will see their 
downfall.  
Proverbs 29:27 The righteous detest the dishonest; the wicked detest the upright. 
Justice: 
Proverbs 16:10 The lips of a king speak as an oracle, and his mouth should not betray 
justice. 
Proverbs 17:15 Acquitting the guilty and condemning the innocent-the LORD detests 
them both. 
Proverbs 17:23 A wicked man accepts a bribe in secret to pervert the course of justice. 
 242
Proverbs 18:5 It is not good to be partial to the wicked or to deprive the innocent of 
justice. 
Proverbs 19:28 A corrupt witness mocks at justice, and the mouth of the wicked gulps 
down evil. 
Proverbs 20:8 When a king sits on his throne to judge, he winnows out all evil with his 
eyes.  
Proverbs 20:10 Differing weights and differing measures-the LORD detests them both. 
Proverbs 20:23 The LORD detests differing weights, and dishonest scales do not please 
him. 
Proverbs 20:26 A wise king winnows out the wicked; he drives the threshing wheel over 
them. 
Proverbs 24:21 Fear the LORD and the king, my son, and do not join with the rebellious, 
Proverbs 25:5 remove the wicked from the king's presence, and his throne will be 
established through righteousness.  
 Proverbs 28:5 Evil men do not understand justice, but those who seek the LORD 
understand it fully. 
Proverbs 28:16 A tyrannical ruler lacks judgment, but he who hates ill-gotten gain will 
enjoy a long life. 
Proverbs 28:28 When the wicked rise to power, people go into hiding; but when the 
wicked perish, the righteous thrive. 
Proverbs 29:4 By justice a king gives a country stability, but one who is greedy for bribes 
tears it down.  
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Proverbs 29:7 The righteous care about justice for the poor, but the wicked have no such 
concern.  
Proverbs 29:14 If a king judges the poor with fairness, his throne will always be secure.  
Proverbs 29:26 Many seek an audience with a ruler, but it is from the LORD that man 
gets justice.  
 Proverbs 31:8 "Speak up for those who cannot speak for themselves, for the rights of all 
who are destitute. Speak up and judge fairly; defend the rights of the poor and needy."  
Corruption: 
Proverbs 17:8 A bribe is a charm to the one who gives it; wherever he turns, he succeeds. 
Proverbs 17:11 An evil man is bent only on rebellion; a merciless official will be sent 
against him. 
Proverbs 17:15 Acquitting the guilty and condemning the innocent-the LORD detests 
them both. 
Proverbs 17:23 A wicked man accepts a bribe in secret to pervert the course of justice. 
Proverbs 17:26 It is not good to punish an innocent man, or to flog officials for their 
integrity. 
Proverbs 18:5 It is not good to be partial to the wicked or to deprive the innocent of 
justice. 
Proverbs 19:28 A corrupt witness mocks at justice, and the mouth of the wicked gulps 
down evil. 
Proverbs 28:5 Evil men do not understand justice, but those who seek the LORD 
understand it fully. 
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Proverbs 28:28 When the wicked rise to power, people go into hiding; but when the 
wicked perish, the righteous thrive. 
Proverbs 29:4 By justice a king gives a country stability, but one who is greedy for bribes 
tears it down.  
 Proverbs 29:16 When the wicked thrive, so does sin, but the righteous will see their 
downfall.  
 Proverbs 29:27 The righteous detest the dishonest; the wicked detest the upright. 
Oppression of the poor:  
Proverbs 14:31 He who oppresses the poor shows contempt for their Maker, but whoever 
is kind to the needy honors God. 
Proverbs 15:15 All the days of the oppressed are wretched, but the cheerful heart has a 
continual feast. 
Proverbs 17:5 He who mocks the poor shows contempt for their Maker; whoever gloats 
over disaster will not go unpunished. 
Proverbs 18:23 A poor man pleads for mercy, but a rich man answers harshly. 
Proverbs 21:11 When a mocker is punished, the simple gain wisdom; when a wise man is 
instructed, he gets knowledge. 
Proverbs 22:2 Rich and poor have this in common: The LORD is the Maker of them all. 
Proverbs 22:22 Do not exploit the poor because they are poor and do not crush the needy 
in court, Proverbs 22:23 for the LORD will take up their case and will plunder those who 
plunder them. 
Proverbs 28:3 A ruler who oppresses the poor is like a driving rain that leaves no crops. 
Proverbs 29:14 If a king judges the poor with fairness, his throne will always be secure.  
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Proverbs 31:8 "Speak up for those who cannot speak for themselves, for the rights of all 
who are destitute. Speak up and judge fairly; defend the rights of the poor and needy."  
Self-government: 
Proverbs 6:6 Go to the ant, you sluggard; consider its ways and be wise!  
Proverbs 6:7 It has no commander, no overseer or ruler,  
Proverbs 6:8 yet it stores its provisions in summer and gathers its food at harvest.  
Proverbs 6:9 How long will you lie there, you sluggard? When will you get up from your 
sleep?  
Proverbs 6:10 A little sleep, a little slumber, a little folding of the hands to rest-  
Proverbs 6:11 and poverty will come on you like a bandit and scarcity like an armed man. 
Proverbs 12:24 Diligent hands will rule, but laziness ends in slave labor. 
Proverbs 16:32 Better a patient man than a warrior, a man who controls his temper than 
one who takes a city. 
Proverbs 17:2 A wise servant will rule over a disgraceful son, and will share the 
inheritance as one of the brothers. 
Proverbs 20:18 Make plans by seeking advice; if you wage war, obtain guidance. 
Proverbs 20:23 The LORD detests differing weights, and dishonest scales do not please 
him. 
Proverbs 22:29 Do you see a man skilled in his work? He will serve before kings; he will 
not serve before obscure men.
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Appendix C  
Glossary of Terms 
Abuse of Power – Power handled incorrectly or outside the jurisdiction of the leader. 
Assumption (See presupposition) –  
Attainder – stained, blackened, marked with a loss of civil rights (possibly hereditary)  
Anti-Federalist – Name of those who opposed the ratification of the Constitution 
Double Jeopardy – being charged twice for the same crime by the same court 
Executive – The leader or branch of government charged with carrying out the law 
Ex Post Facto – Law passed after the fact 
Framer – one who had a part in crafting the Constitution and signed(or would have 
signed) the document.  
Freedom – an absence of constraints such as a state of nature 
Federalist – Name of those who supported the passage of the Constitution 
Judiciary – the branch of civil government that interprets the law and assigns penalties for 
transgressions of the law. 
Leader – for this study, a leader is an officeholder or one in a position to influence others 
Legislature – the branch of civil government that makes the laws and represents the 
people. 
Liberty – distinguished from freedom, liberty is a system in which minimal constraints 
allow all parties the maximum freedom without infringing the rights of any one party 
over another. 
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Militia – the whole body of able men capable of bearing arms to form a military force in 
case of rebellion or invasion. The militia is distinguished from a standing army in that a 
militia is a part time or temporary body. 
Passions – the psychology of the Statesmen. The passions were based on the Christian 
theological conception of the depravity of the nature of man. 
Presupposition – A filter through which reality is screened, an assumption that 
conclusions are built upon. 
Standing Army – a professional body of soldiers at the disposal of the civil government 
continually training for armed conflict. 
Statesman – in this study Statesmen included all leaders, local, state and federal who 
were involved in the Constitutional debates from 1787-1789 
Tyrant – a leader who uses his power for personal gain or simply outside his authorized 
jurisdiction 
Veto – the Executive’s power of denying a law made by the legislature. A veto can be 
overridden with a supermajority of the legislature. 
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Appendix D  
Primary Source British Documents in Constitutional Development 
 
Magna Carta (1215) 
 
Confirmatio Cartarum (1297) 
The Petition of Right (1628) 
Abolition of the Star Chamber (1641) 
Habeas Corpus Act (1679) 
English Bill of Rights (1689) 
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Appendix E  
Primary Documents in American Legal Development 
I.  Early Colonial Charters 
First Charter of Virginia (1607) 
Mayflower Compact (1620) 
Ordinances for Virginia (1621) 
Charter of Massachusetts Bay (1629) 
Charter of Maryland (1632) 
Fundamental Orders of Connecticut (1639)  
Massachusetts Body of Liberties (1641) 
Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (1663)  
Concessions and agreements of West New Jersey (1677) 
Frame of Government of Pennsylvania  1682) 
Pennsylvania Charter of Privileges (1701) 
 
II. American Founding Documents 
Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress (1765) 
A Declaration Setting Forth the Causes and Necessity of Their Taking Up Arms (1774) 
Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress (1775)  
Articles of Association (1774) 
 
III. Early State Constitutions 
Constitution of Virginia (1776) 
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Constitution of Pennsylvania (1776) 
Delaware Declaration of Rights (1776) 
Constitution of Maryland (1776) 
Constitution of North Carolina (1776) 
Constitution of Vermont (1777) 
Constitution of Massachusetts (1780) 
Constitution of New Hampshire (1784) 
 
IV. Organic Documents of the United States 
The Declaration of Independence (1776) 
Articles of Confederation (1777) 
Northwest Ordinance (1787) 
The Constitution of the United States (1787) 
 
 251
Appendix F  
God in the American Legal Heritage 
Below are citations of church and state relations in the American Legal Heritage. 
Section 1 deals with references to God. Section 2 deals primarily with religious 
qualifications in the British/American legal heritage from the Magna Carta to the 
Constitution: 
Almightie God, His Divine Majesty (First Charter of Virginia, 1606, p.1). 
GOD (Mayflower Compact, 1620). 
Divine Assistance (Ordinance for Virginia, 1621, I). 
our Lord God (Abolition of the Star Chamber, 1641, III). 
God (Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, 1677, Chapter XVI, XXIII). 
God, Divine Power, Second Adam, Lord, Jesus Christ, Almighty, Eternal God, Creator, 
Upholder and Ruler of the World, God (Frame of Government of Pennsylvania, 1682, 
Preface, LAWS AGREED UPON IN ENGLAND, ETC., XXXIV, XXXV, XXXVII). 
Almighty God (English Bill of Rights, 1689, 12, VII).  
Almighty God, Lord of Conscience, Father of Lights and Spirits, Author as well as object 
of divine Knowledge, Faith and Worship, God, the Creator, Upholder and Ruler of the 
world, Jesus Christ, Savior of the world (Pennsylvania Charter of Privileges, 1701, I).  
Divine Author of our Existence, great Creator, Supreme and Impartial Judge and Ruler of 
the Universe (Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms, 1775, p.1, 
p.5). 
Creator (Constitution of Virginia, 1776, Sec. 16). 
Nature's God, Supreme Being, Divine Providence (Declaration of Independence, 1776). 
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Author of Existence, Great Governor of the Universe (Constitution of Pennsylvania, 
1776, Preamble). 
Great Governor of the World (Articles of Confederation, 1777, XIII). 
Great Legislator of the Universe, Supreme Being, God. (Constitution of Massachusetts, 
1780, Preamble, Article II).  
God, the DEITY (Constitution of New Hampshire, 1784, Article V; VI). 
 
Church & State in the American Legal Heritage 
First Charter of Virginia (April 6, 1606, pgh. 3). 
“Wee, greatly commending and graciously accepting of their desires to the furtherance of 
soe noble a worke which may, by the providence of Almightie God, hereafter tende to the 
golire of His divine Majestie in propagating of Christian religion to suche people as yet 
live in darknesse and miserable ignorance of the true knowledge and worshippe of God 
and may in time bring the infidels and savages living in those parts to humane civilitie 
and to a setled and quiet governmente, doe by theise our lettres patents graciously accepte 
of and agree to theire humble and well intentioned desires;” 
 
Constitution of Virginia (June 12, 1776, SEC. 16.) 
“That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging 
it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore 
all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of 
consicence; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance love, and 
charity towards each other.” 
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Code of Virginia, Title 57. Religious and Charitable matters (January 16, 1786). 
“Whereas, Almighty God hath created the mind free; That all attempts to influence it by 
temporal punishment, or burthens, or by civil incapacitations tend only to beget habits of 
hypocracy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the Holy Author of our 
religion, who being the Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propogate it by 
coercions on either, as was in his Almighty power to do…That our civil rights have no 
dependence on our religious  opinions any more than our opinions in physics and 
geometry…” 
 
Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, Chapter XVI, March 13, 1677 
“That no men, nor number of men upon earth, hath power or authority to rule over men’s 
consciences in religious matters, therefore it is consented, agreed and ordained that no 
person or persons whatsoever within the said province, at any time or times hereafter, 
shall be in any ways upon any pretence whatosoever, called into question, or in the least 
punished or hurt, either in person, estate, or privelege, for the sake of his opinion, 
judgement, faith, or worship towards God in matters of religion. But that all and every 
such person, and persons, may from time, and at all times, freely and fully have, and 
enjoy  his and their judgements, and the exercises of their consciences in matters of 
religious worship throughout all the said Province.” 
 
Frame of Government of Pennsylvania, Laws agreed upon in England, Etc. XXXIV, 
XXXV, April 25 1862. 
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XXXIV “That all Treasurers, Judges, Masters of the Rolls, Sheriffs, Justices of the Peace 
and other officers and persons whatsoever, relating to courts, or trials of causes, or any 
other service in the government; and all Members elected to serve in provincial Council 
and General Assembly, and all that have right to elect such Members, shall be such as 
possess faith in Jesus Christ and that are not convicted of ill fame, or unsober and 
dishonest conversation, and that are of one and twenty years of age, at least; and that all 
such so qualified, shall be capable of the said several employments and privileges as 
aforesaid.” 
XXXV “That all persons living in this province, who confess and acknowledge the one 
Almighty and eternal God, to be the Creator, Upholder and Ruler of the world; and that 
hold themselves obliged in conscience to live peaceably and justly in civil society, shall 
in no ways, be molested or prejudiced for their religious persuasion, or practice, in 
matters of faith and worship, nor shall they be compelled, at any time, to frequent or 
maintain any religious worship, place or ministry whatever.” 
 
Pennsylvania Charter of Privileges, I, October 28, 1701. 
“BECAUSE no People can be truly happy, thought under the greatest Enjoyment of Civil 
Liberties, if abridged of the Freedom of the Consciences, as to their Religious Profession 
and Worship: And Almighty God being the only Lord of conscience, Father of Lights and 
Spirits; and the Author as well as the Object of all divine Knowledge, Faith and Worship, 
who only doth enlighten the Minds, and persuade and convince the Understandings of 
People, I do hereby grant and declare, That no Person or Persons, inhabiting in this 
Province, or Territories, who shall confess and acknowledge One almighty God, the 
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Creator, Upholder and Ruler of the World, and Profess him or themselves or obliged to 
live quietly under the Civil Government, Shall be in any Case molested or prejudiced, in 
his or their person or Estate, because of  his or their conscientious Persuasion or Practice, 
nor be compelled to frequent or maintain any religious Worship, Place or Ministry, 
contrary to his or their Mind, or to do or suffer any other Act or Thing, contrary to their 
religious Persuasion.” 
 
Constitution of Pennsylvania, Section II, August 16, 1776      
“That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to 
the dictates of their own consciences and understanding: And that no man ought or of 
right can be compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or support  any place of 
worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to or against, his own free will and consent: 
Nor can any man, who acknowledges the being of a God, be justly deprived or abridged 
of any civil right as a citizen, on account of his religious sentiments or peculiar mode of 
religious worship: And that no authority can or ought to be vested in, or assumed by any 
power whatever, that shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner controul, the right 
of consicence in the free exercise of worship.” 
 
Deleware Declaration of Rights Sect. 2, Sect. 3.(Sept 11, 1776). 
SECT. 2. “That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God 
according to the dictates of their own consciences and understandings; and that no man 
ought or of right can be compelled to attend any religious worship or maintain any 
ministry contrary to or against his own free will and consent, and that no authority can or 
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ought to be vested in, or assumed by any power whatever that shall in any case interfere 
with, or in any manner controul the right of conscience in the free exercise of religious 
worship.” 
 
SECT. 3. “That all persons professing the Christian religion ought forever to enjoy equal 
rightsss and privileges in this state, unless, under colour of religion, any man disturb the 
peace, the happiness or safety of a society.” 
 
Constitution of Maryland, XXXIII, (November 3, 1776) 
XXXIII “That, as it is the duty of every man to worship God in such manner as he thinks 
most acceptable to him; all persons, professing the Christian religion, are equally entitled 
to protection in their religious liberty; wherefore no person ought by any law to be 
molested in his person or estate on account of his religious persuasion or profession, or 
for his religious practice; unless, under colour of religion, any man shall disturb the good 
order, peace or safety of the state, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure others, 
in their natural, civil, or religious rights; nor ought any person to be compelled to frequet 
or maintain, or contribute, unless on contract, unless on contract, to maintain any 
particular place of worship, or any particular ministry; yet the Legislature may, in their 
discretion, lay a general and equal tax, for the support of the Christian religion; leaving to 
each individual the power of appointing the payment over of the money, collected from 
him, to the support of any particular place of worship or minister, or for the benefit of the 
poor of his own denomination, or the poor in general …” 
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Constitution of North Carolina, XIX, (December 14, 1776) 
“That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to 
the dictates of their own consciences.” 
 
Constitution of Massachusetts, Article III, (October 25, 1780). 
“As the happiness of a people, and the good order and preservation of a civil government, 
essentially depend upon piety, religion, and morality; and as these cannot be generally 
diffused through a community but by the institution of the public worship of GOD, and 
public instructions in piety, religion and morality: Therefore, to promote their happiness, 
and to secure the good order and preservation of their government, the people of this 
commonwealth have a right to invest their legislature with power to authorize and 
require, and the legislature shall, from time to time, authorize and require, the several 
towns, parishes, precincts, and other bodies politic, or religious societies to make suitable 
provision, at their own expense, for the institution of the public worship of GOD, and for 
the support and maintenance of public Protestant teachers of piety, religion, and morality, 
in all cases where such provision shall not be made voluntary…. 
“And all monies paid by the subject to the support of public worship, and of the public 
teachers aforesaid, shall, if he require it, be uniformly applied to the support of the public 
teacher or teachers of his own religious sect or denomination, provided there be any on 
whose instructions he attends; otherwise it may be paid towards the support of the teacher 
or teachers of the parish or precinct in which the said moneys are raised. 
“And every denomination of Christians, demeaning themselves peaceably, and as good 
subjects of the commonwealth, shall be equally under the protection of the law: and no 
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subordination of any one sect or denomination to another shall ever be established by 
law.” 
 
Constitution of New Hampshire, V,VI (June 2, 1784).  
V. “Every individual has a natural and unalienable right to worship GOD according to the 
dictates of his own conscience, and reason; and no subject shall be hurt, molested, or 
restrained in his person, liberty or estate for worshipping GOD, in the manner and season 
most agreeable to his own conscience, or for his religious profession, sentiments or 
persuasion; provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or disturb others, in their 
religious worship.” 
VI. “As morality and peity, rightly grounded on evangelical principles, will give the best 
and greatest security to government, and will lay in the hearts of men the strongest 
obligations to due subjection; and as the knowledge of these, is most likely to be 
propagated through a society by the institution of the public worship of the DEITY, and 
of public instruction in morality and religion; therefore, to promote those important 
purposes, the people of this state have a right to impower, and do hereby fully impower 
the leglislature to authorize from time to time, the several towns, parishes, bodies 
corporate, or religious societies within this state, to make adequate provision at their own 
expence, for the support and maintenance of public protestant teachers of piety, religion 
and morality.  
“Provided notwithstanding, That several towns, parishes, bodies-corporate or religious 
societies, shall at all times have the exclusive right of electing their own public teachers, 
and of contracting with them for their support and maintenance. And no portion of any 
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one particular religious sect or denomination shall ever be compelled to pay toward the 
support of the teacher or teachers of another persuasion, sect or denomination. 
“And every denomination of christians demeaning themselves quietly, and as good 
subjects of the state, shall be equally under the protection of the law: and no 
subordination of any one sect or denomination to another, shall ever be established by 
law.” 
 
Northwest Ordinance, Article III (July 13, 1787). 
“Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the 
happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.” 
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Appendix G  
Constitution of the United States of America 
 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish 
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the 
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do 
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.  
 
Article. I. 
Section. 1. 
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, 
which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.  
Section. 2. 
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year 
by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the 
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State 
Legislature.  
No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five 
Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when 
elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.  
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which 
may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be 
determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to 
Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other 
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Persons.33 The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first 
Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten 
Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall 
not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one 
Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire 
shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence 
Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, 
Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and 
Georgia three.  
When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority 
thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.  
The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall 
have the sole Power of Impeachment.  
Section. 3. 
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, 
chosen by the Legislature thereof for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.  
Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall 
be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first 
Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the 
Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so 
that one third may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by 
                                                 
33 Note: Underlines in the text denote that that particular provision was later amended. 
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Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the 
Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the 
Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.  
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and 
been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an 
Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.  
The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no 
Vote, unless they be equally divided.  
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the 
Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the 
United States.  
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that 
Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is 
tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the 
Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.  
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, 
and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the 
United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to 
Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.  
Section. 4. 
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, 
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shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any 
time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.  
The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on 
the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.  
Section. 5. 
Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own 
Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller 
Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance 
of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may 
provide.  
Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for 
disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.  
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the 
same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and 
Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of 
those Present, be entered on the Journal.  
Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, 
adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two 
Houses shall be sitting.  
Section. 6. 
The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be 
ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all 
Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during 
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their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning 
from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be 
questioned in any other Place.  
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be 
appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have 
been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time; 
and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either 
House during his Continuance in Office.  
Section. 7. 
All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the 
Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.  
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, 
before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States: If he approve 
he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it 
shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and 
proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree 
to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by 
which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it 
shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined 
by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be 
entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the 
President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, 
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the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by 
their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.  
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of 
Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be 
presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, 
shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of 
the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations 
prescribed in the Case of a Bill.  
Section. 8. 
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to 
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United 
States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;  
To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;  
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes;  
To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies throughout the United States;  
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of 
Weights and Measures;  
To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the 
United States;  
To establish Post Offices and post Roads;  
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To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;  
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;  
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences 
against the Law of Nations;  
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning 
Captures on Land and Water;  
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a 
longer Term than two Years;  
To provide and maintain a Navy;  
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;  
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress 
Insurrections and repel Invasions;  
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such 
Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the 
States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the 
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;  
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not 
exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance 
of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise 
like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in 
which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and 
other needful Buildings;--And  
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To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of 
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.  
Section. 9. 
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall 
think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one 
thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such 
Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.  
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases 
of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.  
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.  
No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or 
enumeration herein before directed to be taken.  
No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.  
No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of 
one State over those of another; nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged 
to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.  
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations 
made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of 
all public Money shall be published from time to time.  
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any 
Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of 
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any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, 
or foreign State.  
Section. 10. 
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque 
and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin 
a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.  
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on 
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection 
Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or 
Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall 
be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.  
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, 
or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another 
State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such 
imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.  
 
 
Article. II. 
Section. 1. 
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He 
shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice 
President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:  
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Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number 
of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the 
State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person 
holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an 
Elector.  
The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of 
whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they 
shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; 
which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government 
of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate 
shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the 
Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number 
of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of 
Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an 
equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by 
Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five 
highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President. But in 
chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each 
State having one Vote; A quorum for this purpose shall consist of a Member or Members 
from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a 
Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest 
Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain 
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two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice 
President.  
The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which 
they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.  
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of 
the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall 
any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five 
Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.  
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or 
Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on 
the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, 
Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what 
Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the 
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.  
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which 
shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been 
elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United 
States, or any of them.  
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or 
Affirmation:--"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of 
President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and 
defend the Constitution of the United States."  
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Section. 2. 
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, 
and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United 
States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the 
executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective 
Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the 
United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.  
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make 
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and 
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the 
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which 
shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such 
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in 
the Heads of Departments.  
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the 
Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their 
next Session.  
Section. 3. 
He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, 
and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and 
expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, 
and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, 
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he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors 
and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and 
shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.  
Section. 4. 
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed 
from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors.  
 
 
Article III. 
Section. 1. 
The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, 
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, 
and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be 
diminished during their Continuance in Office.  
Section. 2. 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which 
the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;-- 
between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States;--
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between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and 
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.  
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in 
which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the 
other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both 
as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress 
shall make.  
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial 
shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not 
committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress 
may by Law have directed.  
Section. 3. 
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in 
adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of 
Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on 
Confession in open Court.  
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of 
Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the 
Person attainted.  
 
 
Article. IV. 
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Section. 1. 
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial 
Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the 
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect 
thereof.  
Section. 2. 
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in 
the several States.  
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from 
Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the 
State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction 
of the Crime.  
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into 
another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from 
such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such 
Service or Labour may be due.  
Section. 3. 
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be 
formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by 
the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the 
Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.  
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations 
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in 
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this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or 
of any particular State.  
Section. 4. 
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of 
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the 
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against 
domestic Violence.  
 
 
Article. V. 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose 
Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds 
of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either 
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified 
by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three 
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the 
Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One 
thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses 
in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be 
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.  
 
 
Article. VI. 
 276
All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this 
Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under 
the Confederation.  
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.  
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several 
State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and 
of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; 
but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public 
Trust under the United States.  
 
 
Article. VII. 
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the 
Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.  
The Word, "the," being interlined between the seventh and eighth Lines of the first Page, 
the Word "Thirty" being partly written on an Erazure in the fifteenth Line of the first 
Page, The Words "is tried" being interlined between the thirty second and thirty third 
Lines of the first Page and the Word "the" being interlined between the forty third and 
forty fourth Lines of the second Page.  
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Attest William Jackson Secretary 
Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth 
Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven 
and of the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth In witness whereof 
We have hereunto subscribed our Names,  
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G°. Washington  
Presidt and deputy from Virginia  
Delaware 
Geo: Read 
Gunning Bedford jun 
John Dickinson  
Richard Bassett 
Jaco: Broom  
Maryland 
James McHenry  
Dan of St Thos. Jenifer 
Danl. Carroll  
Virginia 
John Blair 
James Madison Jr.  
North Carolina 
Wm. Blount 
Richd. Dobbs Spaight 
Hu Williamson  
South Carolina 
J. Rutledge 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney 
Charles Pinckney 
Pierce Butler  
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Georgia 
William Few 
Abr Baldwin  
New Hampshire 
John Langdon 
Nicholas Gilman  
Massachusetts 
Nathaniel Gorham 
Rufus King  
Connecticut 
Wm. Saml. Johnson 
Roger Sherman  
New York 
Alexander Hamilton  
New Jersey 
Wil: Livingston 
David Brearley 
Wm. Paterson 
Jona: Dayton  
Pennsylvania 
B Franklin 
Thomas Mifflin 
Robt. Morris 
Geo. Clymer 
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Thos. FitzSimons 
Jared Ingersoll 
James Wilson 
Gouv Morris 
